The Irony of Western Ideas in a Multicultural World:

Russians’ Intellectual Engagement with the “End of History”

and “Clash of Civilizations”

Andrei P. Tsygankov

Departments of International Relations and Political Science, San Francisco State University

International ideas can make important contributions to how

local cultures and civilizations perceive each other. Indeed, ideas

formulated in one society can be misunderstood by the domestic

publics of another society when they are framed in an ethno-

centric or culturally exclusive manner. This essay examines the

discursive engagement with two prominent Western ideas

among the Russian political elite. These ideas are Fukuyama’s

and Huntington’s visions regarding the post-Cold War world

order.

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Should not the world order scholar try to build out from, and across, the islands of local

knowledge. . .? Carefully focused confrontations of views can be cumulative in their outcomes. Should not one try hard, with modifications appropriate to the achieving of larger truths, simultaneously to maintain the validity of as many such insights as possible? Can we not

hope to find elements of a new world society in the resulting practical syntheses? (Alker 1986: 22)

And if the theories that are available are almost exclusively Western in origin and perspective,

can they convey an adequate understanding of a world political system that is predominantly non-Western? (Bull 1972: 55)

More than half a century ago John Maynard Keynes wrote that “the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood” (as cited in McConnell and Brue 2002: 5). Since then, scholars (e.g., Odell 1982; Alker et al. 1989; Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Yee 1996; Ruggie 1998; Miliken 2001) have taken the role of ideas seriously and produced a voluminous literature on how ideas impact policies and institutional relations. Where our knowledge remains limited, however, is in understanding why ideas, formulated in one society, tend to be perceived differently, sometimes negatively, in other social contexts. What are the conditions under which potentially harmful negative perceptions occur? And, no less significantly, who bears the responsibility for such perceptions?

Consider, for example, that whereas in the West beliefs in the viability of a Western, market-oriented democracy and a human rights-centered world have become relatively well established, in the non-Western part of the world many remain wary and skeptical of such ideas. In various parts of the globe, Western-centered world order visions are often perceived as unlikely to promote a just, stable international system because of their exclusively Western orientation and lack of empathetic understanding of other cultures. It has been argued that rather than promoting the dialogue that is necessary for building an international system taking multiple perspectives into account, these ideas contribute to further isolationism and hostility among international actors (e.g., Furedi 1994; Alker et al. 1998; Rajaee 2000).

The events of September 11 reinforce the need to develop a better cross-cultural understanding among the various peoples of the world. In an attempt to contribute to the building of such understanding, this essay traces the impact of two prominent Western visions of a post-Cold War world order—Francis Fukuyama’s (1989) “end of history” and Samuel Huntington’s (1993) “clash of civilizations”—on the discourse among Russian intellectual and political elites. Both ideas were widely discussed in the non-Western world and particularly in Russia. Gaining some insight into Russians’ reactions is important because, among international events, it was primarily the failure of the Soviet institutions that shaped Fukuyama’s (1989: 3) belief in an “unabashed victory of economic and political Liberalism” (cf. Anderson 1992: 351). Fukuyama’s thesis, emerging as it did in the conservative Western context of the late-1980s, argued the case for the global ascendancy of Western style market democracy. For Huntington, Russia was conceived as a core state in one of the eight major civilizations involved in what he viewed as the coming global disorder. Indeed, he drew the attention of scholarly and policy communities to the elements of global disorder that, in the mid-1990s, were perceived to be increasingly dominant. Both views were received quite critically in the Russian context. Despite Fukuyama’s and Huntington’s intentions to contribute to the development of freedom and stability in the world, their projects were perceived in Russia as constraints to social and cross-cultural creativity, at best, and a war-prone justification for a global West-centered dictatorship, at worst. A central reason for this reaction has to do with the ethnocentric and culturally exclusive nature of the two ideas, and the inability of their authors to fully appreciate the historical, geopolitical, and institutional distinctness of the indigenous cultures to which they were applying their views.

Fukuyama’s and Huntington’s perspectives were selected because they represent examples of highly influential ideas that originated in the West and have had broad impact. Moreover, these two points of view highlight different poles or “ideal types” of Western thinking about world order: Fukuyama’s vision is hegemonic and expansionist; Huntington’s is defensive and isolationist. This essay seeks to demonstrate that however distinct these two visions may be, they were both received negatively by Russian intellectual and political elites and, ultimately, rejected by these elites.

In making this argument, the author first proposes a way of considering the impact that Western ideas can have in a multicultural world. In order to trace the impact of two Western perspectives regarding world order on the Russian cultural community, we then undertake an analysis of the political discourse that more generally characterizes the Russian scholarly and policymaking elite. Although discourse analysis does not lead to cumulative knowledge in the manner of natural science, we are able, nonetheless, “to identify the assumptions that are made in each camp, probe them, juxtapose them, [and] relate them to circumstances” (Bull 1992: xxii). Such analysis can provide valuable insights into the nature of current foreign policy debates and their policy implications. Following a methodology developed by Martin Wight (1992), several distinct schools of thought are identified among the Russian political elite that have emerged since the beginning of Gorbachev’s Perestroika and their reactions to Fukuyama’s and Huntington’s visions are traced across time. In effect, this essay examines how two Western ideas participated in domestic political discourse in Russia, were perceived by this discourse, and contributed to its changes.

Western Ideas in a Multicultural World

Modern world history can be viewed as a product of Western ideas traveling across cultures and continents. For the purposes of this study, ideas are defined as the normative beliefs and worldviews held by individuals, groups, and societies that are relevant to understanding global regularities. For example, imperialism, as a politically and socially institutionalized idea, has been important in shaping the world since at least the 17th century, whereas socialist and liberal ideas were behind many institutional developments in the 19^th and 20^th centuries (Bull and Watson 1984; Hall 1996; Doyle 1997; Opello and Rosow 1999: 100-123, 162-164).

Ideas are rarely disbursed without meeting resistance. Because they are born as expressions of a particular cultural context, ideas travel at various speeds, through different channels, overcome various forms of institutional resistance, and function differently in different cultural contexts (Wiarda 1981; Alker et al. 1989; Waever 1998; Tsygankov, forthcoming). Quite often ideas are perceived negatively and may be transformed almost beyond recognition. Arguably, the latter is what happened with Marxism in its Leninist interpretation in Russia, which is why Georgi Plekhanov, Julius Martov, and many other social democrats ceased their political collaboration with Lenin in the early 20th century (Neumann 1996: 74-79, 110). In a similar way, the originally defensive and inclusive ideas surrounding Nationalism traveled to 19^th century Germany and elsewhere in a racist, exclusive, and hate-filled form (Seton-Watson 1977: 89-100; Opello and Rosow 1999: 123-130, 188-189). The spread of Liberal ideas at the end of 20^th century, too, as this essay intends to show, have had their own peculiar paths.

Two interrelated factors need to be explored in any attempt to understand cultural perception: (1) the degree of ethnocentrism embodied in the idea or ideology on the part of the promoter of the idea and (2) the structure of the local culture that is receiving the idea.. The beliefs and worldviews comprising ideas are perceived negatively if they are considered by those receiving them to threaten world peace and order based on the terms of reference of those doing the receiving. Such a result is most likely when the idea and its assumptions, substances, and implications are formulated in ethnocentric terms.

