

in Gabriel A. Almond & Sydney Verba, eds.
The Civic Culture Revisited.
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CHAPTER II

The Structure of Inference

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ALTHOUGH THE BULK of *The Civic Culture* deals with the comparative description and analysis of the patterns and dimensions of five political cultures, the larger question that motivates the study and that is discussed extensively in the introductory and concluding chapters concerns the relationship between political culture and political structure. The dependent variable is the stability and effectiveness of democratic government. The identification of the independent variable presents a bit of a problem. In their preface, Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba state their main themes in the following words: "what the Greeks called civic virtue and its consequences for the effectiveness and stability of the democratic polity; and . . . the kind of community life, social organization, and upbringing of children that fosters civic virtue."¹ And the first sentence of the first chapter reads: "This is a study of the political culture of democracy and of the social structures and processes that sustain it."² These statements suggest that the argument is structured around three variables or sets of variables: the

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independent variables (social structures and processes), the intermediate variable (political culture, especially the degree of "civic virtue" or, as it is usually called, civic culture), and the dependent variable (democratic stability). Political culture is then narrowly defined as the pattern of cognitive, evaluative, and affective orientations toward *political* objects.

In their analysis, Almond and Verba approach the social structures and processes that sustain the political culture mainly through the subjective orientations of their respondents: the nonpolitical or not directly political culture. And they find that the political and nonpolitical culture are closely linked: "the political orientations that make up the civic culture are closely related to general social and interpersonal relations."³ The relationship is so close, in fact, that cooperativeness and social trust are called "a *component* of the civic culture."⁴ This suggests a somewhat broader definition of the term *political culture* and the fusion of the independent and intermediate variables into a single set of independent variables.

In my discussion of the structure of inference in *The Civic Culture*, I shall adhere to the narrower and purer definition of political culture, but concentrate on the links between political culture, to be treated as the independent variable, and political structure as the dependent variable, leaving aside the antecedent influence of the social structures and processes. The following methodological aspects of the investigation of this relationship must be examined: the measurement of the two basic variables, the selection of the cases for the comparative analysis, the nature of the relationship and in particular the question whether *The Civic Culture* commits the "individualistic fallacy," the causal direction, and the explanation of the relationship.

THE PROBLEM OF MEASUREMENT

POLITICAL STRUCTURE

Most of the efforts of measurement in *The Civic Culture* go into the measurement of various components of political culture and related aspects of the general culture. The political structure side of the relationship receives much more cursory attention. This can be justified on the ground that the former variable is less well known and therefore deserves a more

thorough examination. Brian Barry overstates the relative neglect of the political structure variable when he calls it "an extraordinary fact" that Almond and Verba "do not address themselves to the question how 'democratic' their five countries are." And he argues that what is needed is "either a criterion for the presence of relative amounts of . . . 'democracy,' or a scale . . . on which at least ordinal positions could be established."⁵

Four comments are in order here. A minor first point is that Almond and Verba's concern is with the stability of democracy rather than with democracy as such. A second equally small point is that they do indicate how stable their five democracies are: Great Britain and the United States are regarded as "the two relatively stable and successful democracies."⁶ My third comment follows from the previous one but is of greater substantive importance. The ideal way of measuring democratic stability would be to use an interval scale; the next best method is the ordinal scale that Barry recommends; and the least refined method is the dichotomous classification into more and less stable democracies that Almond and Verba use. But although the last method is a rough kind of measurement, there is nothing basically wrong with it. And the cross-tabulation of two dichotomously categorized variables gives a good idea of the strength of the relationship between them. To anticipate slightly, Almond and Verba find that Great Britain and the United States approximate the civic culture and that the other three countries deviate quite considerably from this ideal. If we dichotomize the political culture variable, too, and then cross-tabulate it with democratic stability, we get the results shown in Table II.1.

