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Corporatism and Comparative Politics

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After World War II, scholars in comparative politics came to share a belief that pluralism was a necessary bulwark against totalitarianism. Nazi totalitarianism had brought on that war, and one of the war's most terrible products was the spread of totalitarian Stalinism. Pluralism was set against communism and the contrasts sharply drawn; prior to the 1980s almost no one talked about pluralism *within* communism. Pluralism also provided a way to describe the historical process of change that had already taken place in Europe and was under way in its former colonies. This historical movement, which came to be represented by the concept of development, was described in terms of specialization, differentiation, and integration, pluralism's central concepts. A link was established between normative concerns (pluralist democracy) and historical changes that people saw, such as the growth of bureaucracy. Pluralism did not provide comprehensive explanatory or causal theories any more than did other approaches, although it pointed usefully to the pressures of groups as a way of explaining many outcomes such as election results or policies. Its main contribution was interpretive. Pluralism successfully provided a meaningful framework for a wide range of important phenomena. Considerable scholarly energy was generated based on the concepts of pluralism, sufficient to organize and inspire a vast amount of research.

The intellectual history of comparative politics in the 1960s and 1970s was dominated by the criticism and transformation of the pluralist approach. Marxism in one form or another was the most prolific source of criticism, particularly after the political movements of the 1960s, but many of the ideas in corporatism also played an important part in transforming the pluralist vision.

One attraction of corporatism is its frequent emphasis on several alternative historical patterns in place of the single dichotomy of pluralist differentiation or totalitarian force, which was both ethnocentric and simplistic.¹ Corporatism is also an ideological alternative. In the past it had opposed liberalism (which had much in common with pluralism), most prominently in the

1920s and 1930s, when corporatism was associated with fascism. That fascism is currently politically anathema does not alter the fact that it *was* an alternative. At other times corporatism has been linked with nothing more terrible than, say, papal social thought.

Unlike pluralism, corporatism paid attention to political structures and variables that analysts have since identified as dynamic and highly influential in shaping current affairs. In pluralism, the importance of the state was largely disregarded. Pluralists were locked into a view of multiple groups held together by a regulatory state. The drive, the energy, and the initiative in society came from groups that were organized and operated in the private sphere. Corporatism, in contrast, starts with the state and defines group interests in terms of their relations to the state.

What does corporatism have to offer as an alternative to the pluralist research paradigm? Could corporatism shape a school of thought as pluralism has done? Of course, one concept cannot substitute exactly for another: A concept at this level is too complex to serve precisely the same function as another concept. Yet corporatism and pluralism do play similar roles. Both are explanatory and interpretive, serving analytical and ideological purposes. Within the small world of comparative politics, corporatism does not yet serve as a major organizing idea for research and theory building, but it has considerable potential.

This review of what corporatism has to offer begins with a look at the process of theory construction in comparative politics. The first part of this chapter will consider the meaning of "corporatism." The second part will discuss what role corporatism plays in theory construction and research design. The last section will evaluate corporatism's potential contribution to comparative politics.

THE MEANINGS OF CORPORATISM

"Corporatism" is an ambiguous term. This is to be expected because it serves many purposes. It provides guidance for research, plays a part in political discourse, and contributes to theory. In each one of those contexts it picks up diverse meanings. Ambiguity, however, is not always a drawback. If we were constructing a tightly wrought proposition or theory, it would be, but corporatism is far from doing that. In pointing a way or suggesting approaches, ambiguity can be positive. The corporatist concept is a frame through which we may tentatively enter a new domain. It is not a precise template for drawing conclusions, but a rough map that guides scholars in exploring the major features of the new terrain.

Like many terms in political science, corporatism is used by political movements and activists to rally support and define a political position. As such it is the object of scrutiny by political scientists as a symbol that plays a role in political affairs independent of the scholar. Corporatism also has an analytical role as an instrument used by scholars in understanding politics. This double level of symbolism is the normal state of affairs for political scientists, but it complicates the job of theory construction.

The concept's twofold character is particularly relevant because "corporatism" as a political symbol is much more highly charged (negatively so) than, say, "pluralism." Many scholars writing on the subject find it necessary to open their analysis with a disclaimer. Because of corporatism's association with fascism in most readers' minds, a scholar's first task is to establish his or her detachment. Corporatism may never play a very strong role in "pure" analysis because it is so negatively charged. Many U.S. scholars have similar problems with using "communism" as an analytical concept. The associations of the term "corporatism" gave it a certain shock value in the 1960s that made its use vivid and interesting, but if it is to play an important analytical role, the concept may need a new name.

State-Group Relationships

Probably the most commonly assumed meaning of corporatism concerns the relationship between interests and the governing apparatus. The image of a corporatist relationship that comes most readily to mind is that of a formal organization representing a major economic or professional interest before state officials within the framework of an official institution. Take, for example, a business association in an official government consultative council. The group is *corporate*, and is *incorporated* into the state.²

Philippe Schmitter's definition, which is centered on the state-group relationship, is often cited despite its complexity. It seeks to achieve the widest possible application.

Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.³

Although Schmitter does, in this definition, refer to a "system of representation" all of the distinguishing characteristics of this definition of corporatism concern the way individual groups relate to the state.

A central aspect of Schmitter's definition is the definite legal (or conventional) form that corporatist relationships take. These forms set the general terms of an exchange relationship that defines the interdependence of the interest organization and the government officials. The content of the exchange specifies the relative power of the group and the state and defines the degree of mutual autonomy. The legal quality of this relationship is crucial to corporatism. This is not to say that corporatism dwells on mere legal formalities, laws on paper that are often ignored in practice. It also includes customary and informal patterns as well. But it insists on drawing attention to whatever specifies rights and obligations and norms of behavior. More than pluralism and Marxism, corporatism emphasizes the direct connection between law and power and between law and interest.

As compared to the pluralist view, the distinctive quality of corporatist studies is their attention to the state. Pluralism places the bargaining and confrontation between groups at the center of its analysis, but corporatism does not see interest groups mainly in terms of their relationship to other interest groups. Those relations (conflictual or cooperative) are controlled by the formal requirements of the law, and the group's life is shaped by its exchange relationship with the state. This relationship determines the power of the state over the group and, conversely, the ability of the group to exploit its privileged position vis-à-vis state authorities to its own advantage. The pluralist view conceives of the state in essentially regulatory terms. Few pluralists would limit the state's actual behavior to the watchdog role posited by early liberals, and most recognize the importance and extent of regulation. But in a pluralist model the state is not a constituent part of interests, as it is in corporatism. Rather, it remains external to those interests, setting boundaries, rules, and incentives.