Ethnocentrism, defined as the belief that one’s own culture represents the natural and best way to do things (see, e.g., LeVine 1965; LeVine and Campbell 1972; Brewer and Campbell 1976; Van der Dennen 1987), is rooted in certain institutional, societal, and civilizational structures and discursive assumptions (cf. Harding 1998). An idea is ethnocentric if it proclaims a commitment to the set of values espoused by a particular environment and is closed to possible dialogue with, and fertilization from, the cultures which are receiving it. Ethnocentric ideas exhibit three characteristics: (1) are considered morally superior, exclusive, and essentialist, (2) view any others and their ideas as morally inferior and potentially threatening to the group proposing the original idea, and (3) encourage the advocacy or defense of the proponents’ values and interests. The adherents to ethnocentric ideas are willing to promote their visions outside their own social universe because these ideas are “virtuous” and “good.” Ethnocentrism can be contrasted with culturally sensitive visions that (1) define one’s own group and its moral values as open to negotiation rather than as absolute, exclusive, and essentialist; (2) view others as different, but morally equal, and, for that reason, as a source of potential information; and (3) promote negotiation as a way of resolving conflict that seeks to establish mutually acceptable norms.

Ethnocentrism has strong roots in the field of international relations and continues to be an impediment to the development of scholarship that is more sensitive to local cultures, makes less rigid assumptions, and—for that matter—is more open to global dialogue with scholars from all over the world. Being “an American Social Science” (Hoffmann 1977), international relations is an area of inquiry that reflects and perpetuates the Western civilizational vision and remains relatively closed to influences from the rest of the world (see Alker and Biersteker 1984; Holsti 1985; Kahler 1993; Inayatullah and Blaney 1996; Waever 1998; Audinli and Mathews 2000).

Some ideas in international relations are more ethnocentric than others. Most debates in this domain typically reveal degrees of ethnocentrism. To illustrate this point, let us briefly consider the “democracies don’t fight each other” thesis. One critique (Oren 1996) of this proposal argues that the social circumstances in which democratic orders take root vary considerably. In some cases, such social settings are far from conducive to the promotion of peace and stability. For example, in the postcommunist context, democratization may become a permissive condition allowing the re-emergence and rise of a previously dormant militant ethnic nationalism. As a result, not only do some of the newly established democracies go to war against each other, but they do so, at least in part, as a result of their movement away from authoritarianism (see, e.g., Brown et al. 1996; MacFarlane 1997).

Typically, ideas perceived as ethnocentric are those advancing either cosmopolitan or realist visions of the world. These two visions offer mutually exclusive images of the world by neglecting the dialectical nature of global versus local interactions and overemphasizing either local or global sources of moral authority. Cosmopolitan writers (see, e.g., Gellner 1983; Fukuyama 1989; Doyle 1996; Taylor 1996) are fully aware of the increasingly globalized character of world politics and, thus, maintain an image of a progressively culturally homogeneous global society, often overlooking the forces of identity and diversity. For conservative cosmopolitans such as Fukuyama, this homogeneous cultural development in global society is viewed as linked to the progress of Western civilization. For cosmopolitans of a more radical orientation (e.g., Gellner 1983; Taylor 1996), Westernized modernity may mean regress and enslavement, but the end result is also homogeneous and identity-insensitive. In contrast, realists (e.g., Posen 1993; Huntington 1996) advance a highly particularistic vision of the international system in which local cultures compete for power and resources under conditions of anarchy. For cultural realists such as Huntington, this competition means an inevitable “clash” and often leads to the opposition of the “West against the rest” (Huntington 1993a: 43).

Understanding the nature of another party’s culture is also important to the transmission of ideas. Most cultures are not homogeneous, but contain at least three distinct yet mutually interrelated groups: a leadership, a political elite, and a larger society. Each group generally possesses its own attitudes and internal structures and/or institutions. For an idea to be received by another culture, it must go through a set of stages that include piquing the initial interest of opinion leaders in that other culture, being actively debated within the political elite, and becoming distributed more broadly within the society. It is worth emphasizing here that the process by which an idea is incorporated into a society’s beliefs and worldviews is usually not linear nor predetermined and typically is affected by people’s historical experiences and present concerns (Jervis 1968, 1976, 1992).

Russian Foreign Policy Discourse

In order to trace the impact of Western ideas on Russian culture, it is useful to first identify the existing spectrum of foreign policy attitudes and schools of thought in Russian society. Since Gorbachev’s reform, at least four broad schools of thought have emerged that characterize Russian foreign policy discourse in the post-Soviet era. Each school has its own image of what a stable and secure Russia should look like. They may be loosely identified with Wight’s (1992: 7-8) typology of theoretical traditions in international relations: (a) those who emphasize international anarchy and control; (b) those who concentrate on international interactions as a civilizing force in world politics; and (c) those who are interested in seeing various transformations in the international system. In the Russian context, this typology yields the following groupings: Liberals, Social Democrats, Statists, and National Communists (see Light 1996; Tsygankov 1997; Shlapentokh 1998; Sergounin 2000).

The Liberal school of thought is generally pro-Western in its orientation and is widely associated with the early “Democratic Russia” movement and politicians such as Yegor Gaidar and Andrei Kozyrev, who held key government positions during the early stages of Russia’s post-communist transformation. Liberals contend that, during the Cold War, Russia acted against its own interests and must now do everything possible to become an integral part of the West. The West is perceived as the world’s only viable and progressive civilization. The main threats to Russia’s “true” identity come from its economic backwardness and its association with non-democratic countries such as Iraq, Cuba, or Lybia. Only by developing Western-like institutions and by joining the coalition of what is frequently referred to as the community of “Western civilized nations” will Russia be able to respond to threats and overcome its economic and political backwardness.

The Social Democratic school is more sensitive to Russia’s indigenous traditions. It shares with the Liberal philosophy a community-based view of the world, but Social Democrats disagree with their pro-Western counterparts over the origins of universally acceptable rules. They argue that a conception of basic human rights should not be viewed as the product of Western civilization alone. Their refusal to view the world as a dichotomy, between a “progressive” civilization and other, yet-to-be-civilized nations, has led Social Democrats to construct a more complex and dialectical image of the post-Cold War era.

For the Social Democrats, Russia is not only an independent civilization but also a part of an international society. In the emerging post-Cold War era, Russia and other major actors are redefining their roles and identities as well as learning how to live in an increasingly interdependent, yet diverse, world. The main threats in this world are coming from two directions: violations of basic human rights and disrespect for cultural pluralism. The challenge is to establish a “unity in diversity” regime in which different nations and cultures are able to maintain dialogue and cooperation by observing certain globally acknowledged rules while following their own internally developed sets of social norms. The challenge for Russia, then, is not to copy the Western pattern, but to find their own culturally sensitive path to economic and political security. Whereas Social Democrats emphasize the role of cultural factors in world politics, Statists view the world primarily in terms of power disparities and competition between states. As former Foreign and Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov and his supporters (e.g., Bogaturov 1996; Krivokhizha 1997; Kortunov 1998) have argued, for example, the main threat to the international system comes from those interested in destabilizing the world’s multipolar geopolitical equilibrium. In order to maintain this equilibrium, at least in Eurasia, Russia must remain a sovereign state and a great power capable of resisting hegemonic ambitions anywhere in the world. In a similar manner to the Liberals and Social Democrats, Statists do not see Russia as inherently hostile to the West. They maintain that, even though Russia is an independent civilization and its interests and values differ from those of the West, it has historically interacted with the West, which has not threatened either its sovereignty or its cultural distinctness.

The National Communist school of thought continues traditional Soviet thinking and merges some old communist assumptions with those of the Statists. They, too, argue that Russia is an independent civilization and a great/superpower and that it should be maintained as such. But they take this line of reasoning a step further. In the National Communists’ view--most frequently articulated by the leader of Russia’s communists, Gennadi Zyuganov (1995, 1998)--Russia is culturally distinct from other civilizations; indeed, it differs from them fundamentally and should not be forced to adopt “alien”—especially Western—cultural, economic, or political institutions. Instead, Russia ought to remain an independent socialist civilization that is autarchic, has a self-sufficient economy, and is generally isolated from “alien” influences. Russia’s interests are incompatible with those of the West and, in fact, its main threat comes from the West and Western imperialist intentions.