Fourth, a more sophisticated measurement of democratic stability has a number of drawbacks that the admittedly crude dichotomous classification does not have. Let us assume that we would operationalize democratic stability and arrive at a cardinal scale with values from 100 to 0. Such a scale would be acceptable only if Great Britain and the United States turned out to have values that were very close together and if the other three countries had considerably lower values; enough is known about these countries (with the possible exception of Mexico) for us to rely on intersubjective expert judgment, and there is little doubt that the experts would be close to

TABLE II.1. *Civic Culture and Democratic Stability* (2 × 2 Table)
Civic Culture

		Civic Culture	
		High	Low
Democratic Stability	High	Great Britain United States (2)	(0)
	Low	(0)	Germany Italy Mexico (3)

unanimous on this ranking (at least as of 1959–60, when the citizenship surveys were conducted). This also means that the whole procedure of operationalization is not really necessary. Robert A. Dahl ran into this problem when he tried to measure polyarchy as accurately as possible. When he inspected the results of his operationalization, he discovered that France appeared in the same low category as Bolivia, and that therefore “France was badly misplaced.” He then disregarded his operational code and simply reassigned France to a higher category.⁷ This difficulty indicates both that the measurement of all the other countries of which much less is known than about France should be taken with a grain of salt and that the “careful” measurement of the better-known countries can be dispensed with because it is acceptable only when it is in agreement with intersubjective expert opinion. Moreover, a simple ranking of the five countries would not be much of an improvement over the dichotomous classification because Britain and the United States would have to be given approximately the same rank, and so would Germany and Italy.

Almond and Verba freely admit their reliance on their subjective judgments for the classification of the five countries: “a brief glance at history will tell which of these [nations] are more stable.”⁸ This, of course, raises the problem: To which period of history do the authors refer? As Barry states, “it would make a big difference whether or not one went back beyond 1945.”⁹ Almond and Verba do not specify this temporal

dimension, but they appear to have especially the post-World War II period in mind. In the German case, this is of crucial importance, and here it is clearly specified that the Bonn Republic is meant, for instance, when its new political structures are contrasted with the persistence of older attitudinal patterns.¹⁰

POLITICAL CULTURE

The measurement and analysis of the political cultures of the five countries in *The Civic Culture* is based on a wealth of survey data. These data constitute hard and detailed evidence, which Almond and Verba use to measure various aspects of the five political cultures, but they do not provide a composite index to measure the degree of civic culture. The civic culture is described as a “cultural pattern” with “several significant components,” but there is no precise specification of either the empirical indicators of these components or the exact weight they contribute to the overall pattern.¹¹ The most important component appears to be subjective political competence, measured by two questions concerning the respondent’s perception of whether he can do something about an unjust or harmful national law or local regulation, and by a Guttman scale based on five questions about local political orientations and activity.¹² A person’s belief in his competence is described as “a key political attitude” and the “self-confident citizen” is called “the democratic citizen.”¹³

It is a weakness in the argument of *The Civic Culture* that the analytical step from the separate components of political culture to the degrees to which the five political cultures approximate the civic culture requires an impressionistic leap. On the other hand, the subjective judgment that the authors make does seem to be in rough agreement with the detailed empirical data, and it is not very likely that an operational measure of the civic culture would have led to a different ranking of the countries. The eventual classification is the result of three divisions. First, “the closest approximation to the civic culture” is found in Britain and the United States, whereas the other countries deviate from it to an important extent. Second, in the former category Britain is rated slightly higher because its political culture “represents a more effective

TABLE II.2. Civic Culture and Democratic Stability (4 × 2 Table)

		Civic Culture			
		High	Medium-high	Medium-low	Low
Democratic Stability	High	Great Britain (1)	United States (1)	(0)	(0)
	Low	(0)	(0)	Germany Mexico (2)	Italy (1)

combination of the subject and participant roles." And finally, in the category of weak civic cultures, a further division is made between Germany and Mexico, which "have some of the components of the civic culture," and Italy, which is deficient in most respects.¹⁴ This fourfold classification of political cultures means that Table II.1 must be amended (see Table II.2). The relationship between the variables remains a perfect one.

