JOSEPH L. ALIOTO’S 1967 MAYORAL CAMPAIGN

DEMOCRATIC PARTY LIBERALISM IN TRANSITION

 ©John J. Rosen, University of Illinois at Chicago  

Please do not quote or cite this paper without permission. Rosen can be contacted at  Jrosen2@uic.edu

   INTRODUCTION

In August 1968, San Francisco mayor Joseph L. Alioto gave the nominating speech for presidential candidate Hubert Humphrey at the Democratic Convention in Chicago.  The pairing of Humphrey and Alioto made sense to Democratic Party leaders because the mayor had demonstrated an ability to appeal to conservative and moderate voters in the second largest city in California.  Alioto first gained a national reputation because of his pioneer role as an attorney representing plaintiffs in private anti-trust suits during the 1940s and 1950s. In 1967, when he successfully ran for mayor, Alioto advertised himself as a moderate liberal who was independent of any party factions and capable of appealing to mainstream voters in both major parties.  During his mayoral campaign, although his support came from the owners of some of the city’s most important businesses, the Chamber of Commerce preferred his Republican rival, and the two major daily newspapers endorsed his opponent.  A long time advocate of Roman Catholic doctrines that upheld the sanctity of private property and labor union legitimacy, Alioto advocated joint private and public urban development and redevelopment projects and championed strong labor unions, including public employee unions. His outspoken commitment to using government policy to expand social and economic opportunities for ethnic and racial minorities and the poor, and his endorsement of environmentalist values also earned him publicity beyond the Bay Area. Alioto also gained attention because of his charismatic style, his insistence on giving priority to the good of the community as a whole rather than to the particular demands of Black, Asian American, or “Chicano” radicals, and his forthright defense of “law and order.”  Joseph Alioto’s 1967 mayoral campaign offers an opportunity to observe Democratic Party liberalism in transition at the grassroots. 

                Joseph Alioto was born and grew up in the Italian-American North Beach district of San Francisco, the only boy of four children in the family of Giuseppe Alioto, a fish wholesaler and proprietor of the International Fish Company, and Domenica Lazio Alioto, a homemaker. Joseph and his sisters Angelina, Stephanie, and Antoinette learned Italian *as their first language, speaking it at home before they started school. Alioto began his education at the neighborhood public school, then transferred to Saints Peter and Paul Elementary School*, a Catholic private school operated by the Salesians, an Italian order of Catholic priests. He graduated from Sacred Heart High School in 1933 and received his B.A. magna cum laude from Saint Mary’s College in Moraga, California, in 1937. A leader in school affairs in high school and college and valedictorian of his class at Saint Mary’s, Alioto excelled in debate and public speaking. A scholarship to the Catholic University of America School of Law took him to Washington, D.C., where he received his LL.B. in 1940. [1]

After working as an intern at the prestigious San Francisco firm of Brobeck, Pfleger, and Harrison, Alioto served in Washington, D.C., as a special assistant in the antitrust division of the Justice Department. He and Angelina Genaro, the daughter of a Dallas wholesaler and distributor, were married on 2 June 1941. During World War II Alioto went to work for the Board of Economic Warfare. He returned to San Francisco after the war, started a family that eventually included five boys and one girl*, and opened a law practice specializing in private antitrust suits. In 1948 he represented the Society of Independent Motion Picture Producers, an organization established by Walt Disney, David O. Selznick, and Samuel Goldwyn, in a suit against United Detroit Theatres Corporation, a firm controlled by Paramount Pictures. Then in 1951 he represented Samuel Goldwyn separately in a suit against Twentieth Century-Fox’s West Coast operation. The Fox West Coast case was settled in Goldwyn’s favor, with $1.9 million in damages awarded to him in 1961. Alioto’s *successes in these and other antitrust cases during the late 1940s and 1950s brought him financial security, professional respect, and national recognition. In 1959 he became general manager of the California Rice Grower’s Association, moving to the presidency of the organization in 1964.   * He successfully expanded its sales, particularly across the Pacific, and modernized production methods and transportation techniques.

When asked to describe his philosophy of government several years after he retired from public office, Joseph L. Alioto replied, “I came “out of the New Deal.” [2] Indeed, a review of the highlights of his political career from the 1940s to 1967 reads like a textbook sidebar illustrating the pursuit of “Vital Center” Democratic Party liberalism in nonpartisan municipal government during the postwar period.  *From 1948 to 1954 Alioto served as a member and as president of the Board of Education, and then he chaired the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency from 1955 to 1959.  During his term on the Redevelopment Agency, Alioto, a Democrat, embroiled himself in highly publicized differences over the details of land use policy with Republican Mayor George Christopher. Yet Christopher and Alioto agreed on the basics of urban renewal and redevelopment.  When Christopher ran for a second term in 1959, Alioto served as the incumbent’s campaign co-chairman along with Republican stalwart Walter A. Haas, Sr., and when the mayor’s dairy business faced unfair practices complaints in 1961, Alioto successfully represented Christopher against the charges in court. [3]  

Like his friend and fellow businessman Benjamin H. Swig, owner of the Fairmont Hotel, Alioto actively raised funds and organized election campaigns for moderate liberal Democratic Party candidates for state office during the 1950s.  In 1957, Swig and Alioto ran Eugene McAteer’s successful campaign for the State Senate.  In fact, Alioto first considered (but later decided against it) running for San Francisco mayor in 1963, after McAteer, having changed his mind about stepping down from state office, decided to drop out of the mayor’s race. 

THE 1967 CAMPAIGN: THE CANDIDATES

The 1967 mayoral campaign came at a time when the city’s predominantly Democratic electorate was showing signs of restlessness.  In 1967 Democrats controlled all four of the city’s assembly districts, but Democratic voter registration was on the decline. [4]   In a special runoff for one of the city’s State Senate seats in August, a moderate Republican, Milton Marks, was elected over a liberal Democrat, John Burton.  (The Senate seat filled by the election of Marks had been vacated when a Democrat, Eugene McAteer, died in late May)  John Burton campaigned on a left-liberal issue oriented platform.  Burton warned Democratic voters that if Marks won the election the State Senate would be split 20-20 between Democrats and Republicans.  If that happened, California’s conservative Governor, Ronald Reagan, would control of the Senate.  Still, San Francisco’s voters, approximately two to one registered Democrats, elected Marks. [5]   The support Marks received from moderate, middle-income Democrats was an indicator of the changing temper and changing concerns of a large portion of San Francisco’s voters that would prove vital for the November municipal elections. 

On September 8, 1967 Joseph L. Alioto announced his candidacy for mayor at a press conference at the Fairmont Hotel in downtown San Francisco.  The announcement marked an important change in the complexion of the campaign while giving rise to allegations that would continue to resurface up until the November election.  Alioto entered the race less than two hours after incumbent Mayor Jack Shelley declared that he would no longer seek reelection and would be dropping out of the race.   Shelley’s withdrawal from the race left only one of the original three major candidates for mayor, Republican attorney and businessman Harold Dobbs, remaining in the contest.  On May 26, 1967 Democratic State Senator Eugene McAteer, who had already launched his campaign for Mayor and who many considered the front-runner, died of a heart attack during a handball match.  As a result, the mayoral contest became essentially a two-man race between Shelley and Dobbs.  It remained so throughout the summer and up until Shelley’s withdrawal and Alioto’s entry into the race in early September.   The campaign turned into a three-man affair again on September 12 when Jack Morrison, a liberal Democrat and City Supervisor, announced his candidacy. 