The Marxian, or class model does place more emphasis on the importance of the relationships between the state and societal groups. Class analysis pays close attention to the exchange or power relationship, which determines whether the state is being used to control one group on behalf of another.⁴ However, it considers formal relationships to be merely changeable forms for establishing domination. Corporatism, on the other hand, makes those formal relationships a topic of central concern, for they are seen as the building blocks of the whole structure.

One of the qualities of a state-group relationship that gives it a corporatist character is suggested by Schmitter's use of the term "monopoly." Only one group is given the right to speak for a specified category of people. Schmitter is referring most particularly to the identification of a single organization to represent that category on various councils of state, such as an official trade organization or a labor union.

The "monopoly" associated with corporatism also can refer to the exclusive authority from the state to regulate a specified sphere of social activity. For example, in most societies the state gives doctors the exclusive right to practice medicine and gives their professional association the right to determine who can be a doctor and what standards they should uphold. In some contemporary authoritarian states, official labor organizations have a different, but related form of status, in that only one labor union organization is tolerated and all workers must belong to it. The union organization acquires the power to determine who can work, and who shall benefit from state services related to the members' status as workers.

"Monopoly" may be an unfortunate choice of words, however, to describe either the representational or social regulating function of corporatist organizations. It suggests broad control over a relatively stable set of people. In modern societies diverse and rapidly changing social structures imply that the boundaries of any particular occupational category are overlapping and constantly shifting. Courts and legislatures are constantly arbitrating between them and redrawing their boundaries. Sometimes college professors

are workers and sometimes they constitute a separate profession. Farmers are sometimes considered part of the business community and sometimes a sort of self-employed working class. Even in one of the best defined spheres, the practice of medicine has its boundary problems. Legally, chiropractors are partly in and partly out of the practice of medicine.

The shifting boundaries mean that monopoly status in the sense of exclusive control over a fixed group is always problematical.⁵ For corporatism the most relevant sense of the phrase "granting a monopoly," however, is rather the active state role in defining and redefining both the powers of these organizations and the group they control and represent. The state creates "official" or "legally recognized" organizations. In a highly authoritarian corporatist society, the government may carry out this active role one step further by actively suppressing any competing claimants, but even in nonrepressive corporatist societies, the notion conveyed by the term "monopoly" lies in the official grant of rights and privileges, rather than the total control of a fixed social category.

The most important subdivision of corporatism is based on variations in the power relationship between interest groups and the state. There are state-dominated groups and group-dominated states. Schmitter refers to "societal" and "state" corporatism. The state-dominated version is associated with authoritarianism and dependent developing countries.⁶ The "societal" form is more an evolution—perhaps a corruption—of liberalism.

Sometimes, unfortunately, this distinction is ignored. On the one hand, the association of corporatism with fascism has encouraged many to write about corporatist relationships as if their defining characteristic was the dominance of the state. On the other, one can also find "corporatism" used to emphasize—reasonably enough—the importance and dominance of corporations. As with all typologies based on power relationships, it is questionable how clear and stable these types are in practice. Societal groups have different degrees of power over different dimensions of their relationship to the state, and this balance varies with time.

Corporatism as a Regime

"Corporatism" is also used to refer to a comprehensive organization of political society beyond state-group relationships. This is the conventional application of the term for, say, Italian Fascism, which sought to replace the system of parties and parliament with a system of corporatist bodies, in which "all" interests would have a firm and fixed role in the political decisionmaking process. In fact, although much of the legal apparatus for this was constructed, corporatism was never completely implemented in Italy. This is not unusual. Incomplete implementation is a major finding in almost every study about almost every corporatist experiment.⁷ On these grounds, it would be easy to dismiss all corporatist pretensions to describe regimes, especially if one assumes that the only form that corporatist relationships may take is that of constitutionally established councils of

corporations. This was how constitutional theorists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries spoke of corporatism.

This vision of corporatism as a regime is unduly restrictive, however. It is more useful to apply "corporatism" to any comprehensive set of relationships in which the major interests in society have been brought into a formal, specified set of exchange relationships with the state.

Almost no modern state has a council of corporations, yet several qualities are central as criteria for labeling some of them "corporatist." The first two are extensions to the entire system of relations that hold between one corporatist group and the state. One may say that a corporatist regime exists when most major groups in society are corporatist, that is, defined in legal terms with specific sets of rights and duties. The regime would not be corporatist if there was a constant redefinition of groups based, say, on negotiating power. To be corporatist, a regime must also have a relatively fixed pattern of representation, in which some definition of the important interests in society is established, maintained, and changed only with deliberation. If the groups relevant to policymaking were redefined on every issue, the system could not be considered corporatist.

Although these two criteria are clearly satisfied by a council of corporations or by other traditional corporatist deliberative bodies, they would also be satisfied by a stable but more informal pattern of comprehensive consultations, indicative planning bodies, and the like.⁸ The regularity of ties, resting on a certain explicitness and stability, distinguishes them from pluralist arrangements. Obviously, this is a matter of degree. If regulatory agencies develop fixed clienteles, with—by custom or by law—privileged status for some groups, this is a move toward corporatism. Similarly, if corporatist institutions become more fluid in ways that bypass administrative decision, they are becoming pluralist.

On another level, corporatism implies something about how a system handles conflicts between groups. In the pluralist model, the primary form of interaction between groups is negotiation or bargaining. The class model of politics assumes either solidarity (between similarly placed groups) or irreconcilable conflict, with the first case represented by the marketplace, and the latter by war. In the corporatist model, the interaction between groups is carefully regulated by the instrumentalities of the state, and some planned, rational outcome is to be expected. If bargaining is the model for pluralism, and military conflict the model for class theory, then bureaucratic planning seems to be the model for corporatism. Like liberalism, corporatism assumes that interest groups do not stand in hostile contradiction, but rather postulates a regulated framework in which groups resolve conflicts guided by representatives of the community, the servants of the state. Corporatism has much in common with socialism's understanding of society after the end of class conflict. In that utopia, a fundamental harmony of groups within the state would presumably be achieved. Corporatist theory holds that this harmony is possible in the short run, and need not wait for the transformation of society.⁹

The need for methods to reconcile the bitter conflicts of the early twentieth century was one of the main impulses for the ideology of corporatism. Because corporatism has often been formulated as an explicit alternative both to the "chaos" and "greed" seen as products of the liberal model and to the bitter struggle foreseen by theorists of class conflict, it is not surprising that the controlled, nondestructive character of corporatist relationships is emphasized by corporatist theorists, particularly conservative ones.