These images regarding Russia’s identity and its external threats are summarized in Table 1 which also indicates a principal proponent for each school of thought.

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Put Table 1 about here

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Russians’ Reception of the “End of History” Thesis

Fukuyama’s Thesis

Fukuyama’s thesis emerged at the end of the 1980s. For a decade, conservatives had been in power in the West and had had an opportunity to shape public discourse both domestically and internationally. The West originally received the arrival of Gorbachev with suspicion and, later, as an obvious sign of Soviet weakness. As time went by, the dominant policy communities of the United States and Europe became convinced that the West would be victorious in the Cold War struggle (Plattner 1988; Brzezinski 1989). It was felt that the West was now in a position to teach the rest of the world how to shape their economic and political institutions as well as the correct moral standards to follow.

In an innovative move, Fukuyama (1989) theoretically articulated and politically justified these policy beliefs for what would become the post-Cold War world. The “end of history,” in this sense, was not accidental in its appearance. Politically, as a Bush administration strategist, and intellectually, as an ardent proponent of modernization theory, Fukuyama was well positioned to formulate the “end of history” argument and to defend the worldwide ascendancy of Western-style Liberal capitalism (see also Fukuyama 1992, 1993; Muravchik 1992; Friedman 1999). His main intellectual target was the realists and their emphasis on international anarchy and cyclical development. Influenced by Hegel’s (1974) and Kojeve’s (1969) interpretations of the end of history, Fukuyama insisted that power politics is hopelessly ahistorical and that liberalism and liberal institutions, such as the rule of law, representative democracy, and the market economy, are acquiring a truly universal significance. Realism is blind to the fact that no other form of social organization, such as fascism, nationalism, or communism, is capable of challenging the establishment of the liberal idea. In a famous passage, Fukuyama (1989: 4) asserted:

What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western Liberal democracy as the final form of human government.

In describing alternative cultural communities, Fukuyama is not that much different from the realists, however. While emphasizing the truly global nature of liberalism and liberal ideas, he remains strikingly parochial in defending Western values as exclusively defined. In his eyes, the West is the community with supreme institutional and moral authority; it is this community’s values that must be promoted globally, whether they are welcomed by other members of the international system or not. Fukuyama views the non-Western parts of the world as the future recipients of Western values and tailors his analysis to demonstrate the “total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western Liberalism” (Fukuyama 1989: 3). In a Nietzsche-inspired pessimistic spirit, he insists that, while the liberal capitalist order is not perfect, it cannot be improved upon either. Other nations have no choice but to develop and modernize exclusively in the manner of Western societies.

Before Disintegration of Soviet State. Social Democrats insisted that a common human civilization should be a product of both Western and non-Western cultures. They (see Krasin 1990; Zamoshkin 1990) agreed with Fukuyama that the West was the first to introduce the market economy and political democracy , but they argued that these values are only part of the common human experience. For example, whereas the West invented the market economy and political freedom, the East introduced ideas regarding how involved and responsible the state should be for a society’s development and respect for a group’s corporate values (Diligenski 1991).^{^[1]} Diverse cultures have a lot to learn from each other. Such mutually advantageous learning, according to Social Democrats, can occur in two forms: mutual borrowing and cultural adaptation. Mutual borrowing assumes that different societies and social systems do not exist in isolation, but, instead, constantly borrow various technological and institutional features from each other in order to successfully meet new challenges (Batalov 1990; Zamoshkin 1990). Cultural adaptation includes the mobilization of domestic social mechanisms to facilitate the incorporation of the borrowed technological and institutional features. The ultimate purpose of cultural adaptation is to assimilate the borrowed feature by integrating it into society’s most fundamental structures, such as values and beliefs (Batalov 1990).

Liberals supported the West as the ultimate authority and advanced arguments similar to those of Fukuyama. Academic institutions, especially the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations and the Institute of the USA and Canada, were particularly active in advancing the view.^{^[2]} The leading researcher at the Institute of the World Economy, El’giz Pozdnyakov (1990: 143; see also Pozdnyakov 1989a, 1989b, 1989c), proposed that the common global human values were those “that are based on the criteria of Western civilization, with its liberal-democratic values and level of scientific-technological development.”

The West today is not merely the geographic concept, not even the concept of capitalism. It is the expression of the highest existing level of economic, scientific-technological, and democratic development, and no society can be called modern without reaching this level. That is why Japan is the West, as are Singapore and South Korea; and this is why we are still not the West (Pozdnyakov 1990: 143; see also Batkin 1988; Arab-Ogli 1990).

To National Communists, moral authority unquestionably was considered to lie with Russia and the non-Western world. National Communists agreed with Fukuyama that modernity is essentially a Western phenomenon, but they argued that it is for this reason Russia should stay away from both the West and modernity and preserve its historical tradition and cultural identity. Following the philosophy of 19th century Slavophiles, some National Communists (e.g., Borodai 1992) viewed Russia as a holder of such traditional values as the importance of firm religious beliefs, empire, and political authoritarianism. Others (e.g., Kurginyan et al. 1990; Prokhanov and Sultanov 1991; Dugin 1991) saw Russia as a technologically advanced and a multi-religious society that, nonetheless, has a powerful civil religion, or ideology, serving to cement social integrity and protect Russia from “harmful” engagement with the West. Russia’s National Communists perceived the West as the alternative--as an inferior moral community. To them, the West had neither developed a particular set of moral values nor identity; it was merely a collection of individuals united by the rational aspiration to become rich at the expense of the rest of the world. The National Communists evaluated Fukuyama’s thesis through this lens. From their perspective, the “end of history” emerged as a product of the ideology of rationalism, yet another attempt to exploit the world economically and corrupt it morally. National Communists insisted that this Western ideology was bad news for Russia; it would only corrupt the Russian culture and would eventually provoke a totalitarian reaction. As the prominent National Communist Sergei Kurginyan (1991) argued, the intention of Fukuyama’s thesis was to contribute to the spread of a common set of human values in the Soviet Union, but in reality it was more likely to create the conditions necessary for the emergence of fascism. And still other National Communists (e.g., Khorev 1996; Glazyev 1997) made a dependency argument by insisting that Russia’s adoption of a market economy would inevitably transform that country into a colony of the West since capitalism and the West cannot be separated.

After Disintegration of Soviet State. As Gorbachev’s reforms failed to live up to rising expectations, the Social Democratic vision lost its hegemonic position in the national discourse. Most Russians also remained skeptical of the National Communist ideas while the relative position of the Liberals improved considerably. However, Liberal hegemony was short-lived. In the context of the failing economic reform and rise of crime and poverty, Liberals could not command sufficient social support and so were soon challenged by the newly rising school of Statism that perceived Fukuyama’s thesis as an attack on Russia’s legitimate national interests (e.g., Migranyan 1994; Stankevich 1994).

The newly emergent school of Statism advocated the notion of Russia as a strong state, or Derzhava (“holder of power”).^{^[3]} Many self-proclaimed Statists were, in fact, former Liberals and remained attracted to the idea that Russia should strive to build a market economy and a political democracy. However, Statists no longer believed that Russia should become a part of the West and argued that the country must defend its own interests. Statists borrowed from National Communists a conflictual vision of the world, one in which power-seeking states strive to defend their geopolitical interests and areas of influence. Without implying extreme confrontation with the West (often the core of National Communists’ writings), Statists, nonetheless, employed much of the National Communist terminology, for example, “national idea,” “great power,” “Eurasia,” and “geopolitics” in their own vocabulary. Although as already noted Statists agreed with Fukuyama and domestic Liberals about the importance of building a market economy and political democracy, they disagreed about the priority of these objectives relative to others. To Statists, establishing a market democracy was not a goal in itself but something that should be subordinated to the building of a strong state. The post-Soviet part of the debate over Fukuyama’s thesis prepared the ground for the eventual replacement of Russia’s pro-Liberal foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev with leading Statist Yevgeni Primakov while at the same time marginalizing the Social Democrats.

