R. Scott Brown
Political Science 407
Mid-term Essay
5/5/01

 

 

 

A Fire Cracker in Your Fist: The Failure of Czarist Russia

 

 

“ There’s nothing in the middle of the road but yellow lines and dead armadillos”

-          James Hightower

 

Standing in between two courses of action is like standing in the middle of the road. It is an excellent place to be hit by a truck. This is what happened to Czarist Russia, when in 1917, two hundred years of waffling on reform policy (epitomized by Nicolas the II) put the old order square on the front grill of the revolution.

From the view of a reformist this was a logical consequence from the lack of dedication to policies that would have put Russia on a more solid path. The Czar’s unwillingness (or inability) to modernize or empower governmental systems along more western models (such as constitutional monarchies) and failure to liberalize the economy, was a problem with deep roots.

 

The Fuse is Lit…

Once Peter the Great exposed Russia a to a West under going the age of reason and the liberal philosophy it entailed, the days of the Czar absolute power were numbered. Perhaps Peter thought that he could control the flow of ideas, selecting those he wished and suppressing all others. This strategy may have worked and indeed did for the short term. However with the founding of higher education institutions, the mechanism of spreading, preserving and development of western style “rationalism” or reform ideology was given a foothold in Russia. Although this vine would not bare fruit through the reign of several Czars, it would eventually grow to choke the life from the Romanoff regime.

 

Fuel to the Fire…

Through oppression within Russia and distraction without (in particular the Nepolionic wars) reform in any really meaning sense, was put off until the rule of Alexander the II. Under the rule of Alexander II, Russia under went its greatest moves toward reform. The Crimean war lost, the glaring shortcomings of where Russia stood in its ability to survive in the modern age became apparent to the staunchest conservative. Poor roads and trains lead to the inability of Russia’s army to get to the fighting. Even Nicholas I advised his son for the need to take action in the direction of reform. Alexander II administration moved far ahead toward building a new society, freeing the serfs, new local governance bodies (the Zemstvos), a more open press and land reform. In each case though the reforms fell fall short of there promise.  The serfs freed, had to stay within their village communities.  The Zemstvos had no political power beyond limited scope of local affairs. The press though given greater freedom was still highly censored. Land reform was, at best, very poor and at worst resembled share cropping and Jim Crow in reconstructionist America following the civil war. The one reform which did seem to enjoy some success at this time was elementary education for the lower classes, this leading to a more educated and political astute population. It can be viewed that in the long laundry list of blunders the failure to enact State Councils was among the most critical in the long term. Considered by his father (who approved it the morning of his assassination) the idea of State Councils was abandoned by Alexandra III under pressure of conservatives among his advisers. Without this step in the governing process the national issues raised at the local levels had no place to be addressed. The situation was a boiler with no where for the pressure to go. All that was required for a disaster was for the heat to be turned up.

 

The Iron fist close as the fuse runs out…

With ascent of Nicholas II Russia found itself ruled by one of its weakest Czars. Lack of vision for the nation and failure to deal with the realities of the pressures upon a modern nation/state, both within and with out, set the stage for the end. This would not just be the end of the rule of the Czars, but of the reform as envisioned by a majority of Russians seeking it.

Failed foreign policy, the most spectacular example, the loss of the Russia-Japan war in 1905, lead to low moral in the military.  Civil unrest at home, which was brutality suppressed, plagued Nicolas II rule and undermined public support. Even the halfhearted attempts at continued reforms displayed a lack of understanding of the situation. The election of the first Duma over turned by the Czar for being liberal. The second Duma meeting the same fate, showed a cynical approach to the newest threat to Czarist rule, public opinion. The crack down on reformist with thousands killed or missing in attempt to restore control did little more than radicalize those oppressed.

With the outbreak of World War I, the last Czar marched an under equipped, under prepared and under governed Russia into war and the arms of revolutionaries that Czarist policy had created. The devastating defeats of the war, famine and the long building unrest in both civil society and the military came to a head in 1917.  The” controlled” changes guided by the armored hand of the Czar reached critical mass and blew apart that iron hand as it squeezed harder for control.

 

What if…

A conservative viewing this situation might call for a closing of Russian to the outside world and a more authoritarian model domestically to preserve the Czarist regime. There are several flaws with this model, the least of which the failure to take into accounts changes both internal and external to Russia. A stronger policy of isolation and internal repression may vary well have saved the Czar from revolution for some time (indeed as it had in the past), however this would have left Russia far behind a rapidly modernizing world.

In a world of faster communications that brought greater outside contact, it was becoming impossible to stop the flow of ideas; the stories of every day luxuries in other places that Russians did not share. The growing interconnection of the world’s economy and its importance to the modern nation/state made retreat a perilous choice. Mass mechanized warfare reduced the protection size once afforded and the door would then have been opened to greater danger of Russia being broken down and then apart by more modernized states. A prime example of this would the dismal failure of the Crimean war. As America leaned in 1941, isolationism is not a realist option in the modern world.

The Czars (starting with Peter) seemed to fail to realize that due to is location and size Russia it is sensitive to external changes regardless of their attempts at isolation in the modern era. This sensitivity brings about internal consequences for Russia, both then and now.

 

 A great mobilization of resources (both human and material) was needed for Russia to be competitive in this situation.  A mobilization of this scale would require a more responsive governing system, as well as a more liberal economic policy.  If they had followed the course of reform as state policy and not as a stop gap measure, the revolution, in the violate form it took, may well have been avoided.