Two problems remain with these definitions: (1) specifying what interests are representable and (2) determining whether there is any implied equality in the representations of various groups.

What sorts of interests are represented in a corporatist regime? Corporatism, like pluralism and Marxism, makes "interest" a central concept, but like them, never succeeds in defining it operationally. Thus, a definitive listing of legitimate interests to be represented in a corporatist regime is not available. In root versions of corporatism, these interests were associated with specific functional roles, prominently including the army, the church, and commercial and artisans' guilds. These versions apply to pre-absolutist days in Europe and to the colonial period in Latin America, when (at least in retrospect) the organizations in question were well developed and the boundaries between them clearly defined.

In contemporary societies the application is more difficult. Pluralists and Marxists begin with interest groups that are generated in society and explore their interaction. Pluralists assume no fixed definitions of interests; Marxists build primary definitions of interests around relationships to material production processes. In corporatism, however, interests are assumed to be limited and given—in contrast to pluralism—and are assumed to be determined by their function for the community as a whole, not by their dialectical confrontation around production or any other process. There is, however, no widely agreed-upon set of functions, and therefore no established set of corporatist interest groups. Most self-consciously implemented schemes in this century (for example, in Portugal and Italy) appear to begin with a quasi-Marxist definition of classes, broaden the definition to include all major economic interests, and add the professions. There seem to be no specifically corporatist interests. The lack of precision here is a real problem for corporatism, and I shall return to it in our evaluation.

Does a regime qualify as corporatist if restrictions are sharply imposed on some segments of the population and privileged access granted to others? In many states—Latin American bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, for example—no broad-based councils exist, yet labor is caught in a state-dominated legal structure and certain economic interests have privileged legal status. Should these be denied the label "corporatist"? It has been argued with much justification that corporatist language was used in these cases as a smokescreen for the implementation of strong governmental controls over labor and dissident political groups.¹⁰

Evenhandedness does *not* seem to be part of a definition of corporatism. Rather, the very diversity and specificity of ways in which different groups

establish links with the state and are treated by the state is the hallmark of corporatism. In many cases that concerned scholars in the 1970s and 1980s—the imposition of authoritarian controls in military takeovers in Latin America and elsewhere in the Third World—the imposition of unequal controls was clearly the product of a particular historical situation. With whatever justice, the military could claim that their unequal treatment of various groups in society was to correct the imbalances of the prior regime. In other words, the contrast in treatment accorded different segments of the population under corporatism is not only possible, but expected. There must, however, be some criteria of “appropriate inequalities,” presumably based on the quality of a group’s contribution to the community good. The nature of the interests represented would, one imagines, dictate the sort of link (including the power and exchange relationship) that the group has with the state. And since the specification of the appropriate interests is already problematic in corporatism, there is not much to help us in dealing with this question.

Clearly the concept of a corporatist regime is highly normative—more a matter of ideals than ideal types. The good things that would result from a successful corporatist regime substitute for a concrete description of just what that society would entail. One is left with a utopian picture in which there is a place for everything and everything is in its place. In this imagined regime, all important groups are represented in the formal structures of the state, and the state monitors and guides their interactions to avoid violent or otherwise illegitimate conflict and to secure stability and peace, appropriate rewards, and collective effectiveness. This is an image of an organic state.¹¹

In the corporatist utopia, there is a formal structure that (in specific contrast to an ideal of equality) accords recognition to members of society based on the quality of their contributions, mediated through groups and institutions. Political interaction is regulated by a notion of the common good, and institutions enforce that notion. The spheres of life are carefully delimited.

Corporatism as an Ideology

As the suffix of the word implies, “corporatism” is often used to denote not only a form of relationship, but a set of beliefs about those relationships. In other words, it may be used in the way we have been discussing so far, to identify and explain a set of practices and institutions, but it also may refer to a set of beliefs held by people who value those practices and institutions and seek to bring them about. When theories are used politically in this way, they become ideologies, and corporatism has most certainly been an ideology. In order to understand the meanings of “corporatism,” then, we must look at the political purposes to which it has been put.

The corporatist ideology has always served an established interest or institution (although not necessarily the dominant one). It has never been consistently used by or for the alienated or isolated. Efforts—for example, in Fascist Italy—to adapt corporatism to aggressively pro-working class

movements have all failed. Despite this element of consistency, corporatism’s political role has changed dramatically over the years.¹² In the early nineteenth century, corporatist theory was applied in the political disputes over the roles of the church and the state in society, and the corporatist ideology was a bulwark for the church against the encroachment of the state. Corporatism asserted the rights of established entities to govern themselves and their members. Later in the nineteenth century, with the rise of the “spectre of socialism,” the corporatist ideology was applied to protect the church and the state against the encroachments of the working class.

Liberalism, while decrying the role of the state in matters touching on business, actively encouraged it to take over many of what the church considered its essential functions. Corporatism was used to defend and legitimize the privileged autonomy of the corporation—in this case, the church. Against socialism, which posed a different kind of threat, corporatism had an almost contrary function (although there were elements of the traditional threat to the church’s functions when socialism was in power). Until the Russian Revolution, the socialist threat perceived by corporatists was the radical claim to autonomy presented in socialist theory, which went far beyond the claim of the corporatists. The socialists represented the proletariat, a class, they argued, that had no ties to the existing community that were to be valued. Against this radical claim to separateness, corporatist theory insisted on the integral nature of the community. The emphasis during this phase of corporatism’s political role was on the harmony of classes and on the fundamental interdependence of the parts of society.

With the rise to power of the fascists and their preemption of corporatist ideology for political purposes, the emphasis changed once again, this time perhaps a bit more subtly, from the natural harmony of the community to an insistence on the duty, obligation, and right of the state, now conceived as an active force, to suppress fragmentation and enforce unity. Corporatism had come full circle, from an ideology that defended the rights of autonomous organizations against the state apparatus to the ideology of that apparatus as it sought to suppress independent organizations. Although such shifts in political meaning are not unique to corporatism, it is striking how large the reversals of its political role have been.