                Jack Shelley had been the first Democratic mayor of San Francisco in the twentieth century, and it seemed logical that his campaign could expect a surge in support following McAteer’s death. McAteer’s major backers, Joseph Alioto first and foremost, kept their campaign organization and finances intact and did not throw their support behind Shelley. [6]   Without the support of McAteer’s backers Shelley’s campaign failed to gain momentum.  On July 2, a Chronicle poll showed Shelley trailing Dobbs by more than twenty percent, and even among Democrats Shelley led Dobbs by less than three percentage points. [7]    Shelley continued to trail Dobbs by significant margins in voter polls when he withdrew from the race in September, but in his statement announcing his withdrawal, Shelley cited medical rather than political reasons.  My doctors “don’t make political decisions, only medical ones,” so [I] “decided – in no uncertain terms – that I must withdraw from a rigorous race for re-election.” [8]  

                Once Alioto announced his intention to enter the race, however, critics on the left and the right of San Francisco’s political spectrum viewed Shelley’s withdrawal with suspicion.  These critics charged that a “deal” had been engineered by influential financial backers of Shelley, in which Shelley, who seemingly had no chance of winning in a two-man race against Dobbs, would withdraw from the race to make room for Alioto.  As a businessman and a moderate Democrat, Alioto was considered by some to be a stronger downtown candidate than Shelley and therefore stood a stronger chance of defeating Dobbs. [9]   In addition, the Chronicle reported that Alioto had withdrawn his name from the 1963 mayor’s race “with at least a tacit understanding that some day he would like to have Shelley reciprocate.” [10] Throughout the campaign, the Chronicle conveyed the argument, sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly, that Alioto was a “replacement” candidate for Shelley.  Thus the Chronicle’s September 8 front-page story reporting on Shelley’s anticipated withdrawal from the race captioned a picture of Alioto with the words “heir apparent.”  In an opinion column, the Examiner’s Dick Nolan also voiced this notion:  “Alioto stepped in, like a tag team rassler (sic).” [11]   The promotion of this idea in the press enabled Harold Dobbs to appropriate it in his own campaign rhetoric against Alioto.  Thus when Shelley announced his formal endorsement of Alioto in early October, Dobbs opined: “The transfer of all the assets and liabilities of Mayor Shelley’s administration to his heir apparent is now complete.” [12]

                Charges of a Shelley-Alioto back room deal came more forcefully from the left wing of San Francisco’s Democratic Party.  Congressman Phillip Burton and his brother, State Assemblyman John Burton, both expressed their suspicions of Shelley’s withdrawal and Alioto’s entry into the race.  Phillip Burton questioned the “murky circumstances” surrounding the scenario, asserting in a September 8 press conference that, “It looks a lot more like a deal of some kind.” [13]   At a press conference of his own, John Burton echoed his older brother’s suspicions and went further to condemn the ‘deal’ as anti-democratic:

Truthfully, it smacks to me like a deal.  I don’t know who the guys are who’d put together a deal that would deny the people the right to vote.  …This is the type of manipulation where you scratch A Entry and go with B Entry.  I can’t believe this just happened. [14]

 

                When liberal Supervisor Jack Morrison announced his decision to enter the race on September 12, he immediately seized upon the allegations of a Shelley-Alioto deal as a campaign issue.  In keeping with earlier statements made by his political allies Phillip and John Burton, Morrison equated the alleged Shelley-Alioto deal with an attempt by large financial interests to manipulate the election.  “In the minds of a few fat cats, Shelley could not win,” Morrison averred at a press conference announcing his candidacy on September 12. [15]   Morrison repeated these charges up until November 7.  Just four days prior to the election, Morrison told voters that

Shelley’s financial backers decided he could not win and they backed him out of the race with Harold S. Dobbs.  Key Democrats indicated to me that the arrangements to back Alioto had been made considerably in advance of Mayor Shelley’s formal announcement that because of health reasons he was withdrawing as a candidate. [16]

 

                Shelley flatly denied allegations of a deal.  He maintained that his decision to withdraw strictly medical, and he formally responded to charges of a deal on September 25 when he returned to office for the first time since being hospitalized earlier in the month:  “There was no deal, no understanding, no arrangement.  Mr. Alioto was in to see me on Tuesday before I withdrew, but he only wanted to say he supported me and to ask how he could help me in the campaign.” [17]   Amidst the charges, Shelley waited until October 4 to give Alioto his formal endorsement, stating then that his decision came after two weeks of reading the papers, listening to the radio, watching television and talking to his friends. [18]

                Alioto turned the charges of a deal into a positive campaign theme.  He denied the charges during a September 8 press conference announcing his candidacy: “I want to make clear that I am completely independent.  I have made no deals of any kind with anyone nor will I.” [19]   This defense proved to be one of Alioto’s more effective campaign themes.  Throughout the campaign Alioto promoted himself as a “new face” who was “independent,” and who could claim detachment from the partisan struggles and problems linked to the current city administration.  Alioto repeatedly stressed the need for a new type of leadership in San Francisco, arguing that “we need a new look at City Hall…there is a need for new faces, new ideas.” [20]   In so doing, he aimed to appeal to voters in the large center of the electorate, including both Democrats and Republicans, who had seemingly grown frustrated with the city’s mounting problems – such as rising taxes and social disorder – that were plaguing the city.  Alioto elaborated on the need for a fresh and imaginative approach to the city’s problems:

Up to now there has been an absolute failure to discuss the basic issues and problems of our city in an imaginative way.  The problems that beset San Francisco and other American cities cannot be solved by the same old faces in the same old places going through the same old paces.  The challenge (is) to fashion a program of progress predicated upon an affirmative and creative spirit. [21]

 

In his campaign speeches Alioto discussed in more detail how he would deliver unto city hall an “imaginative” and “creative” approach to solving the city’s problems.  At a reception sponsored by the Women’s Committee to Elect Alioto Mayor on October 1, Alioto promised an “across the board” city administration representing all elements of the population. [22] At at a meeting of the Federal Bar Association in late September, the candidate described in more detail what his “new look” for City Hall would look like:

It would include: “A unique band of bright, young, trouble shooters and special assistants” – at no costs to the taxpayers to help “get San Francisco moving again.” A cabinet system to head an “aggressive coordinated inter-agency attack” on serious problems.  A program in which City Hall would not wait for the neighborhoods to come to it – but would go to the neighborhoods.” A program that would use “the boundless technological and intellectual resources of the Bay Area’s private sector.” [23]

“But the principle ingredient,” Alioto told supporters “will be my dedication to get this city moving, and keep it moving, and to get out into the neighborhoods to discuss problems first hand.” [24] In addition to bringing new faces to city hall, Alioto promised to support an increase in mayoral authority to help him achieve his program for the city.  The mayor’s formal powers were significantly limited by the 1932 city charter, which diffused the decision-making process throughout the various branches of city government. [25]   When addressing the issue of Charter reform, Alioto indicated that the only reforms he favored would be those that would give the Mayor of San Francisco sufficient power to carry out his responsibilities. [26]

                Alioto’s entry into the race caused Harold Dobbs to rethink his campaign tactics.  Initially, when Shelley withdrew from the race and Alioto announced his candidacy, Dobbs claimed that he would not change his campaign strategy.  The Dobbs campaign had spent the summer criticizing the record of Mayor Shelley, focusing on campaign pledges made by Shelley in 1963 that had gone unfulfilled. [27]   At a press conference on September 8, Dobbs explained why he would not need to change his tactics:  “I haven’t been talking about an individual but about four years of inactivity in San Francisco – problems that have arisen and not been solved.” [28]   Three days later, Dobbs steered his campaign in a new direction.  To counter Alioto’s “new faces” slogan, Dobbs emphasized his own experience in business and in city government, including his service on the Board of Supervisors and as acting mayor on several occasions. San Francisco, declared Dobbs, “can’t afford the luxury of delay while a man learns the job of mayor.  We need a mayor who will do the job, not just learn it.” [29]  