Russians’ Reception of the “Clash of Civilizations” Thesis

Huntington’s Thesis

As was the case with Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis, Huntington’s vision was reflective of the social and political stereotypes of its time and society. The Western context of the early 1990s differed from that which stimulated the emergence of Fukuyama-like triumphalist ideas. The spread of new ethnic conflicts in Europe and the former Soviet Union, the continual threat from Iraq even after the perceived success of the Persian Gulf War, and the environmental and demographic pressures coming from Asia and Africa were increasingly viewed by prominent intellectuals as signs of Western inability to secure peace and stability throughout the globe (see, e.g., Barber 1992; Kaplan 1994). With the growing awareness of new cultural dangers came fear and suspicion toward those in the non-Western world. It was within this context that Huntington’s vision emerged.

Huntington was in a good position to formulate the vision of clash of civilizations as the future world order. Since his Political Order in Changing Societies (Huntington 1968), this scholar had been preoccupied with maintaining stability in modernizing Third World societies and argued against the simultaneous spread of liberal economic and political institutions into the non-Western world (Huntington 1991). Skeptical of mainstream modernization theory, Huntington (1990) was also highly critical of Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis. His skepticism resonated with the growing fear of global instability shared by many in Washington. Moreover, Huntington was not a newcomer to the policy world. His lengthy career spanned not only elite universities, but also political think tanks such as the Council on Foreign Relations and the Olin Institute at Harvard. In addition to teaching and research, the author of “Clash of Civilizations” had been a government advisor serving as coordinator of security planning for the National Security Council from 1977 to 1978 (O’Hagan 2000). With the Soviet threat vanished, he was keenly aware of the conservative demand to map global geopolitical space around a new threat. Indeed, Huntington (1997: 31-32) observed that “the Cold War fostered a common identity between the American people and government. . . .The end of history, the global victory of democracy, if it occurs, could be a most traumatic and unsettling event for America.”

Huntington’s vision involves a familiar ethnocentric bias toward the outside world, and yet also has some principal analytical differences from the “end of history” thesis. Unlike Fukuyama, Huntington (1993a, 1993b, 1996b) is convinced that the West, as a civilization, is unique, not universal. With some modifications, his picture of the world is a familiar realist one that gives no acknowledgement to growing global interdependence and continues to view world development in cyclical rather than progressive terms. His definition of civilizations, their behavioral motives, and the external environment confirm this conclusion.

In Huntington’s view, civilizations are meaningful entities with clear boundaries between them. They are cultural entities that, with the end of the Cold War, are coming to replace nation-states and are differentiated from each other by history, language, tradition, and, most importantly, religion (Huntington 1993a: 23-25). In addition to the West, Huntington identifies seven other civilizations—Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and possibly African—each with its own set of cultural values.

Civilizations strive to protect their values and beliefs. Western values are well known to include Western Christianity, the rule of law, social pluralism, representative government, and individualism (Huntington 1996a). Along with Fukuyama, Huntington is firmly committed to the values of the West, but he defines them as being local rather than universal and sees little use in trying to spread Western values outside their originating civilization. He perceives no reasons to believe that the rest of the world will adopt Western values. On the contrary, he feels that these values are in danger and asserts that the West must strive for power to effectively protect itself.

In addition, despite some blending and overlapping, civilizations essentially operate in an anarchical environment. Differences in power and struggles for military, economic, and institutional resources are and will continue to be a major driving force in world politics. As these ideas suggest, Huntington was committed to a realist mode of thinking as has been argued by a number of scholars (e.g., Rubenstein and Crocker 1994; Alker et al. 1998; O’Hagan 2000). There is, in effect, nothing to prevent or mitigate civilizations’ drive for power and domination. As a result, the West should have no illusions about the world’s growing interdependence. Consider, for example, the way in which Huntington (1993a: 39) treats international institutions’ status and authority as reflected in the status and authority of civilizations. Through international economic institutions, he feels, the “West promotes its economic interests and imposes on other nations the economic policies it thinks appropriate.” Through international security institutions, the West dominates politically.

Having based his ideas upon realist assumptions, Huntington quite logically arrives at his thesis about the clash of civilizations. The clash occurs at both the macro- and micro-levels. At the macro-level, there is a struggle between civilizations in the international arena; at the micro-level, there are threats to states’ internal stability if the fault lines between civilizations happen to cut across their territories: “Violent conflicts between groups in different civilizations are the most likely and most dangerous source of escalation that could lead to global wars” (Huntington 1993a: 48) because non-Western civilizations increasingly have the “desire, the will, and the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways” (Huntington 1993a: 26). He specifically identifies civilizational or cultural conflicts between Western Christianity, on the one hand, and Orthodox Christianity and Islam in Europe, on the other, as well as world-wide conflicts between Western and Islamic civilizations, between Orthodox and Muslim peoples in Europe and Eurasia, between Muslims and Hindus in Asia, between China and America; and between Japan and the United States.

At the domestic level, Huntington argues, the clash of civilizations may take the form of state dismemberment and proposes that the three mostly likely candidates (“torn countries”) for such a scenario in the future are Turkey, Mexico, and Russia because these three, in his view, have a particularly high degree of cultural heterogeneity. Turkey is divided between a Western and a Middle Eastern Muslim identity, Mexico between the identity of a Latin American and a North American country, and Russia between European and Eurasian orientations. Of the three, Russia is in the most dangerous position since it lacks the necessary requirements for a successful redefining of its civilizational identity: its political and economic elite are undecided about joining the West; it is not clear whether the Russian public is ready for such redefinition; and the West does not seem to be eager to embrace Russia (Huntington 1993a: 43).

The solution that Huntington advances for Russia’s and the West’s Eurasian dilemmas involves them forming a political and military alliance against China and the Islamic civilizations. Being particularly worried about the rise of these civilizations, he recommends containment of the threat from the Confucian-Islamic states by promoting and maintaining cooperative relations with Russia. In his book, Huntington (1996: 241, 312) develops this point by stating that “Russia working closely with the West would provide additional counterbalance to the Confucian-Islamic connection on global issues” and that the West should “accept Russia as the core state of Orthodoxy and a major regional power with legitimate interests in the security of its southern borders.”

Russian Perceptions of Thesis

As with Fukuyama’s ideas, the Russian political elite discussed and eventually rejected Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” model of the new world order. Like Fukuyama, Huntington appeared to be committed to viewing Western values in exclusive terms, hoping to convince Russians that, in the light of the threat from the Confucian-Islamic states, they would be better off by joining an alliance with the West. Debate on Huntington’s ideas took place after the Soviet break-up and in the context of the Russian elite’s self-definition as a new Eurasian power. In this context, Russian intellectuals attacked his proposals as destabilizing Eurasia and the world.

Liberals and Social Democrats. The reaction of Liberals and Social Democrats to Huntington was similar. In their discourse, many Liberals and Social Democrats (see, e.g., Mirski 1994; Stolknoveniye Tsivilizatsiy 1995; Tsivilizatsionnaya Model 1995; Utkin 1997) expressed appreciation for Huntington’s interest in the cultural aspects of world politics and gave him credit for raising the issue of civilizations and their interactions within and across states. Yet most of them were dissatisfied with the way he defined civilizations and interpreted their interactions. Igor Pantin (1995), the editor of Polis [Political Studies],^{^[4]} called for a conceptual rethinking of the “clash of civilizations” thesis that would go beyond Huntington’s paradigm and take into account an increasingly global nature of the world (see also Shakhnazarov 1998).