Corporatism is now rarely invoked as a political ideology. The association with fascism was so strong and so negative that it would take a daring political leader (or one blinded by political hatreds) to adopt the term willingly. It has been used more as a term of invective than as a proud identification of the guiding ideas of a regime, although there are some exceptions. Salazar in Portugal hung on to the term to the end, reflecting the profoundly conservative bias of that regime. The Peruvians apparently sought to adopt corporatism for their own purposes during the regime of the “progressive military.”¹³ By and large, however, the term is now used negatively. Governments are called corporatist in political discourse to identify an undesirable characteristic, particularly to establish an association with the fascists and to emphasize the aggressive use of the state to repress dissent—particularly dissent stemming from the lower classes.

CORPORATISM AS PART OF THEORETICAL DISCOURSE

What contribution can corporatism make to progress in comparative politics? This is not an easy question to answer, because the notions of "contribution" and "progress" in the field have not been clarified. To simplify the task of applying the many criteria, I shall put them into two clusters. Corporatism has contributed to *explanation* on the one hand, and to *interpretation* on the other. In the positivist tradition of social science, the contribution of a concept is measured by the degree to which it furthers explanatory theory. This might take the form of building axiomatic theory, developing supported, falsifiable causal propositions, identifying simpler, more basic independent variables, or simply formulating clear, testable hypotheses and operational concepts.

A less commonly discussed form of contribution a concept can make is in building interpretive theory. Here, the contribution is measured by the extent to which a concept provides a coherent normative basis and an understanding of (usually) historical trends. Does the concept provide a way of measuring how well societies (or some part of them) fulfill those norms? Can it determine what stage in history a society has reached, and what basic dynamics or dialectical processes are involved? Interpretive doctrines are more oriented toward action. We should look at both dimensions before coming to a judgment about the utility of corporatism in political science.

Corporatism as an Explanation

Corporatist theorists make little pretense of presenting a comprehensive theory. Unlike most versions of Marxism, for example, but much like pluralism, corporatism points to important dimensions and suggests distinctions and underlying factors. It does not claim to explain events. It is often assumed that there is a claim to explanation from "culture," that is, the ideology of corporatism is handed down as part of tradition, and induces corporatist solutions to problems. Yet I know of no theorist who articulates this position. It is true that a culture of corporatism, that is, norms and beliefs congruent with corporatism, plays an important part in defining historical patterns in the work of Howard Wiarda,¹⁴ but this is not the same as proposing that culture "determines" that pattern. The identification of historical patterns will be discussed later, because it plays an important role in interpretive theory.

Corporatism is therefore to be taken principally as a heuristic. "Heuristic" is often used very loosely to mean merely something less rigorous than a theory, but I am using the term in the sense of a "rule of thumb" that provides very specific rules to simplify a task that might be overwhelming in its complexity and demands for information.¹⁵ A concept's heuristic value in explanatory theory depends on whether it provides efficient clues to useful theories, propositions, and causal factors. The efficiency of the clue (how clearly, quickly, and precisely it gets us to the idea) and the utility

of that idea determine the value of a heuristic contribution. Because there is almost always more than one route to an idea of this kind, the competition among heuristics can and should be severe.

How could a general cluster of concepts such as we have discussed in the first part of the chapter serve as a heuristic in this more rigorous sense? The most important means is through focusing the attention of scholars. The range of political factors relevant in explaining any political fact is so large and so complex, and could be organized in so many ways, that identifying areas in which to look constitutes a major service to a scholar searching for explanations. Concepts might also provide clues to the structure of an explanation. There are many ways of ordering causal chains, and productive clues about which types of variables might fit into which slots can be very useful. Corporatism's heuristic contribution has been to emphasize (1) the central importance of state-group ties for explaining a variety of outcomes; (2) the importance of differentiation within the state apparatus; and (3) the importance of "design" and "choice" in explanation.

Probably the central heuristic rule which one can tease out of the corporatist framework concerns the importance it gives to structural-legal relationships in state-group ties. In corporatist theory, the first question in almost any political explanation schema is, How are the interests linked to the state apparatus? Corporatism requires one to look not only at the interests of the state, but also at the structure that defines the relationships between various interests, the organizations that represent them, and the bureaucracy.

If the explanatory task is to indicate the causes of, say, the adoption of a particular policy, the corporatist heuristic directs the investigator to consider not only the relative power of the interest groups measured by the resources at their command (as pluralists would do), but also the interests of the actors in maintaining or changing their formally defined position within the state, and the way in which the formally defined patterns of representation affect the utilization of resources.

These issues have become central in policy analysis and other forms of political investigation in the 1970s and 1980s, although probably not through the prompting of corporatists. Studies of "bureaucratic politics" focus on the structure of the bureaucratic elements and the interests generated by that structure as significant in shaping policy outcomes.¹⁶ Such studies have been particularly common in analyses of foreign policy decisions, presumably because in that arena, a relatively high percentage of actors (State Department and National Security Council members, for example) have obvious bureaucratic goals, and the interests of their constituencies are hard even to define. Corporatism is a more general approach to the problem of explaining policy outcomes, which has in general been dealt with rather parochially. It states the basic proposition that the rights and privileges determined by an individual's position in the state structure are important in shaping all sorts of political processes.

Corporatists also consider the "state" not as a single entity with a single interest, but rather as a "naturally" divided entity, made up of particular

relationships with the major economic groups and professions (or however interests are defined). The state cannot be isolated from civil society: It is defined by the series of links that form both the state and the societal groups. On the one hand, there cannot be any single state interest, because the state is so complex. On the other hand, one cannot talk about state interests as opposed to those of society when the state is in fact made up of ties with interests in civil society. One can easily employ paradoxical notions in discussing these sorts of relationships, but the point is very simple. The corporatist framework instructs us that simpler and more accurate explanations of such things as policy decisions must begin with a description of the complex and multiple formal and informal legal relationships between the state apparatus and interests.

Another dimension of the heuristic provided by corporatism is highlighted by Charles W. Anderson.¹⁷ By focusing attention on the importance of state-initiated structuring of group-state relationships, corporatism draws attention to the choices being made by those who design those links.