The time element does not present a problem with regard to the measurement of the political culture variable. It is determined by the periods in which the surveys were conducted (1959 and 1960). The preface to *The Civic Culture* characterizes the study as "a snapshot in a rapidly changing world."¹⁵ Actually, the underlying assumption is that political cultures change only slowly. It requires the most revolutionary and traumatic upheavals as well as deliberate efforts to change the political culture to accelerate the process, as Verba has shown in a later study of Germany.¹⁶ But it is nevertheless the conclusion of *The Civic Culture* that the new democratic institutions of the Bonn Republic "have not taken root in the Germans' feelings toward politics and partisanship; earlier attitude patterns seem to persist among the people."¹⁷

A final problem concerning the measurement of political culture is what Stein Rokkan has criticized as the "strong nation-orientation of the survey design" and the tendency to present "straight comparisons between total national cross-sections."¹⁸ A more detailed analysis of differences within the five countries might have been interesting for its own sake, but the basic research design that focuses on the link between political

cultures and structures requires that the nations rather than subnational groups or individuals be treated as the cases for analysis. It should be noted, however, that Almond and Verba take a significant step below the national level; they argue that the "connections between sets of attitudes and the characteristics of the political system can be made more convincing by internal analysis of the attitudes within the nations." They illustrate this approach with the following example:

Suppose one finds that a particular attitude toward interpersonal relations exists most frequently in a system where political participation of a particular sort is most frequent; if one also finds that it is precisely those individuals who hold that attitude who are more likely to be the political participants, one can then support the hypothesis that the particular attitude is connected with a particular kind of participatory system.¹⁹

This kind of indirect evidence adds plausibility to a proposition stated at the systemic level but does not constitute proof. It also raises the danger of the individualistic fallacy, which will be discussed later.

THE SELECTION OF THE NATIONAL CASES

Three criteria for the selection of the cases investigated by Almond and Verba can be gleaned from *The Civic Culture*.²⁰ First, the countries must be democratic. Second, they must be nations with "a wide range of experience with democracy."²¹ This means that both countries "representing relatively successful experiments in democratic government" and those representing less successful experiences should be included.²² Third, there is a special reason for the inclusion of the United States: not only does it represent one extreme on the range of democratic stability—which would have justified its selection according to the second criterion—but it also serves as a bench mark because of all the prior political research performed in the United States. Almond and Verba state: "By far the greatest amount of empirical research on democratic attitudes has been done in the United States. . . . Our five-country study offers us the opportunity to escape from this American parochialism and to discover whether relations found in the American data are also encountered in democratic countries whose historical ex-

periences and political and social structures differ from one another."²³

These are unexceptionable criteria. The first one is dictated by the principal research question: democratic stability has to be examined in countries with democratic regimes. The second criterion is especially important: because only relatively few cases can be investigated, it is essential that they represent as wide a variation as possible on at least one of the variables in order to give a clear picture of the relationship between the variables. The usually most suitable method is to maximize the variance of the independent variable; the variance of the dependent variable should not be taken into consideration because this would prejudice the empirical question.²⁴ But the procedure can also be turned around by maximizing the variance of the dependent variable. This is what is done in *The Civic Culture*: the choice of cases is determined by the range they represent on the dependent variable of democratic stability. Finally, the inclusion of the United States as a bench mark contributes to making the research in this field cumulative.

Although the criteria are beyond reproach, the selection of the specific cases is open to legitimate criticism. In particular, Mexico appears to be a weak case, because it is doubtful that this country can be regarded as fully democratic. For instance, Dahl does not include it among the world's polyarchies or even among the near polyarchies. The location of Mexico in Dahl's low category 14 seems correct and differs considerably from the location of the other four countries in categories 3, 4, and 5.²⁵ A second weakness of the Mexican case is that it turned out to be impossible to draw a national representative sample in this country: only cities over 10,000 in population were surveyed. The authors call attention to this fact in a footnote and argue in an appendix that this discrepancy does not have serious consequences: "A comparison of the Mexican results with those for cities of the same size in the other four nations suggests that this difference in the sample does not distort the results."²⁶ This effort to compare the five urban samples is laudable and the optimistic suggestion based on it is to some extent reassuring, but it is only a suggestion and the fact remains that the four national samples and the Mexican urban sample are not really comparable. Secondary analyses of

the data of *The Civic Culture* have tended to omit the Mexican sample.²⁷

It would have been wiser to increase the variation of the democratic stability variable by choosing a case between Britain and the United States on one extreme and Germany and Italy on the other, instead of picking Mexico, which is so extreme that it does not fit the scale at all. According to this criterion, one of the smaller European democracies could have been selected. Almond and Verba themselves indicate in *The Civic Culture* that the Scandinavian countries, the Low Countries, and Switzerland are in an intermediate position, although they base this judgment on their impressions of the political cultures of these democracies rather than their stability.²⁸ But Almond's earlier theoretical writings reveal that he considers them to be in a middle position on the structural variable, too.²⁹ Actually, it was the authors' original intention to include Sweden in the sample and a preliminary version of the interview was even tested there, but shortly afterward the decision was made to substitute Mexico.³⁰ No explanation for this substitution is given, and in retrospect it appears to have been an unfortunate decision [see page 22].