Liberals and Social Democrats argued that Huntington is inconsistent in defining what he means by “civilization,” and that he overlooks the fundamental processes of globalization cutting across nations and civilizations by analyzing them as local phenomena separated from each other, with their own hardly reconcilable interests in the world. Indeed, in their view, world politics is not only characterized by the differences among units, but also by the constant interactions and integration of units. The group insist that from this perspective civilizations are not separated from each other. In fact, one can make a strong argument in favor of an emerging world civilization with shared norms and values across nations and local civilizations. For example, Liberals and Social Democrats point to the existence of global problems such as those of the environment, overpopulation, and economic development. Such problems require a solution based on global Reason [Noosphera], countries working together for the good of all humankind (Zlobin 1995: 133). Viewed in this way, local civilizations are far from being the only important players in world politics. Nor are they exclusively placed in an anarchical environment where the sole goal is power maximization and only material capabilities matter.

Being highly critical of Huntington’s conflictual picture of the world, Liberals and Social Democrats, likewise (and not surprisingly), criticized the substance of his argument. They considered that the picture of world politics as a series of civilizational clashes is a flawed one. In their eyes, it reflects the Western ethnocentrism that was also evident in Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis as well as a fear that with the end of the Cold War order in world affairs is not possible. As Aleksei Shestopal (1995) put it, both Fukuyama’s and Huntington’s works, despite their differences, can be viewed as indicators of the “decrease in the level of historicity.” In effect, these works are representative of a Western type of historicity that is relatively limited in scope and magnitude and is not applicable to non-Western worlds or civilizations. The end of the Cold War signifies the end of this kind of historicity (Simoniya 1994; Sydorov 1995; Rashkowski 1995; Panarin 1998) and teaches, among other things, that acceptance of cultural pluralism should be the modus operandi of world politics. Not only are Huntington’s analyses and predictions regarding future cultural conflicts along civilizational lines mistaken, but they are also dangerous in and of themselves. In the words of one scholar (Medovoi 1995: 138),

Huntington’s scenarios of the future can only lead to one thing, and that is to a world catastrophe. The worldwide struggle, the struggle along the “fault lines of civilizations”. . . does not make any sense. For a long time, inhabitants of the globe have been well aware. . . that a dignified future can only be accomplished by way of the reasonable and joint efforts of all peoples.

Liberals and Social Democrats believe that Russia should demonstrate another, more interactive way of thinking about civilizations in world politics, one that emphasizes the openness of various civilizations to change and restores the “spirit of genuinely world-wide [read: global—AT] history” (Shestopal 1995: 134). This same point is made by Max Sheler, Jan Mariten, Pier Tiear de Sharden, Sergei and Yevgeni Trubetskoi, Lev Karsavin, Pitirim Sorokin, Javaharlal Neru, Sun Iatsen, Alber Shveitser, and Nikolai Rerikh (Zlobin 1995), but not by either Fukuyama and Huntington. It is not conflict, but cooperation, mutual influence, and the mutual enrichment among different religions, cultures, and nations that are of primary concern to Russian Liberals and Social Democrats (Shestopal 1995).

This argument is extended to Russia’s domestic scene. Rather than viewing Russia as a “torn country” (a la Huntington), the group emphasizes the advantages of multicultural, multiethnic, and multi-religious communities. Such communities contain a wide variety of ideas and promote the advocacy of alternative options as well as are particularly susceptible to social creativity and innovation (Shestopal 1995).

Huntington’s recommendation to pursue the greater integration of the West through both tightening immigration policies and international economic and security alliances is taken by some Russian Liberals and Social Democrats as a call for greater Western isolation from the worldwide transformation of economic and security architectures. Instead, the West should demonstrate its willingness to solve economic (poverty), security, and ecological problems through cooperative arrangements. It is hard to imagine, the supporters of this view argue, that in this “tight,” interdependent world, Western countries can provide themselves with security and prosperity without serious consideration given to the problems of non-Western countries. Moreover, Western societies themselves face a number of serious problems, such as those related to “ecology, [the] superficial cult of consumption, and increasing oversimplification of every-day life due to power of the mass culture’ (Khoros 1995: 123). Therefore, world progress becomes very much dependent on “co-development” and mutual security (Zlobin 1995).

Finally, while favoring Huntington’s proposal to conclude a strategic alliance between Russia and the West—after all, this is what Gorbachev and Kozyrev tried to accomplish for years (although with no particular success)—most Liberals and Social Democrats do not see such an alliance as defending Western values against a potential threat from alien Muslim or Chinese civilizations. Rather than seeing a Russo-Western alliance as one against “the other,” they propose to treat it as one for accomplishing mutually acceptable security and economic goals. Indeed, many Liberals and Social Democrats are interested in developing various political and economic arrangements with Russia’s southern and eastern neighbors, although not at the expense of Russia’s relations with the West.

Not only do Statists share Huntington’s view that local civilizations are major units in world politics, they also agree with his views on the goals of civilizations, the environments in which civilizations operate, and the ways in which civilizations interact with each other. To them, civilizations fight for “prestige and resources” (Tsymburski 1995: 137); “economic, cultural, and political identity,” (Karagodin 1994: 3); and “economic capabilities” (Samuilov 1995: 63). They do so in an environment that is dramatically different from the one depicted by Liberals and Social Democrats. Instead of emphasizing the effects of globalization and interdependence as the Liberals do, Statists make clear that ideas regarding global coordination and the formation of a universal civilization are premature (at best) and have little to do with reality (see, e.g., Karagodin 1994; Samuilov 1995; Tsymburski 1995).

Although Russian Statists are generally supportive of Huntington’s application of the “clash of civilizations” thesis to world politics, some (e.g., Tsymburski 1995, 1997) identify inconsistencies within his arguments and demonstrate that his actual goal is to counter-pose the West against all other non-Western civilizations rather than to warn about the clash of various civilizations with each other. In the words of Vadim Tsymburski (1995: 128), Huntington’s major concern is the “West against the rest.” For this reason he overlooks a number of other important potential inter-civilizational conflicts, for example, between Russia and China, within China (the problem of Tibet), and between India and Pakistan, instead postulating an informal Muslim-Chinese block. Thus, while raising an important problem, Huntington is essentially biased in the presentation of his argument. To this camp of critics, the clash of civilizations does represent the substance of world politics, but not in the way Huntington depicted it.

The application of the “clash” thesis to the analysis of domestic, intra-state politics also is generally supported by Statist theorists except when it comes to the analysis of Russia’s future. Here Statists perceive a drastically different picture. For most of them, Russia is not a “torn” country, divided between East and West, as Huntington views it. Rather, Russia is Eurasia, an example of a local civilization, with a special geopolitical role to play: that of bridge between Europe and Asia. As Sergei Samuilov (1995: 60; see also Kaspe 1995; Aliyev 1998) argues:

One cannot agree with Huntington that Russia is a Slav-Orthodox civilization. Historically the Slav-Orthodox component was very significant in the development of Russia’s civilization, but cannot be considered equal to it. The formation of the Moscow Rus’ was based upon the Eurasianist alternative, which took the upper hand in historical polemics with the pro-Western one associated with the Great Lithuanian Princedom. Since the time of the Moscow Rus’, Russia has been built as a multi-ethnic, mainly Slav-Turkish-Ugro-Finnic state, and, later, as a multi-religious (Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism, Catholicism, Lutheranism, Judaism, etc.) one.

Therefore, Russia, unlike the West, has managed to combine Orthodox Christian Europe with the Turkish-Muslim East. It is this Eurasian way that Statists view as a natural for Russia. As a result, what awaits Russia in the near future is ethnocultural diversity and collaboration within a unified civilization, not a clash.