Political actions and their results are shaped by the institutions and laws that govern the system in which they take place. Those institutions and laws are the product of conscious design by constitutional conventions, legislatures, dominant leaders, triumphant revolutionary parties, and military juntas. Designing institutions implies making big choices. Although there are many small modifications made in any institution or law over the years, there are moments when a single great decision has to be made, providing a strong incentive for legislators to think about the whole institution and make even smaller choices in the light of its overall functioning. In other words, a major determinant of the outcome of political actions lies in the singular, conscious choices being made by those who are periodically called upon (or seize the opportunity) to design the political framework.

Political analysis often pays great attention to the actions of rulers, but the canons of the scientific method as applied to the social sciences were often said to require the rejection of the attempt to explain individual and unique occurrences and to focus instead on repeated patterns. Choice became the concern of political (and other social) scientists when the choice was repeated many times, as in voting. The study of major policy decisions, which clearly represent a sort of macro choice, was treated either as "merely history," as just one instance of the class of choices of a similar type, or as something to be explained as the outcome of many more stable causes.¹⁸ When the results of a single choice are very influential in determining the course of political events that the political scientist wishes to explain, the choice is often assumed to be a given, say, as the fixed preferences of those making the decision.

Students of public policy are concerned with legislation drawn up by a government, and one might expect them to use an explanatory scheme based at least in part on choice. Yet they often do not go beyond the notion of given, fixed preferences of groups. They may use a simple model of choice that describes the outcome of policy choices as the result of pressures

put on the decisionmaker. These pressures are the combination of established preferences (the direction) and the relative power of the group (the force). This reduces choice to a mechanical interaction.

The cognitive elements of choice are returning to the center of concern, however. By "cognitive elements" I mean the way in which preferences are shaped and decisions made on the basis of knowledge, information, and various symbolic forms. No one ever denied that these were important (except, perhaps for some cynics) but there appeared to be no way to enter cognitive elements into a systematic analysis. The rules governing cognitive behavior were either related to the "irrational" or based on logic. Logic, however, never got very far in explaining human behavior. It produced, rather, a general cynicism about the lack of education and culture among both common people and political leaders. What is needed is a more rigorous analysis of design and choice that takes into account the rapidly expanding knowledge of the structure of choice that lies between the rarefied elements of logic and the subterranean elements of the irrational. There is much being explored in the various divisions of cognitive science that is relevant.¹⁹

What is being "designed" in the cases with which corporatism is the most concerned is, of course, not policies but the larger structures of decisionmaking in a system: the regime and the state-group links. The choices involved in designing a regime are to be found in many aspects of political life, but are epitomized in the process of writing constitutions. Yet the study of constitutions and the writing of constitutions have not been very popular in the field of political science, and more particularly in comparative politics (in which it used to find a very comfortable home). Corporatism's emphasis on the importance of the structure of decisionmaking points toward a reinvigoration of the field.

This heuristic of corporatism, then, consists in a broad admonition to assess the design choices that have gone into the situation at hand. The factors that shape the outcomes will be a complex interaction of direct physical determinants as well as the conscious recognition, backed up by state authority, of the intentions of the designers of the system.

Corporatism and Interpretation

Evaluating the contribution of corporatism to interpretation requires a different set of criteria. What is important is the help corporatism can provide in assessing the significance of political events, not why they occur. Generally, corporatism is probably more effective at interpretation than it is at explanation. This is not surprising for a theory born in political action, not political science. The interpretive point of view involves much less "hard science" than explanation, but to people faced with making choices, interpretation is more relevant. People need some way of deciding the significance of what they are called on to do, and for this they need to know more than the latest causal explanation.

The first step in interpretive theories establishes a normative standard to allow direct evaluation. A norm is an elemental form of interpretive

theory; it allows the observer to measure a polity against this norm and make an evaluation. The norm may be relatively simple—for example, "income is divided unequally"—or exceedingly complex—as in the statement, "human potential for realization is frustrated in this society." Evaluation may be used, of course, for assigning blame, estimating salvation, or as a basis for acting in order to achieve the ideal.

The second step, more intricate than the first, is to link general causal theory with these norms. This creates a complex I shall call "historicist theory."²⁰ It establishes a historical trajectory against which one can assess both current progress toward the ideal future state and the effectiveness of the current structure in establishing a historical path that will lead to the ideal. Beyond a simple evaluation of events, one gains insight about their significance by placing them in the flow of history. Political events can then be understood as a stage in the growth of a social structure, or as steps on the road to liberation from a besetting evil.

The most important modern models of historicist theory are Marxist socialism, in which the importance and significance of events is derived from the relationship of those events to the process of social revolution, and pluralist development, which establishes a link to an evolutionary pattern. The stages of growth in development theory are defined by reference to the end point of a fully developed, pluralist and democratic society. Development theory identified key steps and obstacles along the way and employed measurements of modernization to establish just where country X was in the process. Studies of obstacles looked at the relationship between, for example, urban poverty and traditional cultures and the grand historical process of development. Marxism, of course, has a similar range of elements.

Corporatism is also a historicist doctrine. It provides two bases of interpretation, which are in fact at least partially contradictory. First, corporatism suggests the possibility of an alternative path of historical change, which some countries take while others follow pluralist or socialist paths. Secondly, corporatism refers to a stage in development shared by all or most societies.

The Corporatist Path

Corporatism represents an alternative model of history. Of all the possible variants of historical experience that countries might go through, there are a limited number of types, and corporatist evolution is one of them. Philippe Schmitter presented this argument in his article, "Paths to Political Development in Latin America," and Howard Wiarda has been an indefatigable proponent of this point of view. Wiarda's position is most evident in his recent book, *Corporatism and National Development in Latin America*, in which he strongly emphasizes the role of corporatism in counteracting U.S./European ethnocentrism in evaluations of change in Latin America.

Schmitter explicitly (and others by implication) postulates three main paths.