                Dobbs sought support from conservatives and moderates alike, and he had considerable success at appealing to centrist voters.  Dobbs’ campaign aides included both Republicans and Democrats, including former Mayor George Christopher, who was named honorary Chairman of the campaign.  Following McAteer’s death, many of his supporters chose to back Dobbs rather than Shelley.  One former campaign worker for McAteer’s campaign – North Beach businessman and Democrat Joseph C. Tarantino – announced in June that he would support Dobbs, stating: “The campaign issue which caused me to support Gene McAteer is the same one for which I endorse Harold Dobbs, and that is the need for new leadership in City Hall.” [30]   Tarantino would later join other Democrats in the formation of the Democrats for Dobbs Committee. [31]

However, most of McAteer’s and Shelley’s backers supported Alioto’s campaign. Alioto had worked on the campaigns of former Mayors Elmer Robinson and George Christopher, both Republicans, and his long-time friendship and financial support for Eugene McAteer was widely known. [32]   Alioto stressed the continuity between his campaign and McAteer’s when he stated at a campaign rally the day before the election: “I started this campaign as chairman for the great Senator Gene McAteer and I inherited the great organization that Gene McAteer built.” [33]   The similarities in the rhetoric and the appeal of the two were also significant.   McAteer, although a Democratic State Senator, had promoted himself as a centrist candidate who would operate independently and represent the city as a whole in a spirit of nonpartisanship.  In his short-lived campaign, McAteer had criticized both Shelley and Dobbs for stirring up the partisanship issue to draw attention away from what he called the “leadership gap at City Hall.” [34] Alioto continued this theme in his campaign as well.  In addition, several of Alioto’s political aides came from McAteer’s inner circle, including UC Regent and Attorney William K. Coblentz, real estate executive Vernon Kaufman, and Supervisorial candidate and McAteer’s former administrative assistant Robert Mendelsohn, had been identified with McAteer’s mayoral campaign. [35]   Even Tim McAteer, son of the late State Senator, joined and headed the Youth for Alioto Committee. [36]   Thomas N. Saunders, who had been Governor Edmund G. Brown’s campaign manager in 1962, also joined Alioto’s campaign. [37]  

In addition to personnel, Alioto also enjoyed support from many of McAteer’s financial backers.  The day after Alioto announced his candidacy, Kaufman, who was Alioto’s campaign coordinator, declared, “We will have all the money we need to elect Joseph Alioto.  We’re already in high gear.  You’ll see signs all over town very soon.” [38]    Three days later on September 12, former supporters of Shelley and McAteer, including a significant representation from San Francisco’s Italian-American community, gathered for a fundraiser in support of Alioto at Ben Swig’s Fairmont Hotel.

Swig, according to Harold Dobbs, tried to talk him into withdrawing from the race. [39]   Swig denied the charges outright, defended his role as an important financial backer of the Democratic Party, and at the September 12 fundraiser, the hotelman boasted: “We raised $203,500 in 45 minutes.  It looks as though Alioto has the full support of the Democratic Party.” [40]  

In early September, Alioto’s ability to attract the city’s Democratic voters hinged on whether or not a more liberal candidate would enter the race.  So when Jack Morrison decided to enter the race on September 12, Alioto found himself challenged from the left.  Phillip and John Burton, the condotierri of the reformist left-liberal faction of San Francisco’s Democrats, had not endorsed Shelley, but neither had they backed a candidate to oppose him.  At first news of Shelley’s withdrawal, questions centered on whether John Burton, who had just lost a special State Senate run-off election to Republican Milton Marks, would enter the race himself.   While Phillip Burton indicated that he would advise his younger brother not to enter the race, John Burton left open the possibility, declaring: “If the other candidates do not present such a program  (to solve the city’s problems), I’ll seriously consider becoming a candidate myself.” [41]   In the end, John Burton decided to heed his brother’s advice, and the brothers and their left-liberal foot soldiers found their man in Supervisor Jack Morrison. 

Morrison, a former newspaper reporter for the Chronicle and resident of the city’s Marina district, was serving his second term on the Board of Supervisors when he filed as a candidate in the mayoral race.  As a Supervisor Morrison had built a liberal record.  He had opposed the plan for a freeway through Golden Gate Park and originated the ban on Sunday motor traffic through the park’s concourse area.  He was also chairman of the committee that recommended the 40-foot height limitation on the northern waterfront, and he led the fight for billboard control. [42]   Morrison pointed to his record and presented himself to the city’s Democratic electorate as the only true liberal candidate.

Shortly after announcing his candidacy on September12, Morrison received the official endorsement of Philip and John Burton.  On September 15 Phillip Burton announced his support of Morrison because of his “outstanding record as a supervisor,” describing Morrison as “a person of courage, integrity and ability, a hard worker with the ability to be a good Mayor.” [43] John Burton announced his support for Morrison a week later.  Noting that Morrison was a liberal Democrat, Burton stated, “I think we need a liberal mayor – we’ve never had one in San Francisco.” [44]   Morrison spoke confidently of his ability to compete with the well-financed and organized campaigns of Alioto and Dobbs.  “I can win because of my person to person style of campaigning,” he declared, also citing his “large corps of helpers,” “a very substantial money-raising capacity,” and his “constituency, the largest of any person who is running for Mayor.” [45]   “I’ll go directly to the people just as I did before,” he asserted, referring to his previous successful campaigns for city supervisor, when he handed out cards to people at bus and streetcar stops, in front of downtown stores and outlying shopping centers. [46]

THE 1967 CAMPAIGN: CANDIDATES AND THE ISSUES

                    Four major issues received most attention during the campaign from the three main mayoral candidates and in local newspaper coverage: redevelopment and urban renewal, crime prevention and law and order, tax relief for the city’s property owners, and the Vietnam War.  These issues will be discussed at length below.  First however, it is worth noting several less prominent issues that were addressed at various points throughout the campaign.  These included transportation, city beautification, the elderly, education, culture, reform of city government, and pledges of inclusion made to racial minorities. 
        Alioto’s position on those issues demonstrated an effort to demonstrate that the needs of the city’s diverse population did not conflict with business growth and economic prosperity.  He opposed proposals to solve the commuter problem by adding a second deck to the Golden Gate Bridge and the construction of freeways through Golden Gate Park.  As an alternative, Alioto’s “imaginative” approach to San Francisco’s transportation problems included high-speed ferries:

We ought not to limit ourselves to Detroit type vehicles.  We should consider tandem streetcars and high-speed, 2,500-passenger ferryboats

 so that we would not have pressures for freeways in Golden Gate Park – Jack Morrison was one of the authors of that proposal. [47]

 

According to Alioto, city beautification and modernization complemented one another; voters did not need to choose between them.  In October, he told a predominantly middle-class audience of the Citizens’ Planning Committee that city-owned land could be improved to bring in more income and add to the beauty of the city. [48]  

On October 23, Alioto discussed the measures he would take to meet the needs of San Francisco’s elderly.  These included adequate social security benefits, sufficient medical care, tax-relief, improved community centers, and reduced off-hour Municipal Railway fares.  Alioto also pledged to “assign a top assistant to work exclusively with the elderly and would have elderly volunteers man an information office in City Hall.”

