Andriano's Ordeal

The Story of a Catholic Attorney, a Divided City,

And a Nation at War

 

©Bill Issel, SFSU Emeritus and Mills College, bi@sfsu.edu

Prepared for the Mills College Faculty Talk Series

Oakland, CA.  April 23, 2008

            Last year, an organization of San Francisco Catholic lawyers called The St. Thomas More Society celebrated its seventieth anniversary. It was one of two new men’s organizations created by prominent business and professional leaders in 1937 and 1938.  The men pledged their support for Catholic Action, Pope Pius XI’s program for greater involvement of the laity in the work of the Church.  That program was introduced to San Francisco by Coadjutor Archbishop John J. Mitty in 1932.1

Mitty’s Catholic Action call appealed strongly to Sylvester Andriano. In 1937 Andriano was a 48 year old Italian born naturalized citizen who had graduated maxima cum laude from St. Mary’s College and then earned a law degree from the University of California’s Hastings School of Law.  Andriano was one of the three attorneys who took the lead in organizing the St. Thomas More Society, and Archbishop Mitty appointed him president of a second new organization called the Catholic Men of San Francisco.    

How is it that this devout Catholic Action leader became the subject of a scandal in 1942 when the San Francisco Chronicle characterized him as “Long one of the West’s outspoken advocates of Fascism”?  Why did General John L. DeWitt order Andriano excluded from designated “Defense Areas” on both the East and West coasts, and also the Gulf Coast, on the grounds that he was “a potentially dangerous person”?  The answer to the first question lies in local Bay Area political and religious rivalries between Catholics and anti-Catholics in the Italian-American community and between Catholic anti-Communists and their Communist Party competitors.2   The answer to the second question requires attention to a separate set of dynamics related to J. Edgar Hoover’s expansion of the FBI’s counterintelligence responsibilities from 1936 through the years of World War II and beyond.  

Hoover’s zeal in seeking to increase his Bureau’s power and public prominence by expanding its role in counterintelligence has been documented by several historians, but the Andriano case has been lost to history.3   I am writing a book on the case based on Andriano’s FBI file and records from the National Archives, the Bancroft Library, the St. Mary’s College Archives and the Chancery Archives of the Catholic Church.  This is something of a cautionary tale that highlights the damage that can occur when zealous government officials determined to protect the national security ride roughshod over individual civil liberties on the basis of biased information provided by malicious and politically-inspired confidential informants.    

The FBI began its counterintelligence operations after Hoover, President Roosevelt, and Secretary of State Cordell Hull met for discussions on the subject in late August, 1936.  Roosevelt wanted the Bureau to establish a new program of gathering information about and monitoring “Communist . . . as well as Fascist activities,” and he wanted the program to remain secret.  He insisted that “the matter . . . be handled quite confidentially.”  According to Hoover “the President, the Secretary of State and I should be the ones aware of this” work.4 

Nearly six years earlier, in 1931 and across the continent in San Francisco, Angelo Rossi became the city’s first Italian American mayor.  That summer, Rossi sent his friend and family attorney Sylvester Andriano to Europe as the city’s representative to the Paris International Exposition.  Andriano’s law office handled cases for the Italian consulate involving the disposition of estates of deceased local Italian citizens whose family members all resided in Italy, and he was an officer and board member in the city’s Italian Chamber of Commerce, the Marconi Italian language school for children, the Italian Catholic Federation, and the Catholic Young Men’s Institute.  He had recently served on the city’s board of supervisors and would later be appointed by Mayor Rossi to the Police Commission and by Governor Olson to Draft Board Number 100.  During his trip abroad during the summer of 1931, while visiting his brother who was a priest in northern Italy, Andriano decided to involve himself in the lay activism that Pius XI urged upon Catholic men and women in his June 29 encyclical On Catholic Action in Italy.5

San Francisco Archbishop John J. Mitty recruited Sylvester Andriano for leadership in the local Catholic Action campaign, a campaign designed “to bring the ideals and principles of Christ into every phase of human life,” because Andriano had worked closely with his predecessor Archbishop Edward Hanna during the 1920s to mitigate anticlericalism and promote church attendance among North Beach Italian Catholics.  In the summer of 1938, after Mitty appointed him president of the new Catholic Men of San Francisco Andriano and his wife Leonora traveled to Italy to secure the Vatican’s approval of the new San Francisco organization and to tour the major European cities to publicize the Treasure Island Exposition planned for 1939.