1. A pluralist path, in which societies proceed by gradual differentiation and specialization to a more and more integrated and presumably liberal-democratic society
2. A totalitarian path, in which an ideologically committed elite pushes through a comprehensive program
3. A corporatist path, usually linked with some form of authoritarianism

The notion of alternative paths of development has been important because of the general attack on development theorists, who have been accused of forcing the U.S. pattern of evolution (modified somewhat by their understanding of British history) on the experiences of Latin America and other Third World areas. The best-known alternative to the image of development is, however, not corporatism, but the dependency perspective, which is generally anchored in some form of Marxism. According to dependency theory, the later industrializing countries could not follow the same path as Great Britain or the United States because they had to deal with these already powerful states. The new countries had to adapt, and dependent development was the result. How one describes this form of development is a matter of perspective. A pessimist would characterize dependent development as stunted, or at the very least, distorted; a Marxist might suggest that a new, North-South revolutionary dynamic is occurring; a new realist would focus on particular variations in the patterns of production, distribution, and debt.

Wiarda's interpretation of corporatism takes a different perspective on the problem from that of the dependency theorists. In Wiarda's view, differences in development paths stem not only from the different environments of the new countries, but also from their distinctive historical traditions—in other words, their culture. "Culture" in this context refers not merely to a set of ideas, but to a set of practices and formal structures that result from the distinctive situation—including distinctive material conditions. The lines in the debate over the significance of culture are drawn not between "ideas" and "material conditions" but between the impact of history—through the accumulation of institutions and practices—and the impact of current demands. The dependency perspective is a historicist vision that views the behavior of societies as principally an ongoing adaptation to current external demands. Wiarda's view of historical trajectories emphasizes the momentum of the artifacts, institutions, norms, and ideologies. He argues that the accumulation of earlier adaptive responses and imposed practices in the southern European Latin cultures established a corporatist outlook and set of institutions. These were reflected in literature and education, which in turn reinforced corporatist practices and structures.

Schmitter and others criticize this view by noting that corporatist institutions are not continuous, but this is not a convincing argument against the existence of an effective corporatist culture. That culture could be so deeply embedded, for example, that it persists as a model and preferred form even though external forces or domestic calamities might impose a

temporary alternative might suggest that the culture is even more relevant.²¹ The corporatist historical trajectory, interpreted fundamentally as a culture, remains important. Discontinuity in corporatist institutions does highlight the problem of specifying the sources of corporatist institutions. If culture is only one determinant, what are the others?

Schmitter²² speaks of the "elective affinity" of some countries, particularly in Latin America, for corporatism. Beyond culture, he attributes this to some of the factors that figure prominently in the discussions of economic growth. He discusses the impact of late development, that is, situations in which countries have to "catch up." This induces a high level of concerted state effort to speed up the developmental process, and the deals struck with the major economic interests push these countries toward corporatism. Similarly, the dependency of these countries on foreign markets and technology leads to state actions to break or weaken the dependency link and give the domestic economy the space to grow. The sorts of controls the state must impose are related to those that form the basis of corporatism. Dependency theorists do not normally postulate a corporatist path of development. They are more likely to view some new form of socialist revolutionary dynamic as the essential historical movement. But some of the same factors do fit in with a corporatist model.

The vision of a distinct corporatist path is potentially an important interpretive framework with which to understand the development of some parts of the Third World in a way that avoids the ethnocentrism of assuming that they will all inevitably follow the path toward liberal, capitalistic democracy, or that they will have to follow the revolutionary Marxist path. It poses important and interesting questions. The debate between the cultural and economic determinism of this path is one set of questions. Another set asks how closely such countries, presumably concentrated in southern Europe and Latin America, have approximated the ideal path of corporatism, and the consequences of the effort to impose pluralistic institutions in "essentially" corporatist countries.²³

Corporatism as an Evolutionary Stage

A problem emerges, however, for observers who see signs of corporatism in places such as the United States.²⁴ The cultural argument would pretty well rule out a country without corporatist traditions becoming corporatist, as there is no underlying structure to which it can relate, and dependency does not help. The increasing evidence of corporatist institutions in such societies has therefore engendered a new form of historicist theory for corporatism. In this interpretation, corporatism is not an alternative path of development, but a stage in the evolution of political society. In response to the turmoil of late nineteenth-century Europe, corporatism offered an explicit counterproposal to the socialists' vision of the coming stages of history. Instead of the triumph of the working class over the bourgeoisie, the corporatists envisaged a future stage of harmony achieved through the reconciliation of the classes. This would be a corporatist era, or, as M.

Manoilescu called it in the title of one of the better known of corporatism's texts, "century of corporatism."²⁵

If corporatist society is a stage in the "normal" evolution of societies, there must be a common underlying dynamic—a process they all go through to shape a common history. The internal forces of change in Marxism are dialectical, and in pluralist theories of development, technological and attitudinal change provides the dynamic force, but in corporatist theory there is no commanding, comprehensive treatment of the dynamic that produces corporatism. There are, however, a number of possible theories. A conservative variation understands the corporatist dynamic as the drive to restore the harmony of society that was shattered by industrialization. This suggests a very long-term equilibrium model, in which modernization is a powerful disruption and either complex social forces or conscious efforts to restore the balance provide the homeostatic force. Corporatism as a critical doctrine aims to transform society to restore the premodern harmony that existed before the "fall" into modern chaos. The central norm of this interpretation is the integrality of the community.

An alternative hypothesis in corporatist interpretive theory links the rise of corporatism to that of the state. In the 1920s the moving force that often promoted corporatism was nationalism. Linking nationalism and the state is one of the central points of corporatism, which treats them, along with community, as essentially overlapping aspects of the same reality. The forces leading to nationalism could be linked to corporatism on the grounds that they created the vehicle through which society could be organized and harmonized.

The growth of the state itself, irrespective of its links with nationalism, has been an obvious characteristic of the post-World War II period, and several implications of this trend are relevant to corporatism. One might begin with a rather developmentalist argument that the sheer expansion of governmental size and responsibilities leads to increasing specialization and differentiation of the governmental apparatus, and these units increasingly attract and then institutionalize relationships with interest groups. Regulation, planning, and coordination, made necessary by this expansion, may be seen as forcing an organization of procedures and institutions that is essentially corporatist. Alternatively, growth in the techniques of domination may lead elites in a position to influence state policy to promote controls over their competitors. Critics of corporatism see it as an ideological position justifying repression of workers, and the tools for repression as well as more subtle forms of control are increasingly easy to find. Over time, competing groups may take the reins of government and create more controls. The web of relationships that emerges may take on the character of corporatism.