Unlike Liberals and Social Democrats, Statist intellectuals seek to respond to Huntington’s policy recommendations within the same conflict paradigm. In response to his call for greater integration with the West to counter the coming dangers, they (see, e.g., Aliyev 1998; Ilyin 1995; Samuilov 1995) argue, instead, in favor of greater integration within the Russian civilization which they perceive to include many former Soviet states. They are generally supportive of Huntington’s claim that the West should minimize its interference with the affairs of other civilizations because that way Russia’s civilization will face less resistance as it moves toward greater integration. However, they vehemently oppose the idea of a Russo-Western alliance for the purpose of counterbalancing the threat from Islamic or Chinese civilizations. The objection is summarized in the following way by Tsymburski (1995: 145):

The alliance between Russia and the West against the “Muslim-Confucian block” might be an extremely dangerous one. . . . The Chinese and Islam cards have been played against us for too long a time. We cannot allow the West to direct the aggressive energy of other non-Western civilizations against the so called “Russo-Orthodox civilization.”

Samuilov (1995: 62) adds that a Russo-Western alliance against the Muslim world “would inevitably exacerbate the relations between people of Slav and Turkish nationality, thereby threatening Russia’s territorial integrity and strengthening its domestic political instability.”

This account of the perception of ideas can be objected to on at least two grounds: rationalist and culturalist. Rationalists might argue that the approach taken here overstates the role of social context and understates actors’ interests and political calculations. To scholars working in the rationalist tradition, negative reception of ideas is not cultural; in fact, the perception of ideas in this case might well have been different if it were not for the actors’ political interests. If rationalists were to raise the responsibility question at all, they would then place such responsibility for the negative perception on the receiving side of the ideas, rather than these ideas’ producer.

For instance, rationalist studies of nationalism (e.g., Tiryakian and Rogowski 1985; Breton, Galeotti, Salmon, and Wintrobe 1995) downplayed the role of cultural environment—both domestic and external—and, instead, concentrated on nationalists’ potential losses having to do with their fear of risking already acquired status and privileges. If so, nationalist interpretations of various aspects of Western civilization (religion, institutions, social science, literature, etc.) as “alien” and not applicable to their local context are nothing more than the use of politically convenient rhetoric to create the image of an enemy and consolidate public opinion around desired goals. The West then has a little role to play in putting down the fire of anti-Western behavior and interpretations, and responsibility for it lies entirely with local nationalists.

With regard to the present discourse analysis, rationalists might assert that it is the Russian elites, not Fukuyama or Huntington, who are responsible for how these two Western visions of world politics are received. Russia’s rejections of Fukuyama’s and Huntington’s visions of the post-Cold War world order were then purely political and interest-maximizing, and not cultural. Russian elites might have simply more success in presenting themselves as guardians of “national interests” against the “encroaching” and “hegemonic” West if they had a specific target. The “end of history” and “clash of civilizations” theses could usefully serve as such a target. Presenting these ideas as cloaks for Western intentions to weaken, exploit, and conquer Russia is appealing politics if one is motivated purely by preserving power.

This explanation is unsatisfactory for at least two reasons. First, presenting the Russia’s elites as “rational” in calculating its power benefits has its limits. Whereas Russian National Communists certainly benefitted from the arguments of Fukuyama and Huntington, Russian Liberals and Social Democrats did not. Intellectually and politically, these latter two groups had little to gain by creating a threatening image of the West, yet they, too, were highly critical of both visions. Indeed, as has been proposed in the present analysis, Russian Liberals view the West as a potential partner, not a threat. The rejection of Fukuyama’s and Huntington’s ideas across the entire intellectual spectrum suggests that the perception was of a cultural, and not merely political, nature. Second, Russia’s ruling elite only became more nationalistic and anti-Western toward 1993 with the failure of the first wave of reforms and as a reflection of the fact that the Russian public had become less receptive to Western ideas and models of society. Indeed, according to one poll, public support for the American model of society fell from 32% to 12% over the period from 1990-1992 (Sogrin 1996: 36). Under Gorbachev, the domestic elite had no interest in viewing the West and its ideas as a scapegoat; on the contrary, it hoped to benefit from a “strategic partnership” with the West and strove to sell an image of the country’s international openness. Before the Soviet collapse, it was Fukuyama’s ideas that were undermining the political credibility of the West, not the Russian elite’s. The rationalist argument is, therefore, deceptive: it conveniently diverts responsibility for ideas from the intellectuals who produce them and implies that such responsibility rests with the ideas’ recipients.

The alternative, culturally essentialist perspective would advance an argument that is just the opposite of the rationalist view. Culturalists view the world as inherently multicultural and emphasize the role of factors of essentialist nature, such as ethnicity, language and religion (e.g., Bozeman 1984; Brubaker 1996). Rather than placing the emphasis on actors’ political interests, culturalists might argue that local cultural values and social contexts are resistant to external ideas. This perspective downplays the question of intellectuals’ responsibility for the ways in which their ideas are perceived by the outside world by presenting such ideas as loyal and accurate messengers of their cultures. In cultural account, the Russian elite’s rejection of Western ideas would be natural because Russia’s worldview is based on a different set of cultural values reflected in their distinct religion, language, and ethnicity. So long as Fukuyama’s and Huntington’s visions reflected the values of Western civilization, they could not possibly be persuasive to peoples of cultures and civilizations with non-Western origins. Responsibility of ideas-producers is limited here to their immediate cultures, and not extended to the broader cross-cultural context.

The cultural perspective is curiously similar to that of Huntington. A major problem for this perspective is its essentialism; the rejection of ideas that are transported from one culture to another is natural, even inevitable. This essentialism does not take into account the fact that perception is a variable rather than a constant. In reality an idea—though a cultural product—never represents culture adequately or loyally; instead, it represents one aspect of a culture, while denying and reshaping others. Local cultures are not homogeneous, once and for all fixed entities; people within them may react differently to similar ideas across time. Fukuyama’s ideas, for example, generated a stronger nationalist critique after 1992 than before the Soviet disintegration. The political elite’s rejection of the “end of history” idea was, indeed, cultural, but it was neither inevitable nor essentialist. Different schools among the Russian elite reacted to the idea differently, and their reactions evolved over time as their cultural identity changed.

Conclusions

This essay has argued that ideas put forth in the international arena can make important contributions to how local cultures perceive each other. Russia’s engagement with Fukuyama’s and Huntington’s visions regarding the post-Cold War order was selected to demonstrate the dynamics of cultural perception and the ultimate rejection by one culture of another’s ideas if they are perceived to be insensitively and exclusively framed.

One such idea was Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis that argued the case for the global ascendancy of market-oriented democracy. The Russian political elite wrestled with Fukuyama’s ideas twice, before and after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Before the disintegration, the “end of history” thesis was perceived as either suppressing alternative ways of considering modernization (Social Democrats) or imposing on Russia an imperialist ideology that was morally corrupt and politically dangerous (National Communists). Only early Russian Liberals advanced arguments that were quite similar to those of Fukuyama. After the Soviet collapse, the Liberals found themselves in a hegemonic position and tried to pursue policies that were loosely consistent with the “end of history” worldview. However, Liberal discourse was challenged by the rising school of Statism that perceived Fukuyama’s ideas as an attack on Russia’s legitimate national interests. In the new context of the Soviet disintegration, Russia’s sharply increased poverty and crime, a much more pessimistic outlook emerged that further complicated the engagement with the westernized ethnocentric idea. Liberals could not command sufficient social support and the debate on Russian national interests further solidified the influence of Statists and marginalized Social Democrats, on the one hand, and National Communists, on the other. The rise of Statism also prepared the ground for the eventual replacement of Russia’s pro-Liberal foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev with leading Statist Yevgeni Primakov.

Russia similarly discussed and eventually rejected Huntington’s “clash of civilization” ideas. Like Fukuyama, Huntington was committed to viewing Western values in exclusive and essentialist terms. Unlike the proponent of the “end of history” thesis, though, Huntington argued the case for defending, not expanding, Western cultural values and forecasted a future world order marked by clashing cultural values. He, too, was hoping to convince Russians that, in light of his identified threat from the Confucian-Islamic states, they would be better off by joining in alliance with the West. As happened with Fukuyama’s thesis, Huntington’s idea backfired and drew severe criticism from across the political and intellectual spectrum.