For those on Social Security, I will work to see their benefits are sufficient to sustain dignity.  For those in need of medical attention, I will work to see local medical care is the best and that Medi-Cal provides wholesome care, not cattle-herd treatment.  For those who own their own homes, I will see their homes remain theirs and aren’t lost because of over-burdensome taxes…Furthermore, I propose to defer property tax payments by senior citizens until they dispose of their homes. [49]

 

Alioto’s education plank, detailed in a talk to Phi Delta Kappa on November 1, included the expansion of pre-schools, development of massive school reading programs, recruitment of better teachers and operation of more demonstration schools. [50]   On October 31 he outlined a cultural platform at a meeting of the North Beach Lions Club. Included were the strengthening of present cultural facilities; the creation of a theatrical sports complex south of Market Street; the development of the Palace of Fine Arts for ballet and other performances; and the creation of a San Francisco Cultural Foundation to provide grants to deserving students and neighborhood groups for the advancement of the arts. [51]

Harold Dobbs likened San Francisco to the Big Apple and pledged to govern in “a style like that which Mayor John Lindsay has brought to New York.” [52]   As a Republican in a city where approximately two-thirds of the electorate registered as Democrats, Dobbs, like Alioto, pledged himself to be a moderate, non-partisan Mayor. [53]   His plank on city beautification called on private citizens to take the initiative in maintaining the city’s beauty.  “A park must not be an item on a tax bill,” Dobbs told an audience at Golden Gate Park on November 1. [54]   His platform also called for improved public transportation, including new buses that were cleaner and safer for the benefit of passengers and drivers. [55]   Dobbs also made promises to senior citizens, although they were less elaborate and ambitious than Alioto’s.  On October 9, Dobbs pledged that he would assume leadership in seeking property tax relief “for those senior citizens who own their own homes and are living on marginal fixed retirement incomes.”  He added that he would insure that present programs for the elderly were operated efficiently and with less red tape, and that he would seek to improve employment opportunities for senior citizens. [56] Like Alioto, Dobbs called for a cultural revival in San Francisco, urging the promotion of “neighborhood performance and art festivals, as well as little theater and other performing arts groups.” [57]  

Both candidates also promised to improve the city’s race relations by making city hall more accessible to minority residents.  Both candidates proposed job creation as a vehicle for reaching economic equality, and Alioto promised to work with the Board of Education to ensure that the city had “schools to match San Francisco’s greatness.” Both candidates pledged to work with minorities to create new jobs and provide better housing. Alioto promised to establish a mayor’s cabinet with officers dedicated to racial equality programs, as well as task forces that would bring minority residents into the policy making process.  Dobbs repeatedly stated that he would “create 21 neighborhood action committees to give ethnic groups of San Francisco a voice in City Hall.” [58]

At his press conference announcing his candidacy Morrison outlined his positions on several issues.  He called for more Federal aid to the cities and civil rights and jobs for minorities, and like Alioto, he favored an expansion of rapid transit and improvements in local transportation: “we must have a program for limiting the use of the private automobile.” [59]   Morrison also opposed adding a second deck to the Golden Gate Bridge and the expansion of freeways in the city. [60]   Like Alioto, Morrison emphasized the need to reform city government, but his language stressed populist themes whereas Alioto’s rhetoric emphasized efficiency.  On October 23, Morrison outlined a ten-point program for reform designed to take control of city government away from “downtown big money interests” and give it back to the “real community.” [61]   The program for reform would include a new city charter, proposals to nominate candidates for the Board of Supervisors in district primaries, an elective school board, fewer commissions, a city “ombudsman” to hear citizens’ complaints and a single office for building permits.

Redevelopment

            During his service on the Board of Supervisors, Jack Morrison criticized Redevelopment Agency projects, particularly ones in the predominantly African-American Western Addition.   The Agency, Morrison charged, caused “tragic dislocations of families” and reduced the supply of low-cost and moderate-cost housing. [62]   Morrison clashed with Mayor Shelley over issues involving redevelopment projects.  On October 25, Shelley vetoed a Board of Supervisors action that would have temporarily halted redevelopment in the Western Addition.  Morrison urged the Board to override the veto on the grounds that the Redevelopment Agency failed to adequately relocate displaced families. [63]   In his campaign, Morrison called for a new approach to redevelopment in San Francisco – one that would “assure decent housing for all San Franciscans” – and he promised to oppose any project that did not provide re-housing for the displaced owners and renters. [64]   In addition, he pledged that his new approach to improve San Francisco’s older neighborhoods would operate independently from the Redevelopment Agency.  Morrison also proposed that state savings and loan associations be required to file reports making it possible to determine “patterns of discrimination against certain neighborhoods or racial groups.” [65]  

Dobbs also promised to oppose further redevelopment projects.  On August 10, he told an audience of Mexican-Americans in the Mission district that there would be no more redevelopment projects in San Francisco: “No one in the city need fear redevelopment projects because there won’t be any.  Too many people have to be moved.” [66]   On October 19, Dobbs renewed this pledge: “When I’m mayor we’re going to finish each and every one of these projects before we undertake any more.  We have bitten off more than we can chew.” [67]  

Alioto, who had served as chairman of the city’s Redevelopment Agency from 1955 to 1959, was the only major candidate to take a forthright stand in favor of new urban redevelopment projects.  “There’s cruelty in the fact that some of our most spectacular views are seen through the cracked windows of our most dismal slums.”  Urban renewal, provided “residents of the neighborhoods themselves [are] drawn into the planning process,” could ensure that San Francisco would not become “an economic schizophrenic – the poor in their slums and the rich in their luxury towers.” “There should be sufficient planning so that what takes the place of slums doesn’t turn out to be slums with plumbing,” Alioto declared in a statement in mid October.  “The emphasis should be on rehabilitation.  There ought not to be a bulldozing mentality.” [68]

Law and Order

Crime prevention and law and order were also prominent issues in the 1967 mayoral campaign.  San Francisco was not immune to the social problems and upheavals that touched other major urban areas in the 1960s.  Student protests in Berkeley, the hippie counterculture in the Haight-Ashbury, and a race riot in Hunters Point in October 1966 all made the issue of law and order an important one for voters.  In an article reviewing Shelley’s term as Mayor, the Examiner cited civil rights protests, labor strikes, race riots, the rise in prostitution and topless nightclubs, and San Francisco’s emergence “as world capital of the Hippies” as problems that the next Mayor would have to address. [69]   When addressing these issues, both Alioto and Dobbs concentrated on the role of the police department.  Alioto outlined his law and order platform at a news conference on October 9.  As mayor, he pledged that he would “mobilize all forces” to keep the streets safe for everyone from “the Marina to Hunters Point.”  In so doing, he promised to be particularly aggressive in cracking down on drugs, prostitution and violence: “I want Mr. Bigs’ behind bars, the men who trade wholesale in girls and drugs.” [70]   Alioto emphasized that peace in the streets would not be achieved through excessive police force, and he went out of his way to defend the police from what he considered unfair criticism.  He stated that as mayor he would be “the lawyer for the Police Department,” and that he would ensure that the police received training in how to both protect the citizen’s constitutional rights and keep the streets safe.  In this sense Alioto sought to distinguish his approach to law and order from that of Dobbs, who he accused of having a “police dog mentality” on law enforcement. [71]  

Because Dobbs focused on the role of the police using more forceful language than Alioto, the Chronicle described the Republican’s approach as a “war on crime.” “San Francisco streets,” declared Dobbs, “must be made the safest in the world.” [72]   Before Alioto entered the race, Dobbs accused Shelley of “handcuffing” the police by telling the Chief of Police “what he could do and couldn’t do in the use of firearms.” Shelley’s approach to crime, according to Dobbs, created a disorderly city; the hippies of Haight Ashbury were allowed to flout the law, and the streets became “unsafe for women.” [73]   After Alioto replaced Shelley in the race, Dobbs matched Alioto’s pledges to increase manpower, improve education, and improve communications and lab systems for the police department.  Yet, while stating that he was against police brutality, Dobbs declined to join Alioto in stressing the need for the police force to be vigilant in rooting out abuses in authority and to monitor its compliance with citizen civil liberties.  In August Dobbs argued that police should be allowed to “use their guns” and do “anything to carry out the law and provide protection.” [74]   In November he pledged to give “100% support to our fine police department WITHOUT POLITICAL INTERFERENCE.” [75]