A clear analysis of the basic dynamics of corporatism has not yet taken shape. Some scholars might object that such a large-scale and ambitious analysis is not feasible, and remain content merely to describe trends. Without some theory of the underlying dynamics, however, corporatism will never have the analytical power to become a major interpretive theory.

Another way of analyzing corporatism as interpretive theory is to ask about the envisaged historical scenario. Where does corporatism fit in? What stages are involved? Manóiescu and other scholars writing in the 1920s and 1930s thought of corporatism as an emerging dominant form of political organization, if not the culmination of historical political development. Among contemporary scholars of comparative politics in the United States, where residual liberalism is very strong, the tendency has been to consider corporatism, for all of its plausibility and important goals, as an intermediate stage in history. In his interpretation of Latin American and southern European corporatism, Howard Wiarda has clearly implied that despite its successes and appropriateness to the culture of the area, corporatism is a schema that must be transcended in order to achieve real development.²⁶ Schmitter, a bit playful with ideas, perhaps, ended his article on the "century of corporatism" with a hint that corporatism may be giving way to syndicalism.²⁷

EVALUATION

Before considering corporatism's role in the practice of comparative politics, a few notes about corporatism's potential political role are appropriate. It is very unlikely that corporatism, named as such, will reemerge as politically important, given its legacy of association with the fascist regimes of the interwar period. However, this prediction does not hold for the concepts associated with corporatism. Some of these concepts will no doubt play an important role in politics, even though they may surface under another name.

There is no shortage of political advocates of a strong state, both among those who find democracies "ungovernable" and among those who feel that strong state action is required in developing the poorer countries. An ideology like corporatism could become the rallying cry of a new generation of politicians concerned with strengthening the state. I would expect, however, that the opposite might occur, with corporatism returning to the much earlier political role of limiting state power. Elements of corporatism may appeal to the conservative and neoliberal groups that have emerged in the 1970s and 1980s in countries such as the United States.

Although twentieth-century corporatist analysis has stressed the importance of an active role by the state, corporatism is also identified historically with limiting the state to protect the established privileges of important groups and institutions. The new conservatives of the 1980s tend to see private enterprise, the family, and local communities as entities that can and should exist completely separate from the bureaucracy, government officials, elected politicians, and the whole apparatus of the state. It seems almost inevitable that this generally conservative point of view will come to emphasize the protection of the established legal and political status of these groups—not their separation from the state in general, but insulation from the sort of arbitrary changes, restrictions, and disciplining that tends

to be carried out by either authoritarian dictators or by political majorities in liberal societies. Corporatism, or at least these elements of it, might easily become a focus for those who wish to stabilize and retrench, to protect societal groups against populist policies without threatening their privileged position in, and their protection by, the state.

Corporatism's ability to serve as an important research paradigm in comparative politics is more promising than its political prospects. The concept packages a set of heuristics that are becoming steadily more important. Designing relationships to specify particular rights and duties for the various interest groups in society seems appropriate for the 1980s. In contrast to the pressure/bargaining models of pluralism or the Marxist effort to find a reductionist dynamic, corporatism seems to point scholars in the right direction.

As the state expands, links between official bodies and social groupings of all kinds have also proliferated. Analysts need concepts that will catch this type of increased "webbing" between the various elements of society, and corporatism does this better than liberalism or Marxism, both of which tend to reduce the relationships to ones of power. The expansion of the state is not the expansion of a single entity, but the increasing density of relationships that center on the official apparatuses of the state. Corporatism catches this better because of its focus on the links of the groups with the state apparatus, not on the distribution of power between a state interest and a societal interest.

The regulatory, consultative, and other sorts of relationships that are constantly being constructed and reconstructed between groups and the government have become a very active part of government. The image of governments simply making and then implementing policy foreshortens the process. Establishing bureaucratic instruments through which to implement and monitor policy is a major activity, and such acts of "bureaucratic creativity" have meaning not only for the specific policy, of course, but for the whole range of exchanges between the government and the affected interests. In other words, corporatist design has become more and more evident in the contemporary practice of statecraft.

There are, however, major problems with corporatism as a serious contribution to interpretive theory. Anderson points out, for example, that a major problem in implementing a corporatist design for a political system is that corporatism fails either to specify which interests should be represented in the state or to provide the means to make that specification.²⁸ This is not just a matter of applying a general analysis of such interests to the specifics of a particular country and time. That would be bad enough, but the problem is worse. No meaningful criteria have yet been established. As noted above, the corporatists of the 1920s and 1930s apparently accepted a quasi-Marxist definition of classes as at least one set of interests. The workers and the managers, suitably divided among a few general sectors of the economy, constituted the basic elements of corporatist schemes, although the logic of this was not convincingly spelled out. If corporatism

does not begin from the quasi-Marxist definition of interest, it is apparently forced to accept any and all interest groups as legitimate and thereby becomes only marginally distinguishable from pluralism. If corporatism is to identify a certain kind of regime, then it must be able to determine which interest groups deserve the sorts of rights and privileges corporatism specifies. Otherwise, corporatism provides no way of assessing how well particular state relationships fit the mold and, therefore, no way of guiding action. This reduces corporatism to merely a post hoc justification that does not satisfy the requirements of interpretive theory.

Perhaps an even more damaging weakness of corporatism as an interpretive theory is its difficulty in specifying dynamic factors that would bring about the changes it projects. The reestablishment of equilibrium after the "disturbance" of modernism, nationalism, and the expansion of the modern state is so general as to be unconvincing. A truly powerful interpretive theory enables one to assess the value of certain actions in conforming to, countering, or making way for the operation of basic historical dynamics. In seeking the integration of group-state links, corporatism cannot afford to be vague about what causes integration or disintegration.

Finally, corporatism has paid little attention to the nature of conflict between groups. Some conservatives see corporatism as promoting depoliticized patterns of conflict resolution, with the interpretation that conflict must be resolved through the arbitration of experts. But the connection between the expert's opinion and the good of the community, which is the central part of the ideal, is not well explicated. Without further specification along these lines, the mechanics of progress toward harmony will remain unclear.