Why did the Russian political elite perceive negatively, and eventually reject, Fukuyama’s and Huntington’s visions of the post-Cold War world order? And why did these two American conceptions of what was happening or going to happen contribute to the discourse of isolation and hostility in Russia? The argument made in this essay is that the answers to these two questions lie in the generally ethnocentric nature of the ideas. Both the “end of history” and the “clash of civilizations” proposals shared assumptions concerning the West’s superiority and were framed in culturally-exclusive terms. Fukuyama and Huntington were blind to Russia’s distinct historical traditions and present concerns. Fukuyama failed to seriously consider that every country—and certainly one as large and old as Russia—will modernize in its own way, in accordance with its own social memory, and at a socially appropriate pace. And Huntington “forgot” about Russia’s distinct Eurasian identity and geographic location. The two scholars failed to appreciate the facts that Russia’s interests are in both Europe and Asia and that the country is destined to live side by side and get along with others in a region which contains religious, ethnic, and linguistic diversity. The Russian intellectual and political community carefully discussed both American ideas, but because of these ideas’ ethnocentric nature, they were doomed to be perceived negatively and eventually rejected as not applicable given the Russian cultural context.

In addition to the discourse, Russia’s institutional practices likewise have failed to conform with either of the visions of Fukuyama and Huntington. For the ten years that have passed since the end of the Soviet Union, the Russian government has developed a set of political, economic, security, and cultural institutions that are not like either of the two American visions’ expectations. Russia’s super-presidential system, oligarchical capitalism, and renewed perception of the West as a potential threat (rather than as a strategic partner) are hardly in agreement with Fukuyama’s image of a pro-Western liberal democracy. Nor do the Russian cultural institutions conform with the image of “clash of civilizations.” Despite its domestic and peripheral ethnic diversity (some 140 different ethnic groups), Russia does not seem to face a major threat to its cultural cohesion and territorial integrity. However serious Chechnya is, it remains the only example of secessionism in Russia’s postcommunist development.^{^[5]}

An important lesson of Fukuyama’s and Huntington’s engagements with the Russian political elite is that those who produce ideas are responsible for how those ideas are perceived outside the idea’s immediate cultural context. Because we continue to live in a multicultural world, a certain degree of negative reaction is inevitable, but it is in our power to reduce it. Intellectual ethnocentrism, almost by definition, has the potential to produce misperception and negative responses in another cutlure. It is up to those who design a vision and wish to influence the political elite in a different culture to assume responsibility for framing the ideas so as to maximize their communicability.

Taking ethnocentrism seriously is vital for our knowledge cumulation and theory building. Without solving this problem, we make doing research in international studies more difficult because we do not know if and how far we can extend our knowledge outside its social context. To study the issue of cultural perception and make progress in it, we must begin by recognizing the existence of the delicate dialectical balance between cultural plurality and diversity, on the one hand, and the increased commonness of humanity, on the other. Furthermore, we ought to produce our knowledge being aware of the outside world’s possible reactions. Specifically, we need to be able to answer the three following questions: (1) Who is the Other that might critically react to our scholarship, that is, who are we trying to influence? (2) How different is the Other’s historical experience? And (3) how distinct or specific are the Other’s present concerns?

With these considerations in mind, Western scholars need to remember that a multicultural world dictates becoming aware of other moral contexts and their possible reactions to locally-generated ideas. It is important to realize that in non-Western contexts Western ethnocentric conceptualizations of the world order will inevitably strengthen the discourse of cultural nationalism and weaken that of cultural liberalism. This statement implies that scholarship capable of improving trust and respect among different cultures and civilizations must be built on the premise that there is both plurality and diversity in the global society (Tsygankov, forthcoming).

For Russian and other non-Western scholars, there is a need to move beyond cultural nationalism. In an increasingly globalized world, isolationism is no answer to large-scale dilemmas. The non-Western world ought to aim for a strategy of culture-sensitive adaptation in, rather than isolation from, the world. The mission of non-Western intellectuals is, thus, to explain to their often insensitive and ethnocentricWestern counterparts that they want integration into the world, but not just any integration and not just at any cost.

Epilogue

President Vladimir Putin’s decision to support the United States in the post-September 11 struggle against terrorism reflected the new conceptualization of world political scene and led to an important change in the Russian discourse. Although Putin began his term as a Statist, building on Primakov’s philosophy of multipolarity,[6] he is increasingly viewed as a Liberal. In reality, however, the post-September Putin is neither a pro-Western Liberal, nor a Statist-Primakovite. The new international political circumstances pushed the president to adopt the new foreign policy philosophy of Pragmatism. Pragmatism, while awaiting of its further development, had two clear components. The first is a continuation of Primakov’s vision and reflected Russia’s readiness to defend its own interests in the power- and competition-driven world.[7] The second aspect is a departure from the early Statist philosophy in its emphasis of economic, rather than security, dimension of world politics, and so it has a more liberal appeal. The new foreign policy philosophy was therefore a synthesis of Statist and Liberal principles. It assumed that in today’s world, geoeconomics gained an upper hand over geopolitics, and thus Russia must defend its national interests primarily by economic means and not overstretch itself politically.[8]

Putin’s Pragmatism is an attempt to defend Russia’s interests in the new environment and solve two key tasks. The first task is to improve the state of the Russian economy by capitalizing on domestic oil reserves and the Russian ability to increase exports to the West (provided that the West would invest more actively in the Russian petroleum industry). The second is to preserve the space of maneuver required for defending Russia’s political interests in world politics. Without antagonizing the West and the United States, Russia plans to continue to deal with Chechnya, Iran, and Iraq as it sees fit. Given the West’s need to have Russia as an ally, Russia’s president seeks to strengthen what he sees as his country’s national interests. Although Putin is not a liberal Westernizer per se, as a result of his actions, Russia may eventually develop closer relations with the West.

As a result of his political move, Putin has been conditionally supported by Liberals and Social Democrats, but is also increasingly criticized by Statists and National Communists. Liberals were supportive of Putin’s decision to side with the United States after September 11, and they argued that the alliance of Russia with the West should go beyond solving some tactical purposes and forge development of common identity and cultural values (e.g., Yavlinski 2002; Kara-Murza 2002). The attitude of Social Democrats was a more complex and cautious one. While being supportive of Putin’s decision and sympathetic toward the West, the group cautioned that, among other causes of the spread of terrorism was unilateral use of power of the United States and the narrowly chosen pro-American model of globalization (Buzgalin 2002). Some Social Democrats were also less inclined to view America and Europe as culturally similar and recommended that Putin explicitly side with Europe in the post-September 11 world (Fedorov 2002).

In some respects, the views of Social Democrats corresponded with those of President Putin. Putin also downplayed military interventions as a long-term solution to the problem of terrorism. He did not commit Russian troops to the effort, and instead emphasized the relevance of international law and the United Nations. He was also careful to not cast his actions in a pro-American or an anti-Islamic light and, immediately after the terrorist attack, warned against framing the policy response as a “war of civilizations” (Putin 2001). The latter is important given that some of the Russia’s Liberals moved closer to Fukuyama-Huntingtonian language in characterizing 9/11 as a clash of the Western “civilization” with a cultural “barbarianism” and proposing that Russia make a decisive “choice” between “barbarians” and “civilized nations” (e.g., Kara-Murza 2002).[9]

The reaction of Statists and National Communists varied from developing a tactical and pragmatic cooperation against the “common enemy” of terrorism to an outright rejection of any association with the West. Statists continue to view Russia’s great power status as main national priority and emphasize the “harmful” aspects of American military hegemony and political unilateralism as one of the reasons for the attacks of September 11. They favor a broad coalition of great powers, including Russia, China, and India as the most appropriate response to the threat of global terrorism (e.g., Tsymburski 2001; Kortunov 2002). National Communists went even further than Statists in condemning the decision of Putin. The problem, in the minds of this group, is not merely the American strategy and hegemonic ambitions; such strategy and ambitions themselves should be viewed as inevitable products of the Western culture and its creature-modern civilization. September 11 then was nothing less than a part of an epical struggle for liberation from the unipolar/unicultural Western world. In such a world, Russia has a duty to side overtly with anti-Western, and especially anti-American forces (Zyuganov 2001; Dugin 2002).