In contrast to Dobbs, Alioto and Morrison both emphasized the need to attack the root causes of crime.  Alioto stressed the need to “create jobs for the 34,000 youths in San Francisco who are unemployed.” [76] Morrison’s platform on crime prevention made attacking the root causes of crime the cornerstone, allowing him to link law and order with the protection of civil rights and civil liberties.    Rather than focus on police procedures in the manner of Alioto and Dobbs, Morrison built his law and order platform on improving the conditions of minorities and the poor.  He declared that he would “bring justice every time the civil rights of our residents are threatened,” and said that San Francisco must “break out of the cycle of poverty in which those who have nothing else to lose finally lose help.” [77]

The main feature of Alioto’s platform on crime was the creation of a Crime Commission, which he promised would be representative of all elements of San Francisco.  The new agency would not operate as a review board, nor would it supplant or conflict with the permanent Police Commission in the Police Department.  Instead, Alioto’s proposed Commission “would revise police procedures for effective and just law enforcement and report on the present laws dealing with gun sales, narcotics, pornography and sex crimes.” [78]   The Commission would look into crime prevention, jails, probation and rehabilitation. [79]   In addition, Alioto pledged that he would make sure that the police received all the skilled manpower it needed, improved its communications technology, and received the resources necessary to create a highly trained Mobile Tactical Force ready to move quickly to limit outbreaks of violent crime. [80]

San Francisco’s hippie residents became an important issue in the debate on crime and law and order, particularly after a number of confrontations between police and hippies in the Haight-Ashbury district in October.  The arrest of thirty-two hippies during a police “sweep” of the district on October 9 and a violent clash between police and people on the street on October 30 drew the criticism of San Francisco civil libertarians.  Hippies who protested the “sweeps” argued that police should be concentrate on ridding the neighborhood of criminal gangs who they said made the district dangerous for everyone. 

The issue intensified when workers at the Huckleberry House, a haven for runaways in the Haight-Ashbury district, were arrested on charges of contributing to the delinquency of minors.  The three candidates addressed the hippie question on October 29at Glide Methodist Church, a left liberal “social movement half-way house” in the city’s Tenderloin district.  Of the three candidates, Morrison was the most critical of the recent events in Haight-Ashbury.  “It is almost as if anyone who goes in and provides unofficial help for people out there is in danger of being arrested,” Morrison said in reference to the Huckleberry House workers. Dobbs, having been quoted by the Chronicle stating that the hippies should be “pressured” out of San Francisco, faced intense questioning at the forum. [81]   In response, Dobbs forthrightly reiterated:  “Law and order must be carried out in that area as well as other areas of San Francisco.” [82]   As he did on most of the issues in the campaign, Alioto took the middle ground of the three major candidates, stating that he had no problem with the hippies so long as they respected the laws and did not bring an increase in drug traffic to the city. [83]

Tax Relief for Property Owners

Tax relief for property owners proved another major issue in the 1967 mayoral campaign.  In 1966, the California State Legislature enacted Assembly Bill 80, a law requiring that property taxes were to be levied according to a standard formula, instead of what the New York Times referred to as “an assessors whim.” [84]    Whereas past assessments in San Francisco varied from five to fifty percent of the estimated market value, the new law required that the land and building were to be assessed on the basis of twenty to twenty-five percent of their appraised market value.   As a result, when new assessments were mailed out in the summer of 1967, many San Francisco property owners discovered that their tax bills had increased three to four times since the previous year. [85]   The higher assessments triggered a hue and a cry from San Francisco property owners, and on September 18, the Tax Appeals Board heard the first of 7,609 assessment protests filed by San Francisco taxpayers. [86]

Each of the three candidates devoted close attention to the protests of property owners, and each promised, if elected, to seek legislative reversal of A.B. 80.  Dobbs, for example, said he would lead a delegation to Sacramento and would “demand” that the Governor and Legislature move to “eliminate the personal property tax on home owners” and get some tax relief for “real property taxpayers and renters.” [87]   The candidates differed, however, on how they would bring immediate relief to San Francisco property owners.  According to Alioto, A.B. 80 gave business a “windfall” of $29 million by reversing the traditional ratio in which business paid two-thirds and homeowners one-third of all city taxes. [88]   Alioto and Morrison both made it clear that they would shift the tax burden from homeowners back to business, but they disagreed on how this should be accomplished.  Morrison proposed a “gross receipts tax” that would target every business, large and small.  In addition to making this part of his platform, Morrison wrote a measure that appeared on the November ballot as Proposition “N”, which if approved would have required businesses to pay one-twentieth of one percent on gross receipts each quarter. [89]   Alioto put a human face to his ideas on tax relief on October 16 at a press conference held outside the Sunset-district home of a retired boilermaker, whose property tax had nearly doubled from the previous year.  The plan he detailed demonstrated more caution than Morrison’s proposals in shifting the tax burden to businesses.  He opposed the gross receipts tax on businesses urged by Morrison because “gross receipts are no standard for earnings, and a firm with big gross receipts could still be losing money.”  In addition, he also opposed personal city income taxes on private persons and corporations because he believed that they were “unwieldy” and had “a way of getting out of bounds.” [90]   The cornerstone of Alioto’s plan was a “commercial rent or occupancy tax”, in which small neighborhood businessmen would be exempted.  Thus, whereas Morrison sought to shift the tax burden to all businesses, Alioto targeted big business.  In addition, he also proposed a “commuter tax” on those who “use San Francisco facilities but do not pay taxes here.” [91] Alioto also supported Federal tax incentives to encourage moderate- and low-income housing reforms to ease the property tax burden, and he proposed the appointment of “representatives of all segments of the community to the commissions of San Francisco.” [92]

According to Alioto, there was no realistic alternative to shifting some of the tax burden back to big business.  Dobbs disagreed, and he offered a plan to bring tax relief to the city’s property owners that was dramatically different from the proposals of Alioto and Morrison.  Whereas Alioto and Morrison argued that the tax burden should be shifted back to businesses, Dobbs contested that the solution was to reduce government spending.  Thus rather than propose new taxes for businesses, he believed that he could achieve a cut in the tax rate by trimming the “frills and fat” from city spending.  This position was endorsed by the Chronicle, which reported in early September that under Shelley’s administration city spending had risen by thirty-three percent to unprecedented levels. [93]   “I do not favor any new taxes,” Dobbs proclaimed. “I’ll remove the frills and the fat…. Let’s live within our means and try to get along with what we have.” [94]   Dobbs’ platform on tax relief then, was critical of both Morrison and Alioto.  He characterized Morrison as a free-spending liberal who lacked practical business experience. [95]   In a speech to the Federal Bar Association on October 24, Dobbs also attacked the “commuter tax” proposed by Alioto, claiming that it would essentially operate as a third income tax and would drive businesses out of San Francisco. [96]   For Alioto, however, the alternative offered by Harold Dobbs was unrealistic.  “That would require a $58 million cut – or 15 percent across the board – an obvious impossibility,” Alioto stated in October. “Any budget can be trimmed, but not pole-axed.” [97]