THE INDIVIDUALISTIC FALLACY

The danger of the ecological fallacy has been widely discussed among social scientists in recent years. The reverse of this fallacy, the individualistic fallacy, has not received as much attention. Erwin K. Scheuch defines it as the incorrect inference of the conditions of higher-order systems from observations on lower-level units.³¹ Elsewhere he expresses this idea in slightly different words: "The danger of the individualistic fallacy is . . . present when the units of observation or counting are smaller than the units to which inferences are made."³² This fallacy is a special danger in research based partly or wholly on survey data, such as *The Civic Culture*. Moreover, it is important to consider the individualistic fallacy in this connection because *The Civic Culture* serves as Scheuch's major example of the fallacy.

There are two aspects of *The Civic Culture* that Scheuch criticizes: the first consists of the uses to which specific questions in the survey are put, and the second concerns the overall

relationship between civic culture and democratic stability. He points out that the individualistic fallacy arises when "ego's responses are treated as an observation of one's environment" or as "expert judgments."³³ Almond and Verba do use their questions in these ways, as they explicitly concede: "Though we only talk to individuals and do not observe them interacting with others or engaged in political activity, we do ask them about their attitudes toward others, their relations with others, their social activities, their organizational memberships, and their political activities."³⁴ Two points can be made in defense of this practice. One is that when Almond and Verba ask questions about the individual's environment, they are primarily interested in his subjective view of the environment instead of in its objective condition.³⁵ Second, to the extent that they do use individuals' responses as indicators of objective realities, this can be justified on the practical grounds that interviews with individual respondents are, as Scheuch himself admits, "vastly more economical" than direct observations of the units involved.³⁶

A much more serious charge is Scheuch's allegation that *The Civic Culture* commits the individualistic fallacy with regard to the main theoretical question treated in the book, which concerns the relationship between civic culture and democratic stability. He states that between-nation differences in responses to questions such as what one is proud of in one's country are "used as expressing stability of political institutions."³⁷ In my opinion, this charge is without foundation. The political stability of the five democracies is observed and measured quite independently of the results of the surveys. Almond and Verba make this point rather weakly when they say that political structures "might better be studied by some means other than a systematic survey."³⁸ But later on they state clearly that the classification into more and less stable democracy is made "on the basis of data outside of our study," and that the survey findings "are intended, not to replace, but to supplement other materials used for the analysis of political systems."³⁹ Furthermore, they warn against two dangers with regard to the relationship between political culture and structure. One is the unwarranted assumption of congruence between these two

variables.⁴⁰ The other is the tendency to circular reasoning. For instance, the stability of British democracy is often explained "in terms of a basic consensus among the British people. But what is the evidence for the consensus? If one looks carefully, it is often the existence of a stable political system."⁴¹ This circularity involves an inference from political structure to political culture. What Scheuch has in mind is the reverse circularity—from culture to structure. Since these two variables are first observed and measured independently and only then related to each other, neither type of circularity occurs.

CAUSE AND EFFECT

The civic culture is generally treated as the independent variable by Almond and Verba, and democratic stability as the dependent variable. The distinction between independent and dependent variables is purely of an analytical nature and does not necessarily imply that the independent variable is the cause and the dependent variable the effect. Critics of *The Civic Culture*, especially Carole Pateman and Brian Barry, have alleged that it does make this assumption and that it neglects the reverse causal relationship: instead of, or in addition to, political culture influencing political structure, the structure may affect the culture.