Andriano’s assumption of leadership in San Francisco Catholic Action triggered a campaign against him from three different local sources linked to transnational political competition. One assault came from  professional anti-Catholic activists, including leaders of the city’s Italian Masonic organization, who regarded Andriano as an embodiment of the monstrous political offspring produced by the Vatican’s illicit embrace of Fascist evil after the signing of the Lateran Treaty of 1929.  A second set of attacks came from anti-Fascist political exiles from Italy (fuorusciti) who regarded devout local Catholics as morally equivalent to the bureaucrats running Benito Mussolini’s allegedly criminal regime. A third offensive against Andriano derived from the local Communist Party (CP). Local party leaders followed up their success in influencing the strategy and tactics of the 1934 waterfront and general strike with a vigorous program of labor organizing and electoral politics. Like its counterparts in leading cities in the United States and Europe, the San Francisco CP denounced Catholic cultural authority and political power in its San Francisco publications and public meetings.

            Andriano had been the subject of criticism as early as 1930, when the anticlerical socialist newspaper Il Corriere del Popolo had singled him out for particular scorn in connection with Archbishop Edward Hanna’s attempts to boost church attendance in the Italian-American community.  In 1931 Andriano even received an anonymous death threat, which arrived in an envelope containing seven bullets.  

            Then in 1938 and 1939 Andriano’s political capital fell even lower among his various critics when he was characterized as “the brains” behind Mayor Angelo Rossi’s numerous anti-Communist and pro-Catholic Action policies.  Voters reelected Mayor Rossi, who won with 48 percent of the vote in a three-sided race. Congressman Franck Havenner, the choice for mayor of much of the city's labor and left (including the CP, then still pursuing a People's Front strategy in local politics), was defeated, and the CP’s slate of candidates for the Board of Supervisors and for city assessor all went down to defeat. 

In July 1939, the FBI began its investigation of Sylvester Andriano, collecting information from confidential informants who claimed that the attorney was a Fascist sympathizer.   By June 1940, N. J. L. Pieper, the San Francisco special agent in charge of the San Francisco office had collected statements from similar informants, and he informed the Washington office that Andriano “is considered by the Italian colony as one of the most ardent and powerful supporters of Mussolini in the United States.”  In March 1941, eight months before Pearl Harbor, Hoover decided on the basis of assertions by these and other similarly inclined informants that Andriano should be placed in “custodial detention” in case of national emergency.  From then on, the Bureau dismissed testimony sympathetic to Andriano and built a case against him on the grounds that he was, as Special Agent Pieper charged on June 29, 1941, “one of the strongest pro-Fascist sympathizers in the San Francisco area.”6   In a pattern that would continue throughout the investigation, the Bureau subsequently sought out additional condemnations of the attorney that would buttress the original charges.  The same allegations, sometimes proffered by the same individuals, found their way into HUAC and Tenney Committee investigative hearings in November and December 1941, and again in May 1942.

Myron B. Goldsmith asserted that Andriano’s practice of concluding his speeches to Catholic audiences with the refrain “Our Light Comes from Rome” proved that he harbored Fascist sympathies. He claimed that Andriano’s presidencies of the Italian Chamber of Commerce and the Marconi language school, organizations that received Italian government subsidies, constituted prima facie evidence that the lawyer served Mussolini.  “This man [Andriano],” he proclaimed, “is indubitably the fountain head of all Fascist activities on the Pacific Coast.”7

Carmelo Zito and Antonio M. Cogliandro joined Goldsmith in singling out Andriano as a leading Fascist fifth columnist.  Cogliandro was a veteran of the North Beach Masonic offensive against Catholics since World War I.  A seminary dropout who had left the Catholic Church, Cogliandro was as disaffected as Andriano was devout.  Zito was the anticlerical socialist editor of the newspaper Il Corriere del Popolo.

In addition to Goldsmith, Cogliandro, and Zito, the Tenney Committee heard from several other North Beach anti-Catholic activists, including Charles H. Tutt, manager of the local branch of the anti-Fascist Mazzini Society.    Harry Bridges and Communist Party member Archie Brown also testified, using the hearings in an effort to even the score with their Catholic opponents; their remarks focused primarily on Rossi’s Catholic Action-inspired labor relations practices. 