In addition to restoring the equilibrium to the city tax structure, Alioto believed that with his extensive business and legal experience he could further alleviate the tax burden by generating additional revenue for the city.  He claimed that he could save $8 to $10 million by “riding herd” on the $100 million of goods the city purchased annually.  He added that he would raise the price of water that San Francisco sold to its neighbors while doubling the hydroelectric output of the Hetch-Hetchy system.  Finally, he claimed that he could raise millions of dollars by profitably leasing underused city properties, including 60,000 acres of city-owned land in neighboring counties. [98]

The Vietnam War

One topic of national scope, primarily a symbolic rather than practical issue for the City and County of San Francisco, received considerable attention throughout the campaign.  The 1967 municipal election in San Francisco included a referendum on the Vietnam War.  Proposition “P”, as it appeared on the ballot, asked San Francisco voters to vote yes or no on the following:

Declaration of policy: Shall it be the policy of the people of the City and County of San Francisco that there be an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam so that the Vietnamese people can settle their own problems? [99]

 

Only Morrison among the three major candidates considered the Vietnam War an appropriate issue for San Francisco voters, and he alone urged a “yes” vote in the municipal election.  In addition to voting for Proposition “P”, he said that as mayor he would support a proposed “peace” delegation on the California Democratic Council the following year if it applied “pressure that would change the Johnson war policy.” [100]   Shortly after announcing his candidacy, Morrison explained why San Franciscans should support an immediate end to the war:

The financial crisis of the great urban areas of the country and financial needs of San Francisco and other cities demand an early end of the Vietnam War.  We need more federal money for education, housing and transportation and these revenue requirements will never be met until we have a vast infusion of federal money, and we won’t have it until the war ends. [101]

 

Dobbs represented the opposite end of the spectrum on the issue, indicating that he would vote “no” on the Vietnam measure.  Although he said that he favored ending the war as soon as possible, he declared that “it is not an issue in the mayor’s race.” Dobbs believed that it was up to the president and the military to decide how a conclusion to the war could be accomplished, even if this meant continued escalation. [102]

Although he did not consider the Vietnam War to be an issue with relevance to municipal affairs, Alioto agreed that the war had significance for the well being of the city and affirmed the voters’ right to know the candidates’ views on the matter.  In so doing, he carved out a position for himself that placed him between the extremes of his two main rivals.  In speeches on two consecutive days in late September, Alioto established his position on Proposition P. He told a meeting of the Federal Bar Association on September 26: “Vietnam obviously is so pervading and overriding an issue that it affects everyone in San Francisco…. I categorically reject the suggestion by Mr. Dobbs last week that escalation is an acceptable alternative.  My own view is it’s a war we all hate and wish we could end in a hurry…. We should do everything in our power to negotiate and get the troops out of there,”. [103]    The next day Alioto addressed the New America Democratic Club, promising to vote “no” on the ballot measure because of its “irrational” and “sloppy wording.” Alioto objected to the use of the word “immediate” in conjunction with “withdrawal.” He supported immediate negotiations and massive economic aid, but he could not support a measure that asked voters to approve “immediate negotiations and withdrawal.” [104]   Alioto’s position on Proposition P matched that of the Johnson Administration, which officially weighed in on the issue when Vice-president Hubert Humphrey visited San Francisco on October 10.  Humphrey gave an interview to local television stations and addressed Catholic social workers, local businessmen, and Peninsula aerospace workers.  Humphrey told audiences that although he believed San Franciscans had the right to “express their feelings about the war in Vietnam through a ballot vote,” the outcome of the vote would “not change foreign policy.”  That, Humphrey stated, depended on “whom you elect president of the United States.”  As for the ballot measure itself, Humphrey joined Alioto in strongly objecting to its wording. [105]

THE 1967CAMPAIGN: SEARCHING FOR SUPPORT

        In many respects Alioto waged his mayoral campaign on two fronts.  On one, he contended with Jack Morrison for the support of the city’s liberal voters.  On the other, he battled with Harold Dobbs over the city’s moderate voters.  The following account will first describe Alioto’s campaign, primarily against Morrison, for the support of the city’s liberal organizations.  The focus will then turn to Alioto’s campaign against Dobbs, in which the support of a significant portion of the city’s moderate voters was at stake. 

Morrison frequently expressed his belief that Dobbs and Alioto would split the votes of moderate to conservative constituents, and his claim that no essential difference existed between the two lawyers became a mantra of his campaign.  Appropriating a phrase that Dobbs had used at one point to characterize McAteer and Shelley, Morrison referred to his two rivals as “Tweedledee and Tweedledum.”  He declared that both represented “the effort of a few downtown financial barons to keep San Francisco in their fiefdom,” and that “these aging and fearful men have had their day.” [106]   Thus Morrison’s declaration that “City Hall is not for sale,” became a frequent battle cry of his campaign. [107]   As part of his program for government reform, Morrison promised that he would do away with what he claimed was the traditional system of awarding commission posts to the highest campaign contributors.  “The first thing I’ll do on my first day in the Mayor’s office will be to remove every last vestige of the payoff from City Hall.  I will kick out every commissioner who bought his way in.” [108]   On October 17, Morrison offered to open his financial records to the public, and he challenged Dobbs and Alioto to do the same.  A look at the financial books of Alioto and Dobbs, Morrison claimed, would show that their financial backers overlapped. [109]   By portraying Alioto and Dobbs as two sides of the same coin, the Supervisor attempted to deflect claims from the Alioto camp that a Morrison candidacy would cause a split Democratic vote and possibly usher the Republican Dobbs into the mayor’s office.  “I think he and Dobbs appeal to the same narrow group of voters and downtown interests,” Morrison averred.  “I expect to attract a much broader base of support, from people all over San Francisco.” [110]   Morrison stressed, however, that he would rely heavily upon the “minorities” as well as a labor endorsement as the pillars of his electoral base. [111]   Alioto viewed the dynamics of the three-way race for mayor differently.  He denied that he represented “downtown interests,” and repeatedly stressed in his speeches and appearances that Morrison would take votes away from him, possibly resulting in a Dobbs victory. [112]  

On September 19, Alioto and Morrison received equal time at a political luncheon with members of the Democratic Forum and the San Francisco Democratic Association. Nearly two hundred members, most of them young and newly middle-aged lawyers who “might normally be expected to be heavily pro-Morrison,” listened as the two candidates sparred. [113]    The Chronicle reported that although Alioto was mostly complimentary in his comments towards Morrison, the “exchange of compliments was strictly one-sided.”  Morrison asserted that he was the “only candidate in the race who can offer a choice that is suitable,” and dismissed Alioto’s “new faces” campaign as “the intellectual equivalent of ‘Keep it cool with Coolridge’.”  Morrison also claimed that Alioto had angered the “Negro community” when he was on the Board of Education and that he was responsible for the displacement of black families from the Western Addition while chairman of the Redevelopment Agency.  Alioto defended his record on the Board of Education (1948-1954) and as chairman of the Redevelopment Agency (1955-1959), and he asked the audience to consider the following reason not to support Morrison: he simply could not win.  “I think Jack Morrison is an able and dedicated public servant, and if I believed for one moment Jack Morrison could win this election I would be willing to get out of the campaign.” Supporting Morrison would result in the least desirable result for Democrats: a Dobbs victory.  “If Harold Dobbs is elected I think you are going to see considerable trouble in the Negro Community,” Alioto warned.   He added: “How much service is any one doing the Negro Community if he runs wittingly or unwittingly to help Harold Dobbs.”  Remarks such as these drew angry objections from Dobbs, and his response will be addressed at length below. Alioto ignored Dobbs and continued to emphasize the likelihood of Morrison’s campaign indirectly contributing to a Dobbs victory. Addressing a group of supporters two days after the aforementioned political luncheon, he alleged that Morrison was acting as a “stalking horse” for Dobbs. [114]   Alioto renewed this charge two days before the election, contending that Morrison was “boasting” that the “votes he’ll get can only help Harold Dobbs.” [115]