In general, the Russian foreign policy elites are reminding the president that an unqualified support for the United States has the potential to damage Russia’s relations with Europe, China, and the Muslim countries. Consistent with their reactions to Fukuyama and Huntington, the Russian intellectuals and politicians worry that U.S. policies may undermine, rather than strengthen, peace and stability in multicultural world.

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Table 1

Summary of Visions of Russia’s Identity and Its External Threats

School of Thought	Vision of Russia’s Identity and External Threat	Principal Proponent
Liberals	Russia is part of the West and should integrate with Western economic and political institutions; main threats to Russia’s identity come from non-democratic states	Andrei Kozyrev
Social Democrats	Russia is an independent civilization, but also part of international society; it has its own specific interests, but also shares some common interests with other civilizations; main threats to Russia come from violation of basic human rights and disrespect for cultural pluralism	Mikhail Gorbachev
Statists	Russia is sovereign state and great power with its own specific interests in maintaining stability in the international system; main threats to Russia come from state-revisionists seeking to change existing balance of power	Yevgeni Primakov
National Communists	Russia is independent socialist civilization and great/superpower; its main threats come from the West and its imperialist intentions; Russia’s interests are incompatible with those of the West and include the preservation of a balance of power between socialism and capitalism and the spread of the influence of Russian civilization	Gennadi Zyuganov

School of Thought

Vision of Russia’s Identity and External Threat

Principal Proponent

Liberals

Russia is part of the West and should integrate with Western economic and political institutions; main threats to Russia’s identity come from non-democratic states

Andrei Kozyrev

Social Democrats

Russia is an independent civilization, but also part of international society; it has its own specific interests, but also shares some common interests with other civilizations; main threats to Russia come from violation of basic human rights and disrespect for cultural pluralism

Mikhail Gorbachev

Statists

Russia is sovereign state and great power with its own specific interests in maintaining stability in the international system; main threats to Russia come from state-revisionists seeking to change existing balance of power

Yevgeni Primakov

National Communists

Russia is independent socialist civilization and great/superpower; its main threats come from the West and its imperialist intentions; Russia’s interests are incompatible with those of the West and include the preservation of a balance of power between socialism and capitalism and the spread of the influence of Russian civilization

Gennadi Zyuganov

Western Visions of Future of World Order	Perceptions in Russia
Fukuyama: the “end of history” or global triumph of Western style economic and political freedoms	Social Democrats: Fukuyama’s argument is a limitation of freedom and social creativity National Communists: Fukuyama’s argument is a justification for a global West-centered dictatorship
Huntington: the “clash of civilizations” that in Eurasia can be prevented by Russia’s alliance with the West against China and the Muslim world	Liberals: Huntington’s thesis envisions a limitation to dialogue and cooperation among civilizations that can lead to destabilization in Eurasia Statists / National Communists: Huntington’s thesis is an attempt to split Eurasia and to further weaken Russia by pushing it into a war against China and the Muslim world

Western Visions of Future of World Order

Perceptions in Russia

Fukuyama: the “end of history” or global triumph of Western style economic and political freedoms

Social Democrats: Fukuyama’s argument is a limitation of freedom and social creativity

National Communists: Fukuyama’s argument is a justification for a global West-centered dictatorship

Huntington: the “clash of civilizations” that in Eurasia can be prevented by Russia’s alliance with the West against China and the Muslim world

Liberals: Huntington’s thesis envisions a limitation to dialogue and cooperation among civilizations that can lead to destabilization in Eurasia

Statists / National Communists: Huntington’s thesis is an attempt to split Eurasia and to further weaken Russia by pushing it into a war against China and the Muslim world

^{^[1]}In their response to Fukuyama’s thesis, Mark Khrustalev and Marina Lebedeva (1990) also emphasized the fact that Fukuyama overlooked the creative potential of non-Western societies. In his subsequent work on the social capital involved in the global economy and the cultural preconditions for economic development, Fukuyama (1995) modified his view. However, he remained committed to modernization theory and to the idea that, regardless of various societies’ initial social conditions and cultural contexts, the general path of economic development is the only one; therefore, policymakers should concentrate on forging strategies for building a market economy, not on debating differences in the outcomes.

^{^[2]} It was expressed well in a number of articles that were published by leading academic journals between 1987 and 1991, for example, Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodniye Otnosheniya (the World Economy and International Relations) and SshA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya (the USA: Economy, Politics, and Ideology).

^{^[3]} For a more detailed analysis of Statism, see Light (1996) and Kovalev (1997). For the most important statements on Statism, see various documents of the SVOP (Council for Foreign and Defense Policy), an influential non-governmental organization that was established for the purpose of challenging the Liberal political philosophy associated with Deputy Prime MinisterYegor Gaidar and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and in the process to propose specific policy recommendations (see especially, Strategiya dlya Rossiyi 1992; Strategiya—2 1994; Strategiya 2000)

^{^[4]} Polis (Politicheskiie Issledovaniia) is one of the top political science journals in Russia. It is published by the Institute of Comparative Politics, Russian Academy of Science.

^{^[5]} Huntington (1999) has used the case of Chechnya to argue in favor of Russia’s “consolidation” of its culture and the abandonment of its project of multicultural federalism.

[6] For example, in several speeches, Putin outlined a vision of Russia as a country of unique intermediate location between Europe and Asia. Since 1999, Russia’s President has visited key states of the region—the former Soviet area, China, India, Mongolia, North Korea, and Brunei— and signed some agreements of key significance, such as the treaty of strategic significance with China. Putin even visited Cuba, from where he made a characteristic statement supportive of multipolar world and critical of “unipolar hegemonic tendencies” in the world.

[7] According to Putin, “the norm of the international community and the modern world is a tough competition—for markets, investments, political, and economic influence … nobody is eager to help us. We alone have to fight for a place under the ‘economic sun’” (Putin 2002: 4-5).

[8] In his April 2002 state of the nation address, Putin emphasized international factors of economic significance and Russia’s need to survive economically in the new world (Putin 2002: 3-4, 14-15). The emphasis on geoeconomics builds on earlier discussions of Russian intellectuals about optimal strategies of adjustment to the processes of global economic interdependence (see Neklessa 1997; Rogov 1998). The influential Council for Foreign and Defence Policy summarized the new liberal-nationalist vision in the document untitled “Strategy for Russia: Agenda for President—2000.” The authors of the document criticized Primakov’s concept of a multipolar world as outdated, financially expensive, and potentially confrontational. Instead, they offered the concept of “selective engagement,” which they compared to Russia’s 19^th century policy of “self-concentration” after its defeat in the war with Crimea, and with China’s policy since Deng Xioping (Strategiya dlya Rossiyi 2000). For analyses of Putin’s Pragmatist philosophy see Tretyakov 2002; Meshkov 2002.

[9] Fukuyama’s perspective on the September 11 attack was that of a desperate backlash against the progressive modern Western world by “radically intolerant” “Islamo-fascists” (2002). Huntington’s response (2002) differed, but he too traced the violence to the Muslim world and downplayed the West’s exclusionary practices and a share of responsibility for the increase of violence in the world.