All of the unfriendly witnesses made charges against Andriano on the basis of alleging “guilt by association” and by offering misleading half-truths.   They asserted that his legal business with the Italian consulate, and his service as an officer and a board member of the Italian language school and the Italian Chamber of Commerce, proved that he was a Fascist leader.  They considered the Vatican an ally of the Mussolini regime and therefore Andriano’s participation in the Italian Catholic Federation and his other Catholic Action work was proof of his Fascist sympathies.  According to his detractors, Mussolini’s regime had signed a treaty with the Vatican, the Vatican had officially sanctioned Andriano’s Catholic Men’s organization, and therefore, Andriano was complicit with Fascism. 

None of his accusers offered actual evidence that Sylvester Andriano sympathized with Fascism or served as an agent of the Fascist government of Italy. The committees heard from a total of thirty-three witnesses in the executive sessions of November and December 1941 and the public meetings in May 1942.  Only eight witnesses referred to Andriano at all, five of whom merely acknowledged that they knew of his work with the Italian-language schools.  Mayor Rossi affirmed Andriano’s patriotism, denied charges that he was a Fascist agent, and testified that he had never seen Andriano give the Fascist salute.  

Andriano denounced the charges as “a pack of lies.” He rejected the state legislative committee’s right to convene a pseudo court and label him a Fascist on the basis of hearsay and politically-inspired denunciations.  He refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of a show trial where there was no presumption of innocence, where he had no opportunity to present witnesses on his own behalf, and where the rules of evidence were virtually non-existent.8  

Andriano’s Catholic Action colleagues and Archbishop Mitty immediately began a campaign to dissuade the Army from implementing the Committee’s recommendation.  Twenty-two city officials and business leaders, including St. Thomas More Society President Harold McKinnon, Sheriff Daniel C. Murphy and District Attorney Edmund G. “Pat” Brown telegraphed President Roosevelt in an unsuccessful request for presidential intervention in the case. Mitty even traveled to Washington, D.C. and met with Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy in an unsuccessful bid to convince him to intercede with the General DeWitt to allow Andriano to stay in San Francisco.  Frank J. Hennessy, the U.S. Attorney for the region and his deputy Alfonso Zirpoli objected to the exclusion recommendation and appealed the decision when the military board met to issue the order.  Zirpoli knew that Andriano was “a very active church man,” considered him “a real patriot,” not a pro-Fascist security risk.  In an oral history interview forty years later, Zirpoli discussed the politics involved in Andriano’s election to the Italian Chamber of Commerce:  “the sad part about that is that the reason he was elected president of the Italian American Chamber of Commerce is because we didn’t trust the candidate who was opposing him who we felt was a Fascist.”9   

The Tenney Committee accepted the witnesses’ condemnations of Andriano and labeled him a security risk.  It then recommended that he be removed from the draft board on which he had served for eighteen months and be subject to removal from coastal defense regions.  The Tenney Committee recommendations matched those of J. Edgar Hoover, whose informants – as evidenced by the substance of redacted internal Bureau memoranda and reports – included those who testified before HUAC and the Tenney Committee.  General DeWitt ordered the lawyer removed on the grounds of the hostile testimony collected by Hoover and presented at the HUAC and Tenney Committee hearings. 

Andriano left San Francisco in October 1942 in response to the Army’s individual exclusion order, but he refused to comply with the requirement that he submit himself for photographing and fingerprinting and that he keep the FBI informed of his whereabouts.  After leaving San Francisco Andriano stayed in Chicago, Denver, Santa Fe, and Reno, and he also returned to California several times during the subsequent year in violation of the Army’s exclusion order.  The FBI continued to gather information about him, adding his refusal to comply with all of the exclusion order’s requirements to his alleged Fascist sympathies as grounds for investigation.  From October 1942 when he left San Francisco until he returned to the city after his order was cancelled in the fall of 1943, FBI special agents in Chicago, Denver, El Paso, and Los Angeles kept track of his movements.  Army Intelligence G-2 operatives opened his mail and reported the contents to the FBI, and G-2 agents conducted personal surveillance of Andriano.  “As you know,” the Director wrote on November 21 to Special Agent Pieper in San Francisco, “this case has attracted a great deal of attention and the Bureau may be subjected to criticism should we fail to fulfill our investigative responsibilities in connection with it.”10 