For instance, Barry asks the following question, which, he implies, Almond and Verba fail either to ask or to answer: "Might one not argue that a 'democratic' political culture—such as the 'civic culture'—is the *effect* of 'democratic' institutions?" And he continues by saying that there is a *prima facie* case for answering this question affirmatively: "If you ask people whether they expect to get fair treatment from civil servants or whether they think they could do anything about changing an unjust government regulation, it is possible that their replies add up to a fairly realistic assessment of the actual state of affairs, rather than, say, projections onto political life of childhood conclaves about the best place for a picnic."⁴² And he recommends that the question of the direction of causality be solved by studying the naturally occurring "crucial experiment" of a change in regime and by observing whether and when a change in political culture occurs. This is a good

suggestion, although, as Barry concedes, it runs into the obvious difficulty that "undemocratic régimes may be hostile to surveys which ask people what they think of their rulers."⁴³ A more practical method would be to repeat the same survey in a democracy that shows either a clear improvement or an evident deterioration in its stability and effectiveness. Instances of the latter type are not difficult to find in the 1960s and 1970s—and they include Britain and the United States! Such an effort to establish the exact cause-and-effect relationship of the variables would be worthwhile in spite of the fact that, as I shall argue presently, Barry is mistaken when he attributes the hypothesis of unidirectional causality to Almond and Verba.

In a review of the literature on political culture and participation in which *The Civic Culture* figures prominently, Carole Pateman criticizes the prevalent "one-sided view of the relationship between political culture and political structure" in which these variables are regarded as cause and effect respectively. The reverse causal relationship is neglected by Almond and Verba, she states, as a result of their narrow definition of political culture in terms of *psychological* orientations.⁴⁴ Consequently, it tends to be forgotten that political culture and structure are "mutually interdependent and reinforcing."⁴⁵

This last conclusion is precisely Almond and Verba's view, and to attribute any unidirectional hypothesis or theory to them entails a perplexing misinterpretation of *The Civic Culture*. First of all, Almond and Verba tend to use terms that are purposely neutral on the direction of causality to indicate the link between culture and structure: the civic culture is said to "fit," to be "particularly appropriate" for, and to be "most congruent" with a stable democracy.⁴⁶ Second, the fact that political structure can have an impact on political culture is implicit in the cognitive dimension of the concept of political culture. The political culture of a country consists of cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations toward political objects, and the cognitive orientation consists of "knowledge of and belief about the political system, its roles and the incumbents of these roles, its inputs, and its outputs."⁴⁷ Obviously, such knowledge and beliefs cannot fail to be influenced by the objective realities to at least some extent. An earlier definition, which narrowly equates culture with psychological orientation,

is indeed rather misleading, but this is corrected by the subsequent inclusion of its cognitive element.⁴⁸

Third, there are several explicit statements about the mutual impact of political culture and structure: for instance, "if one is interested in political orientation . . . one must expect to study attitudes and behavior that are affected by structural characteristics."⁴⁹ Or take the following example:

If the citizens in one country report more frequently than those in another that their government operates in their interest or that it can be trusted, this is a real difference in attitude with real consequences. But because the object of orientation differs (we are not, for instance, comparing, as one does in a single-nation survey, the attitudes of men and women toward the same government), it is more difficult to explain these differences in attitude toward government. To some extent the explanation may lie among the factors usually adduced in surveys to explain attitudes—social group, personality, other attitudes, and so forth. On the other hand, it may simply be that one government is *in fact more beneficial in its operation or more to be trusted* than another. Or it may be both—the two types of explanation do not necessarily contradict each other.⁵⁰

The authors also indicate their conviction that such factors as socialization, political orientation, and political structure and process must be treated as "separate variables in a *complex, multidirectional system of causality*."⁵¹

A final point that should be noted is that Almond and Verba repeatedly argue that adult experience in politics rather than childhood socialization is crucial in the formation of political attitudes. Their initial hypothesis is that, in contrast to earlier work on political attitudes, their own research will show that "the importance . . . of *experience with the political system* has been seriously underemphasized."⁵² The performance of political structures is therefore both a cause and an effect of the political culture.

ELITE POLITICAL CULTURE AND ELITE PERFORMANCE

The final question that must be asked about the relationship between the civic culture and democratic stability concerns the explanation of the empirical link between the two variables. Why are high degrees of democratic stability and of civic cul-

ture, which is a judicious mixture of activist and deferential orientations, mutually reinforcing? As far as one of the directions of causality is concerned—the impact of structure on culture—no lengthy explanations are required. A stable and effectively functioning democracy is bound to stimulate a high level of subjective political competence but also a much lower level of actual participation because of the infrequent necessity of becoming involved in politics when the system operates satisfactorily. With regard to the other direction of the causal link, the explanation is more complicated and controversial. Almond and Verba argue that the civic culture is conducive to stable democracy because there has to be a balance between the responsiveness and the power of governmental elites: “elite responsiveness requires that the ordinary citizen act according to the rationality-activist model of citizenship. But . . . if elites are to be powerful and make authoritative decisions, then the involvement, activity, and influence of the ordinary man must be limited.”⁵³