African-American community leaders allied with Phillip and John Burton and the left-liberal wing of the Democratic Party were quick to announce their support of Morrison.  The first major endorsement from the African-American community came on September 15 from Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett, editor and publisher of the Sun Reporter – a weekly African-American newspaper published in the city’s Western Addition neighborhood.  When Morrison announced his candidacy on September 12, he directed a campaign promise specifically to Goodlett:  “If I am elected, a Negro will be appointed to the Public Utilities Commission.” [116] Goodlett and several other Black leaders cited Morrison’s record as Supervisor, Alioto’s record on the Board of Education and the Redevelopment Commission, and Dobbs’ seeming insensitivity to minority issues and his “crime in the streets platform” in their reasoning for supporting Morrison.  “Only Supervisor Morrison understands the foreboding circumstances and the dangerous conditions which the denial of justice to racial minorities has created in San Francisco.” [117]   Unmoved by Alioto’s argument that by supporting Morrison liberals would be helping Dobbs, Goodlett stated: “I have grave doubts about Mr. Dobbs philosophy, but we Negroes have lived under trying circumstances before.  We would rather go down to defeat if necessary with a candidate we can support.” [118]   Another African-American leader, Burton ally State Assemblyman Willie Brown, predicted that minority voters would support Morrison at least in part because of Alioto’s “sordid record on the Board of Education and with the Redevelopment Commission.”  “Mr. Alioto has no appeal to Negro voters,” Brown stated. [119] The Baptists Minister’s Union endorsed Alioto, but towards the end of October dissenters from that body joined a group of ministers pledging their support for Morrison.  The group criticized Alioto’s record as chairman of the Redevelopment Agency, and they alleged that Dobbs’ “crime on the streets” platform was really his “euphemism for violent suppression of the legitimate aspirations of Negroes.” [120]

The endorsements from organized labor and the San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee also illustrated how the candidacies of Alioto and Morrison divided the city’s Democrats.  Dick Meister, labor reporter for the Chronicle described the divisions within the labor community as the deepest split “by far in local labor history” over a mayoral endorsement. [121]   When McAteer was in the race, support from organized labor was divided between the State Senator and Mayor Shelley. After McAteer’s death, Shelley, a former labor leader himself, obtained near unanimous support from the city’s most influential labor organizations.  Shelley’s withdrawal and the entry of Alioto and Morrison into the race re-opened the question of which candidate the city’s major labor unions would endorse. 

Alioto’s reputation as a friend of the labor movement derived from law school days, when he interned with the Rev. John A. Ryan, the nation’s most prominent “labor priest” in Washington, DC.  However, the lawyer lacked the personal history in the San Francisco labor movement that had cemented working class voters to Jack Shelley when he ran for Congress and then for Mayor.  At the September 8 press conference announcing his candidacy, Alioto took pains to tell voters that “people who talk in terms of City Charter reform when they mean they want to take away the gains labor has made . . .get no sympathy from me.” [122] Alioto’s candidacy initially received a tepid response from organized labor, and some labor leaders hesitated to make an endorsement.  Daniel F. Del Carlo, head of the Building Trades Council of 44 Unions, typified this sentiment, stating, “We’ll have to study this matter very carefully.  After all, Alioto isn’t very well known in the labor movement.” [123]  

                It did not take long for labor to warm up to Alioto. The first major endorsement came from the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU).  In May the ILWU had voted unanimously to endorse Shelley, and Alioto appeared confident that he would win the endorsement from the union.  Pointing out that the ILWU represented 500 rice workers, Alioto, who managed the California Rice Grower’s Association from 1959 to 1964, and then became its president, boasted of having developed “exemplary relations” with the ILWU. The Chronicle reported on September 9 that the sentiment among ILWU officials appeared to be that Alioto “was far too conservative for their taste.” [124]   But after a four-hour long meeting on September 18, the ILWU voted 40 to 17 to endorse Alioto over Morrison, with Dobbs receiving two votes. [125]   In his speech to the committee prior to the vote, Alioto emphasized the liberal aspects of his platform, stressing tax relief for property owners and the need for cooperation between government and industry in a drive “to create jobs for the 34,000 youths in San Francisco who are unemployed.” [126]   Morrison, a favorite with the ILWU in each of his previous campaigns for Supervisor, repeated to the committee his claim that Alioto and Dobbs were cut from the same cloth.  “My two major opponents are out of the same mold.  One is a right-wing Republican, the other is a right-wing Democrat.” [127]   A statement by one member of the ILWU Legislative Committee spoke to the effectiveness of the notion that votes for Morrison would help elect Dobbs: “Jack’s a great guy, and we would support him for any other office…. The trouble is, though, in this mayor’s race, Alioto can win.  Morrison just can’t.” [128]   Alioto may also have benefited from his ability to convince labor voters that he – not Morrison – had received Shelley’s endorsement as well as his symbolic role as leader of the Democratic labor.  When he came to the ILWU meeting, for instance, Alioto walked into the hall surrounded by several of Shelley’s former campaign aides. [129]

                Following the ILWU meeting the candidates turned their attention to the AFL-CIO and the endorsement by its political arm, the Committee on Political Education (COPE).  COPE’s endorsement carried weight among working class voters, and Alioto had a friend on the COPE board, George W. Johns, secretary of the San Francisco County Labor Council.  Alioto had served with Johns on the city Board of Education, and in 1961 when Johns ran unsuccessfully for a seat on the Board of Supervisors Alioto chaired his campaign committee.  However, Johns stopped short of pledging his personal support for Alioto, saying only that labor would want a mayor who would: “recognize the labor movement, consider the problems of working people, give labor representation in city government, and treat [it] as well as any other segment of society.” [130]

In his campaign appearances leading up to the convention Alioto continued to pledge the repeal of A.B. 80 and the need to create jobs for San Francisco’s unemployed youths.  When pledging tax relief for property owners, Alioto seized the opportunity to attack Morrison’s record on the Board of Supervisors.  Morrison was a member of the Board of Supervisors in 1966 when it passed a resolution supporting the passage of A.B. 80, and Alioto reminded voters of this throughout the campaign.  “About all he (Morrison) ever came up with is a resolution to pass Assembly Bill 80, which will ruin thousands of property owners and renters in November – a problem he is only now beginning to recognize.”  He added that Morrison “didn’t stop at that, he himself lobbied it through the State Legislature.” [131]  

The candidates met on September 20 at the Labor Temple for a meeting preliminary to the COPE endorsing convention, which was scheduled for September twenty-second.  In his address to the committee Alioto proclaimed his “working class” background and assured his audience that he was going to “be a friend of labor,” and that gains made by labor under Shelley would be “maintained and expanded.”  He added, “its nonsense to say that government ought to be run like a business,” and he promised to “throw out” any bids on city work from non-union firms, and to use “every power in the Mayor’s office to eliminate the sweatshop conditions in Chinatown.”  In his talk at the Labor Temple, Alioto demonstrated his well-known penchant for using a pugnacious style that played well with his wage earning audience.  “He ignored the microphone, and strode up and down the aisles in the Labor Temple as he harangued his audience and lashed out at Supervisor Morrison, one of his opponents.” Morrison defended himself by challenging the idea that had seemingly contributed to his failure to receive the endorsement from the ILWU.  “I can win,” Morrison declared to the committee. [132]  

Following the preliminary COPE meeting the three candidates faced off before California Society of Professional Engineers, where they stressed key themes of their campaigns. Dobbs presented his plank on crime while pledging to be “mayor of all the City, not just of some special interest group.”