Hoover was himself partly responsible for the high profile of the Andriano case.  On September 10, 1942, Hoover wrote to newspaper columnist and radio newscaster Walter Winchell about the Andriano case as a prime instance of Fascist influence in American communities.  Two weeks later, Jack Tenney also wrote to Winchell, the letter copied to Hoover, that the San Francisco hearings proved that Sylvester Andriano’s was “the most flagrant case of all” the examples of Fascist influence in California.  Then on October 8, the Andriano case was featured in a March of Time radio broadcast on the CBS network, followed on October 18, with an article in Time magazine in which Andriano alone was identified by name as one of “the ousted Fascistophiles” who were “excluded from the San Francisco military area as dangerous to security – the first such action against white citizens.”11  

Throughout the nearly four years of the investigation, Hoover consistently disregarded informant testimony reported to him that supported Andriano’s denial of the charges.  In September 1941, for instance, the San Francisco office interviewed the teacher at the Italian language school in San Francisco.  The agent was told that “only Italian language and literature were taught in the schools and . . . no attempt was made to teach the children Fascist ideology.  She stated that in fact the Italian Consul had specifically forbidden the teaching of Fascism in the school, and the textbooks, though furnished by the Italian Government, contained no Fascist propaganda.”  According to Agent Piper and Hoover, however, the use of alphabet books in which “D” stood for “Duce” and textbooks lauding the accomplishments of Mussolini’s regime constituted “Fascist teachings.”12   

On February 6, 1943, Special Agent Pieper interviewed Archbishop Mitty, who insisted that “all of the facts and the true character of Andriano were not known” and that the investigations had not “brought forth all of the facts regarding the man and his character.”  Mitty insisted “that many political enemies of Andriano have been able to paint him in such a bad light that the true worth of the man, his integrity and patriotism was not known.”  Mitty told the FBI agent about a conversation with Andriano over dinner in Chicago, during a stopover when Mitty was returning from Washington, D.C. after meeting with Assistant Secretary McCloy.  Andriano, according to Mitty, “felt that an injustice had been done to him . . . nevertheless he had gained so much from being an American citizen he felt that it was a small price to pay for such a privilege.”13 

Sylvester Andriano was himself interviewed during his period of exclusion while living in the La Salle Hotel in Chicago by Special Agent S. J. Drayton.  Andriano told Drayton that while “the Wartime Civil Control Administration had the power to exclude him from the Western Defense Command, they exhausted their power by ordering him to leave and he was not obligated to report to them.”  He regarded “the compliance to the Wartime Civil Control Administration’s instructions to be fingerprinted, a desecration of his rights as an American citizen . . . He took an oath upon being naturalized not to be desecrated.  Outside the restricted areas,” Andriano continued, he was “a free American citizen, just like any other citizen” and “he is under no obligation to report his movements.”  Since “all other American citizens in the area of Chicago were not required to report their movements, therefore it was not necessary that he would report his movements.”14  

Hoover and his Assistant Director D. Milton Ladd were incensed by Andriano’s refusal to obey the order that he be photographed and fingerprinted, and that he report his whereabouts to the Bureau after leaving San Francisco.  Andriano regarded the order as “an infringement on his rights as an American citizen.”  Hoover regarded Andriano’s refusal as a flagrant gesture of disrespect toward the government and a personal affront to himself as FBI director.  Hoover made several attempts to convince Attorney General Francis Biddle to initiate a criminal prosecution of Andriano for violating Public Law 77-503.  That law of March 21, 1942 provided legislative legitimacy for Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066 and authorized criminal penalties for violating the order.  Hoover and Ladd believed that the Andriano case was an ideal test case for Public Law 503.  Assistant Secretary of War McCloy agreed and joined Hoover in urging an indictment, but the Attorney General and Secretary of War Stimson disagreed.  Biddle accepted the truth of the charges against Andriano but he thought that “The [exclusion] program was pretty edgy anyway, and this was the hell of a test case to pick.”  Recounting the case in his memoirs he wrote that “there was nothing against [Andriano] except that he had been active in the fascist movement like so many successful Italians, and the stupidity of such an indictment might wreck the whole program.”15 The Justice Department prosecuted Gordon Hirabayashi and Min Yasui instead, and their convictions were upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court on June 21, 1943,

Frank Hennessey, the U.S. Attorney in San Francisco had from the beginning objected to the inclusion of Sylvester Andriano on the list of persons “recommended for apprehension by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and internment for the duration of the war.”16   Hennessy’s appeal of the Army’s decision proved successful on August 9, 1943, which led to the cancellation of Andriano’s individual exclusion order.  Despite this, Hoover continued to request permission to begin a prosecution of the attorney, now on the grounds that as president of the Italian Chamber of Commerce he had failed to meet some of the formal requirements of the Registration Act for foreign-sourced organizations.  Finally, in April 1944 Hoover was ordered by Assistant Attorney General Tom Clark to discontinue all investigatory proceedings. 17