This means that the “governing behavior” of the elites is an intermediate variable in the causal link from civic culture to democratic stability. This factor is similar to what Almond and Verba call “role culture,” especially the culture of those roles specialized in the formulation and execution of government policies.⁵⁴ But no attempt is made to measure elite political culture and behavior either by a systematic survey or by an impressionistic ranking or classification of the five national governmental elites. Because of the strong relationship between the civic culture and stable democracy, the implicit assumption is that in the Anglo-American countries in which the civic culture is approximated, the governing elites possess the favorable mixture of responsiveness and effective power. But as Carole Pateman rightly asserts, particularly with regard to the assumption of elite responsiveness, this is a “premise rather than a conclusion.”⁵⁵ Her criticism on this score is, it seems to me, the substantive crux of her entire critique of *The Civic Culture*: the assumption that there is an optimal level of elite responsiveness in Britain and the United States disregards the possibility that more participation may both require and foster a higher level of responsiveness than this “optimal” one

without necessarily having an adverse effect on governmental performance.⁵⁶

Whether or not the balance between power and responsiveness can safely shift to the advantage of the latter component without endangering the overall stability of the system is an empirical question.⁵⁷ This question is not answered by Almond and Verba, but neither is it answered by their critics. In my opinion, Almond and Verba's assumption remains a good deal more plausible than the alternative hypothesis, which overlooks that too much participation may result in governmental immobilism and that increases in participation may well entail greater inequality of participation—and therefore increasingly unequal political influence—among individual citizens. The fact that the two countries where people have long enjoyed various forms of direct democracy such as the referendum and the initiative—Switzerland and the United States—are also rather conspicuously among the politically more conservative and socially and economically less equal Western democracies should serve as a warning to unrestrained advocates of participatory democracy.

The objection raised by Pateman concerns the explanation of the causal link between a *high* level of civic culture and a *high* level of democratic stability. There is a similar but, to my mind, more serious problem with regard to the explanation of the connection between *low* levels of both civic culture and democratic stability. Almond and Verba state that “perhaps the most significant deviations from the civic culture occur in the political participation and commitment” in the three relatively unstable countries. Especially in Germany and Italy, participant orientations are not well developed, and passivity and even alienation are pervasive attitudes. If the reasoning applied to the British and American cases is applied here, we would expect that such passive orientations would make the governmental elites powerful and effective but not very responsive. Britain is said to have a balance of active and passive roles but, in contrast to the United States, this balance in Britain “tends somewhat in the direction of the subject, deferential pole.” As a result, there are “strong and effective governments” in Britain but “the extent of democracy” may be

rather limited.⁵⁸ Germany and Italy tilt even more strongly in the direction of passive attitudes, and their governments should therefore be high on effectiveness and low on democratic responsiveness. In other words, this line of reasoning links an inadequate civic culture to the poor quality of democracy instead of to democratic instability. Since it is the latter empirical finding that must be accounted for, this explanation is not satisfactory.

The second explanation that Almond and Verba attempt stresses the elements of cooperativeness and social trust in the civic culture: "In comparison with Great Britain and the United States, Germany, Italy, and Mexico have relatively low levels of social and interpersonal trust." One effect of this deficiency is that it inhibits political participation. But what is more important is that, particularly in Germany and Italy, the "lack of ability to cooperate politically reflects a more general inability to enter political bargains, to collaborate, and to aggregate interests. The society divides up into closed and relatively hostile camps."⁵⁹ This argument generalizes from mass to elite attitudes and plausibly explains democratic instability and ineffectiveness in terms of the inability of the leaders of antagonistic political subcultures to reach agreement on public policy. The weakness of the second explanation is that it overlooks the possibility that the leaders of antagonistic subcultures will *not* behave antagonistically toward each other; as the writers belonging to the consociational school have emphasized, stable democracy may be achieved by means of cooperative arrangements at the elite level in spite of the division of the political culture into hostile subcultures at the mass level. It should also be pointed out that a passive and deferential mass political culture is congruent with consociational democracy because it gives the subcultural elites the necessary leeway to reach compromises on potentially explosive issues.⁶⁰ The best empirical examples of consociational democracy are Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands. In a previous section, the omission of the smaller European democracies from *The Civic Culture* was criticized on the basis of Almond and Verba's own criteria. We now have an additional reason to regret that not at least one of the consociational democracies was included in the sample of countries.