Corporatism has had a very important role in comparative politics as part of the critical attack on the pluralist-developmental thinking that dominated the field in the 1960s and 1970s. As a non-Marxist—even anti-Marxist—conception that has some affinity to the state-heavy authoritarian forms of government, it has opened up new ways of seeing. Particularly attractive is its perspective on the dominant fact of political life in the late twentieth century: the ramifying, interpenetrating network of state-society relationships. It is not yet, and may never be, a genuinely powerful research and theory-constructing paradigm. This would require not just elaboration of detail and empirical applications, but rather a thoroughgoing inspection and strengthening of its analytical foundations. And, given the political liabilities of the term, the constituent concepts of the ideology might emerge after such an overhaul under new names. Corporatism is full of interesting ideas and suggestions, but it is unlikely to survive in its present form.

NOTES

1. This emphasis appears, for example, in Philippe Schmitter's article, "Paths to Political Development in Latin America," in D. Chalmers, ed., *Changing Latin America* (New York: Academy of Political Science, 1972). Also see the collection edited by Frederick B. Pike and Thomas Stritch, *The New Corporatism: Social and Political*

Structures in the Iberian World, (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974); and Howard Wiarda, *Corporatism and National Development in Latin America* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981).

2. One sees references to the "corporate state" or the "corporate society" referring to the prominence of business corporations in political affairs, or, perhaps, the similarity of the state apparatus to a business corporation. This is not the meaning here. It may be a peculiarly American usage, in fact, to identify "corporations" only with business corporations.

3. Philippe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" in Pike and Stritch, *The New Corporatism*, pp. 93-94.

4. For this reason, class analysis and corporatist approaches both seem more relevant than pluralism to areas such as Latin America and the Third World in general, where the state is called upon to play a central role.

5. The more common meaning of "monopoly" remains applicable, of course. Firms still get monopoly profits by a variety of techniques ranging from a clever use of patents to coercion. Even this seems to be more difficult, however, with so many marginally different products. In any case, monopolies of representation are far more difficult to maintain.

6. See Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" Note the association of corporatism with authoritarianism in the studies of the phenomenon in Latin America, as in James Malloy, ed., *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1977).

7. For Italy see A. Aquarone, *L'organizzazione dello stato totalitario* (Turin: Giulio Einaudi, 1965).

8. Charles W. Anderson argues that parliaments are the typical institutional form of corporatism, and he is clearly right in that the ancient corporations met in bodies that evolved into modern parliaments. The modern typical form of corporatism would be, however, the administrative/consultative committee. Parliaments are too much the loci of bargaining among individuals (at least in the United States) or groups representing party factions that are not clearly interest linked to be significant as corporatist institutions. See his comments in Charles W. Anderson, "Political Design and the Representation of Interests," in P. Schmitter and G. Lehmbruch, eds., *Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979), pp. 271-298.

9. Alfred Stepan, in *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), discusses the "organic state" tradition, which emphasizes the integral nature of the community. He distinguishes this tradition sharply from corporatism generally on the grounds that the latter refers only to the institutions that relate individual interest groups with the state. This may be clarifying, but the two concepts have been used together, and depend on each other too much to make the separation permanent.

10. See Guillermo O'Donnell, "Corporatism and the Question of the State," in Malloy, *Authoritarianism and Corporatism*.

11. The term is central to Stepan's analysis in *The State and Society*.

12. Particularly useful in showing these changes are two volumes on the history of corporatism: R. Bowen, *German Theories of the Corporative State* (New York: Whittlesey, 1947); and M. H. Elbow, *French Corporative Theory: 1789-1948* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953).

13. See Howard J. Wiarda, *Corporatism and Development: The Portuguese Experience* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1977); and Stepan, *The State and Society*.

14. See particularly his collected articles in Wiarda, *Corporatism and National Development*.

15. For an example of the looser use, see Wiarda's last chapter in *ibid.* The more rigorous use of the term *heuristic* is common in writings on problem solving in such fields as "artificial intelligence." See for example A. Newell and H. Simon, *Human Problem Solving* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972).

16. Well-known works in this bureaucratic politics school include G. Allison, *The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); and M. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1974).

17. Anderson, "Political Design."

18. The influence of the power and success of economic analysis is evident here, to the point that "theories of choice" as currently formulated in political science seem more often than not to be formulated as probabilistic theories of repeated choices, modeled on consumer choices. Voting studies are one example.

19. See, for example, Herbert Simon's immensely stimulating *The Sciences of the Artificial* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969). For a collection of recent contributions, see D. F. Norman, ed., *Perspectives on Cognitive Science* (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1981). For an interesting review of some major concepts in perception and choice as they relate to international politics, see Robert Jervis, "Political Decision Making: Recent Contributions," *Political Psychology* 2, 2(Summer 1980):86-101.

20. The term "historicist" distinguishes this interpretive theory from that focused on less time-oriented concepts, such as theories based on the realization of an individual's potential during his or her lifetime or on a static moral ideal. As a static moral imperative toward harmony and integration, corporatism might conceivably function as a nonhistoricist interpretive theory, but this is not its most important use for comparative politics.

21. This seems to be one conclusion that might be drawn from Stepan's emphasis on the tradition of the organic state in Peru. At the very least, one should consider the "organic state" as an available option no matter what form of regime exists. See Stepan, *The State and Society*.

22. For example, in Schmitter, "Paths to Political Development."

23. There is much work, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s, that interpreted Latin America's political difficulties as rooted in the conflict of liberalizing trends with the traditions of the area. See, for example, Kalman Silvert, "The Costs of Anti-Nationalism: Argentina," in *The Conflict Society* (New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1966); and Richard Morse, "The Heritage of Latin America," in L. Hartz, ed., *The Founding of New Societies* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964).

24. Howard Wiarda, for example, has noted a number of such features in "The Latin Americanization of the United States," in *Corporatism and National Development*, pp. 323-339. He does not, in that essay, seem aware of the problem for theory being considered here, i.e., that corporatism may be considered either an alternative path or a common stage, but not both, without a much more complex version of history than has been developed.

25. M. Manoilescu, *Le siècle du corporatisme* (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1936).

26. This seems to be the implication, for example, of the last paragraphs of Howard J. Wiarda, "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model," *World Politics* 25 (January 1973):206-235.

27. See Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" I interpret Schmitter's use of "syndicalism" as referring to the growth of communes, grass-roots labor unions, and various forms of "collectives," which was a popular theme with observers in the 1960s. I wonder whether Schmitter would still suggest this direction for social change in the 1980s.

28. Anderson, "Political Design."