J. Edgar Hoover’s investigation of Sylvester Andriano did not contribute to strengthening American national security, because Andriano was not, contrary to the informants whose testimony Hoover utilized, an agent of the Italian government who exercised “a sinister influence” on Bay Area Italian communities.  In contrast with large numbers of philo-Fascist Italian-American Catholics, Andriano rejected Fascist ideology and many Italian government policies because in his view they were incompatible with his Catholic faith.18

As we have seen, the charges against Sylvester Andriano came from a prominent Masonic leader and several anti-Catholic activists on the political Left:  an Italian socialist editor, Communist Party leaders, and anti-Fascist exiles.  By accepting the veracity of the charges, J. Edgar Hoover allowed himself to become a proxy for these San Francisco anti-Catholic political activists determined to discredit the city’s most prominent Catholic Action lay activist and remove him from public life.  During the Red Scare after World War II, J. Edgar Hoover often warned Americans not to become “dupes” of the Communist Party.  It would not be an exaggeration to conclude that J. Edgar Hoover’s investigation of Sylvester Andriano made him a “dupe” of the San Francisco Left.                                             

 Endnotes

1.  For an overview of the Catholic Action program in San Francisco see William Issel, “ ‘For Both Cross and Flag’:  Catholic Action in Northern California during the 1930s,” in Transatlantica: revue d'études américanines/american studies journal, 2006.1, available online at http://www.transatlantica.org/sommaire151.html.

2. This is the subject of the author’s article “‘Still Potentially Dangerous in Some Quarters”:  Sylvester Andriano, Catholic Action, and Un-American Activities in California,” in Pacific Historical Review 75 (May 2006): 231-270.  This paper extends the analysis in that article in order to present a fuller picture of this episode in San Francisco’s history during World War II.  This paper draw on a wider range of sources, including the Andriano FBI file obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, than those used in the article.  For a recent survey of Fascism in Italy, see Alexander DeGrand, Italian Fascism: Its Origins & Development, third edition, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000.  On Italian Fascism and American Italians, see Gaetano Salvemini, Italian Fascist Activities in the United States New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1977; John P. Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism: The View from America Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972; Wilson D. Miscamble, “The Limits of American Catholic Antifascism: The Case of John A. Ryan,” Church History, 59 (1990), 523 – 538.  On the relationship between Roman Catholicism and American Italians, see Peter R. D’Agostino, Rome in America: Transnational Catholic Ideology from the Risorgimento to Fascism, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2004.  On Catholic Action, see Joseph P. Chinnici, O.F.M., Living Stones: The History and Structure of Catholic Spiritual Life in the United States, Maryknoll, N.Y: Maryknoll Press, 1996, 135 – 171.  On the San Francisco scene, see Rose D. Scherini, “Executive Order 9066 and Italian Americans: The San Francisco Story,” California History, 70 (1991/92), 367 – 377, 422 – 424; Rose Scherini, “The Fascist/Anti-Fascist Struggle in San Francisco,” in Richard N. Juliani and Sandra P. Juliani, eds., New Explorations in Italian American Studies, Staten Island, N.Y.: American Italian Historical Association, 1994, 63 – 71; Gloria Ricci Lothrop, “A Shadow on the Land: The Impact of Fascism on Los Angeles Italians,” California History, 75 (1996/97), 338 – 353, 385 – 387.  Stefano Luconi, “Mussolini’s Italian-American Sympathizers in the West: Mayor Angelo J. Rossi and Fascism,” in Janet E. Worrall, Carol Bonomo Albright, and Elvira G. Di Fabio, eds., Italian Immigrants Go West: The Impact of  Locale on Ethnicity,  Cambridge, Mass.: American Italian Historical Association, 2003, 124 – 133; Stephen Fox, The Unknown Internment: An Oral History of the Relocation of Italian Americans During World War II,  Boston: Twayne, 1990; Bénédicte Deschamps, “Opposing Fascism in the West: The Experience of Il Corriere del Popolo in San Francisco in the late 1930s,” in Worrall, Albright, and Di Fabio, eds., Italian Immigrants Go West, 109 – 123; Gary R. Mormino and George E. Pozzetta, “Ethnics at War: Italian Americans in California during World War II,” in Roger W. Lotchin, ed., The Way We Really Were: The Golden State in the Second Great War, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000, 143 – 163; Lawrence DiStasi, ed., Una Storia Segreta: The Secret History of Italian American Evacuation and Internment during World War II, Berkeley: Heyday Books, 2001;  Patrizia Salvetti,  “La communità italiana di San Francisco tra italianità e americanizzazione negli anni `30 e `40,” in Studi Emigrazione, 19 (1982), 3 – 39; Andrew M. Canepa, “Profilo della Massoneria di lingua italiana in California (1871 – 1966),” in ibid., 27 (1990), 87 – 107.