FUTURE RESEARCH ON POLITICAL CULTURE AND DEMOCRATIC STABILITY

What are the lessons to be drawn from *The Civic Culture* for possible replications of this study? With regard to those aspects of *The Civic Culture* that I have defended against its critics, I naturally offer no suggestions for change. My criticisms, of course, do imply that improvements should be made in future research of this kind, but they cannot be translated directly into specific recommendations. For instance, my suggestion to repeat basically the same survey in the same democracy with intervals of a few years when its stability is clearly either improving or deteriorating in order to establish the causal direction of the relationship between the civic culture and democratic stability requires either a knack for predicting political changes or a lucky break. With the advantage of hindsight, it is easy to say that a repetition of the 1959-60 surveys in Britain and the United States in, say, 1965, 1970, and 1975 would have yielded highly valuable data for the question under consideration, but it is far more difficult to have had the foresight to make such plans in 1960.

It is also much easier to indicate the countries that should ideally have been included in the 1959-60 sample of *The Civic Culture*, instead of or in addition to the five that were in fact included, than to decide which of these should be included in future cross-national studies. According to Almond and Verba's own estimate, one of the Scandinavian countries should have been included as a representative of intermediate democratic stability. Now, approximately two decades later, such advice can still be given, although experts would probably agree that the Scandinavian democracies should be rated higher on this dimension, especially in comparison with the Anglo-American countries. It would have been even more interesting to have had one of the consociational democracies in the original study. As a matter of fact, we now know that they reached their high point of consociational development in the late 1950s—exactly at the time that the five countries of *The Civic Culture* were surveyed—and that they have been declining since then.⁶¹ The inclusion of one or more of them in a new survey would still be of considerable value, but the best opportunity has un-

fortunately been lost. Another suggestion would be to consider the inclusion of Canada and/or Israel, both of which have sufficient consociational characteristics to be regarded as semi-consociational democracies.⁶² Finally, an obvious and unequivocal recommendation that can be made is that future surveys of mass political culture be complemented by explicit attempts to measure the intermediate variable of the patterns of elite political culture.

In conclusion, I should like to point out that my methodological critique as well as the few rather general recommendations that I have made here concern only a quite limited aspect of *The Civic Culture*. The main question that motivates and dominates it, and the treatment of which I have looked at from various angles, is the culture/structure relationship. But the answer to this question is not the major significance of the book; for one thing, it is not a totally surprising answer. The more important contribution of *The Civic Culture* is its painstakingly careful description and analysis of the details of five political cultures. Its purpose is not only hypothesis testing at the macro level but also, and more significantly, exploration and discovery of patterns of attitudes at the micro level. I agree with Philip E. Converse's judgment that a major accomplishment of *The Civic Culture* is its "success in objectifying some of the 'flavor' of differences in political culture which, like Mark Twain's weather, everyone has talked vaguely about but nobody has done much about in a systematic way."⁶³ It strengthens the structure of inference with regard to the key question, and it is also an achievement in its own right.

NOTES

1. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1963), p. vii.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 493.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 490 (italics added).
5. Brian Barry, *Sociologists, Economists and Democracy* (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1970), p. 50.
6. Almond and Verba, *Civic Culture*, p. 473; see also p. 479.
7. Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1971), p. 243. I apologize to Professor Dahl for bringing up this example once more after already having used it in two earlier papers; see Arend Lijphart, "Toward Empirical Democratic Theory: Re-

search Strategies and Tactics," *Comparative Politics* 4, no. 3 (April 1972): 427-28, and Lijphart, "The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research," *Comparative Political Studies* 8, no. 2 (July 1975): 170. My excuse is that it is such a striking example. I should also like to emphasize that I agree with Dahl's decision to follow his own expert opinion instead of the mechanical outcome of the operationalization in this case.