3.  Athan G. Theoharis and John Stuart Cox, The Boss:  J. Edgar Hoover and the Great American Inquisition, Philadelphia:  Temple University Press, 1988; Richard Gid Powers, Secrecy and Power:  The Life of J. Edgar Hoover, New York: The Free Press, 1987; Katherine A.S. Sibley, Red Spies in America:  Stolen Secrets and the Dawn of the Cold War, Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 2004; Raymond J. Batvinis, The Origins of FBI Counterintelligence, Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 2007.

4.  Theoharis and Cox, 151.

5.  The material in the preceding paragraph and the following three pages is based on material detailed in Issel, “Still Potentially Dangerous.”

6.  N. J. L. Pieper to Director, June 29, 1941, 100-32005-2.  Unless otherwise noted, all FBI and Military Intelligence documents are in the author’s possession and were obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. 

7.  This paragraph and the following two pages are based on material in Issel, “Still Potentially Dangerous.”

8.  Ibid. and Peter Ackroyd, The Life of Thomas More, New York: Anchor Books, 1998, 400.

9. Alfonso J. Zirpoli, “Faith in Justice:  Alfonso J. Zirpoli and the United States District Court for the Northern Disctict of California,” an oral history interview by Sarah L. Sharp, Regional Oral History Office, Bancroft Library, University of California Berkeley, 1984, 61; Issel, “Still Potentially Dangerous.”

10.  The details in this paragraph are based on various memoranda and reports in the Andriano FBI file. The quotation is from John Edgar Hoover to SAC, San Francisco, Nov. 21, 1942, 100-32005-72; letter marked “Personal Attention.”

11.  “John” to Walter Winchell, Sept. 10, 1942, 100-32005-45; Jack B. Tenney to Walter Winchell, Sept. 23, 1942; letter marked “Confidential and Personal, no file number; the March of Time broadcast is discussed in a teletype from Pieper to Director, Oct. 9, 1942, 100-32005-69; the article in Time magazine, “RoBerTo Checked” appeared in the Oct. 19, 1942 issue (“Fascists there [in San Francisco] used to say RoBerTo as a greeting – Ro for Rome, Ber for Berlin, To for Tokyo.”)

12. Interview, name redacted, quoted in Report from the San Francisco office, Sept. 16, 1941, 100-32005-29.

13.  N.J.L. Pieper to Director, F.B.I., Feb. 11, 1943, 100-32005-[last two digits illegible]; teletype fro Pieper to Director, Feb. 10, 1943, 32005-84.

14.  S. J. Drayton interview with Sylvester Andriano, quoted in Report from the Chicago office, March 9, 1943, 100-32005-[last two digits illegible].

15.  D.M. Ladd, “Memorandum for Director,” March 30, 1943, 100-32005-97; D.M. Ladd to The Director, March 31, 1931, 100-32005-100; John Edgar Hoover, “Memorandum for the Attorney General,” April 12, 1943, 100-32005-95; Francis Biddle, In Brief Authority, Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1962, 220.

16.  Andriano’s name appeared on page 1 of the June 22, 1942 confidential list.  Record Group 181, Twelfth Naval District, District Intelligence Office, FBI Reports on Euro-Ethnic Organizations, Box 1, Folder 1438 A8-5/EF/16 (13A) FBI List of Pro-Axis Sympathizers Recommended for Internment.

17.  J. Edgar Hoover to Assistant Attorney General Tom C. Clark, Feb. 12, 1944, 100-32005-121; Tom C. Clark to The Director, April 13, 1944, 100-32005-134.

18.  Andriano described his objections to Fascist ideology and Fascist policies in a letter

to his Catholic Men of San Francisco colleague, Professor James L. Hagerty, March 10, 1943, original in box 237, James L. Hagerty Papers, Archives of the College of St. Mary’s of California, Moraga.