8. Almond and Verba, *Civic Culture*, p. 74.
9. Barry, *Sociologists*, p. 50.
10. Almond and Verba, *Civic Culture*, p. 119.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 440.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 218, 231.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 257.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 455, 479, 497.
15. *Ibid.*, p. vii.
16. Sidney Verba, "Germany: The Remaking of Political Culture," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1965), pp. 130-70.
17. Almond and Verba, *Civic Culture*, p. 119.
18. Stein Rokkan, review of *The Civic Culture* in *American Political Science Review* 58, no. 3 (September 1964): 677.
19. Almond and Verba, *Civic Culture*, p. 75.
20. It is striking how even quite serious critics miss obvious points in the books that they review. For instance, Barry remarks that "Almond and Verba do not explain the rationale of their choice of countries for study" (p. 52), although early in *The Civic Culture* (p. 12) the authors signal their intention to do so, and then devote no less than five pages to this question (pp. 36-41).
21. Almond and Verba, *Civic Culture*, pp. 9-10 (italics added).
22. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 12; see also p. 55.
24. See Lijphart, "The Comparable-Cases Strategy," pp. 163-64.
25. Dahl, *Polyarchy*, pp. 232-33, 248.
26. Almond and Verba, *Civic Culture*, p. 46, 509.
27. See, for instance, Giuseppe Di Palma, *Apathy and Participation: Mass Politics in Western Societies* (New York: The Free Press, 1970).
28. Almond and Verba, *Civic Culture*, p. 8.
29. Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics* 18, no. 3 (August 1956), esp. pp. 392-93, 405.
30. Almond and Verba, *Civic Culture*, p. 48.
31. Erwin K. Scheuch, "Social Context and Individual Behavior," in Mattei Dogan and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1969), p. 138.
32. Erwin K. Scheuch, "Cross-National Comparisons Using Aggregate Data: Some Substantive and Methodological Problems," in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1966), p. 164.
33. Scheuch, "Social Context and Individual Behavior," p. 139.
34. Almond and Verba, *Civic Culture*, p. 73.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 70.
36. Scheuch, "Social Context and Individual Behavior," p. 140.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 141.
38. Almond and Verba, *Civic Culture*, p. 68.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 74, 75.

40. Ibid., p. 34.
41. Ibid., p. 47; see also p. 50.
42. Barry, *Sociologists*, p. 51.
43. Ibid., p. 52.
44. Carole Pateman, "Political Culture, Political Structure and Political Change," *British Journal of Political Science* 1, no. 3 (July 1971): 292, 293.
45. Ibid., p. 302.
46. Almond and Verba, *Civic Culture*, pp. 473, 493, 498.
47. Ibid., p. 15.
48. Ibid., p. 14.
49. Ibid., p. 68.
50. Ibid., p. 65 (italics added).
51. Ibid., p. 35 (italics added); see also p. 473.
52. Ibid., p. 34; see also pp. 373, 489-99.
53. Ibid., p. 478.
54. Ibid., pp. 29-31.
55. Pateman, "Political Culture," p. 302.
56. High levels of political participation may also be advocated because participation is considered a value in its own right and regardless of its effect on elite power and indirectly on democratic stability, but this question is not at issue here.
57. See Stanley Rothman, "Functionalism and Its Critics: An Analysis of the Writings of Gabriel Almond," *Political Science Reviewer* 1 (Fall 1971): 254-58.
58. Almond and Verba, *Civic Culture*, pp. 493-95.
59. Ibid., p. 494.
60. Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," *World Politics* 21, no. 2 (January 1969), esp. pp. 221-22. See also the collection of writings on this subject edited by Kenneth D. McRae, *Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974), and Hans Daalder's critical review "The Consociational Democracy Theme," *World Politics* 26, no. 4 (July 1974): 604-21.
61. Val R. Lorwin, "Segmented Pluralism: Ideological Cleavages and Political Cohesion in the Smaller European Democracies," *Comparative Politics* 3, no. 2 (January 1971): 163-67.
62. See Kenneth D. McRae, "Consociationalism and the Canadian Political System," in McRae, ed., *Consociational Democracy*, pp. 238-61, and K. Z. Paltiel, "The Israeli Coalition System," *Government and Opposition* 10, no. 4 (Autumn 1975): 397-414.
63. Philip E. Converse, review of *The Civic Culture in Political Science Quarterly* 79, no. 4 (December 1964): 593.