 Morrison's prediction:  I'm going to win because I'm the best qualified candidate running for mayor this year, a candidate

who's never spoken from both sides of his mouth and one who's never said one thing and done another.

Alioto retorted: I’m not going to make many promises, but there’s no doubt that this City is in a mess just like every American city is in a mess today, and this group especially will understand that the engineering of a city calls for new solutions. [133]
 

In the days leading up to the COPE convention, Alioto received support from numerous local labor groups.  The International Ladies Garment Workers Union, Service Workers, Local 1100, the Cooks Union Local 44, the AFL-CIO’s Building and Construction Trades Council, and the officers of the Bay City Metal Trades and Industrial Unions Council all endorsed Alioto.  The Department Store Employees Union, which had endorsed Morrison in his previous bids for the Board of Supervisors, now voted 12-0 to endorse Alioto over Morrison.  Other representatives of several large unions, however, including the Painters Union Local 4, Carpenters and Operating Engineers, stood by Morrison. [134]   Dobbs objected to his minority position, and on September 21, he held a press conference to protest the decision by labor leaders to allow only Alioto and Morrison – “the new candidates” – an opportunity to address COPE delegates prior to convention vote. [135]

                The struggle labor support reached its apogee at the September 22 AFL-CIO political convention.  After a vote that appeared to give Alioto two votes more than the two-thirds required for the endorsement, the convention broke up in disarray without endorsing a candidate after a discrepancy in the vote was noted.   A recount was undertaken after it was noted that although there were 260 votes casts, the official tally showed a total of 280 votes.  The unofficial recount showed Alioto receiving 169 out of 258 votes, which left him three short of the two-thirds necessary for endorsement.  Due to the discrepancy and Alioto’s failure to garner two-thirds of the vote in the recount, a new endorsing convention was set for October 6. [136]

                Although he failed to receive an endorsement at the September 22 convention, his vote did indicate that Alioto had the support from the majority of the AFL-CIO labor leaders.  He drew closer to an official COPE endorsement on the evening of September 29.  That night, at a meeting of the San Francisco Labor Council (having been assured that the convention results had been audited by a certified public accountant) delegates accepted an executive committee recommendation to endorse “a slate consisting of all candidates with a majority vote (italics added).” [137]   The debacle at the September 22 convention and the action of the Labor Council drew angry responses from supporters of Morrison.  William Jordan, president of the Marine Firemen’s Union, accused COPE officers of “attempting to deliver the votes to Alioto by any means.” [138]   The day before the October 6 re-vote, Jordan appeared with five other labor leaders at a Morrison press conference to back Morrison’s claim “that the labor vote is with me.” [139]   Morrison’s left-liberal Democratic Party cohorts Willie Brown and John Burton described Alioto’s strong showing at the September 22 convention as a “real tragedy” and criticized the unions: “true friends of labor aren’t supported in their time of need.” [140]   Burton argued that the Labor Council delegates were bureaucrats out of touch with their members, and he insisted that the union leaders who had endorsed Alioto would not be able to deliver their members’ votes, a sentiment that Morrison voiced after the ILWU voted to endorse Alioto. [141]   “So a few labor leaders have gone for Alioto.  Well, I’m still confident that on November 7 the rank and file will be mine.” [142]

                Alioto suffered a slight setback the day before the October 6 COPE endorsing convention when AFL-CIO president George Meany ruled that Teamster Union Delegates, who were not affiliated with the AFL-CIO but who had been invited by the council to participate, would not be able to vote in the convention.  The Examiner reported that the disqualified Teamster delegates, representing ten locals – most of who supported Alioto – would have totaled forty votes. [143] In the end, the AFL-CIO’s Committee On Political Education did not make an official mayoral endorsement, leaving the city’s unions to “go their own way” politically.  The vote at the October 6 COPE convention gave Alioto 190 votes, Morrison 92 votes, and Dobbs 33 votes.  Although he fell short of the 214 votes necessary for the endorsement, Alioto took the vote as an important indicator of his growing base of support.  “It is quite evident,” he stated after the vote, that “I have the vast majority of labor solidly behind me.” [144]

                The competition between Alioto and Morrison for the Democratic vote took another controversial turn on October 4 when the San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee voted fourteen to seven to endorse Morrison over Alioto. [145] In his speech to the committee on October 4, Morrison stepped up his attack on Alioto.  He accused Alioto of appealing to “race hatred” in a recent speech, and asserted that Alioto’s campaign was “going nowhere, despite all the money and undercover deals.” [146]   Alioto continued to maintain that he was the only true non-partisan candidate in the race and the only one who could bring a fresh approach to city hall, while repeating the claim that Morrison stood no chance of winning and could only help Dobbs into the mayor’s office.  In a September statement commenting on Morrison’s entry into the race, Alioto pointed to Morrison’s tenure on the Board of Supervisors to link him to the city’s problems.  “In three terms on the Board of Supervisors,” Alioto said of Morrison, “he has never come up with a decision or bold approach to deal with our city’s problems.” [147]  

Alioto’s ability to claim he wore the mantle laid down by Shelley received a boost when Shelley formally endorsement Alioto on October 4, describing Alioto as the prime moderate candidate, “not a way out liberal, but not a conservative.” [148]   Shelley reiterated Alioto’s argument that Morrison could not win.  “I like Jack Morrison.  I think he’s a liberal and I think he’s a very sincere guy, but frankly I don’t think he can be elected at this point.  He lacks the backing and the forces to put him in office.” [149]

                By October 4 both candidates had earned endorsements from a variety of San Francisco’s liberal organizations. Alioto scored the largest victory with the endorsement by the ILWU and his strong showing at the aborted COPE endorsing convention.  Morrison had the support of several smaller labor groups, and on September 26, the New America Democratic Clubb – described by the Examiner as a “new politics” group – voted 17 to 15 to endorse Morrison over Alioto. [150]   Morrison also had support from the city’s most liberal politicians, including U.S. Congressman in Phillip Burton, State Senator George Moscone, and State Assemblymen John Burton and Willie Brown.  However, no clear winner emerged on October 4, when the San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee voted to endorse Morrison.  Prior to the committee vote, Alioto’s supporters declared that a mayoral endorsement by the Central Committee was illegal and that the convention itself was rigged, and Alioto withdrew his name from the vote.  The endorsement was illegal, Alioto’s campaign claimed, because pursuant to the City Charter the office of mayor was non-partisan, and that under the election code the committee had no authority to endorse a mayoral candidate. [151]   Committee Chairman Agar Jaicks, a Morrison supporter, justified the endorsement the day before the meeting, declaring: “It’s time the people know where the Democratic Party stands in this race.”  Jaicks continued that because of charges of deals and counter deals and “with labor divided, the business community in turmoil, the voter has little chance to sort out the facts.” [152]   In the days following the Central Committee’s endorsement of Morrison, Jaicks obtained legal support for his position.  The day of the meeting Jaicks requested a legal opinion on the matter from the State legislative counsel’s office.  The following day he cited a letter from Deputy Legislative Counsel Edward Bershatsky to Assemblyman Willie Brown to support the committee’s action.  The letter stated that if a county central committee “determines it to be in the best interest of the party to endorse a candidate for a nonpartisan office, it may do so.” [153] On October 6, State legislative counsel George H. Murphy affirmed the contents of Bershatsky’s letter in a formal legal opinion.  Murphy’s opinion provided Jaick’s with the legal basis he sought, ruling that: 

We find nothing in the election code provisions pertaining to county central committees that would prohibit either expressly of by necessary implication such a committee from endorsing a non-partisan candidate.  To the contrary, the provisions…expressly authorize a county central committee to do whatever it deems to be for the benefit of the party. [154]

 

                Jaicks found himself defending against charges that the meeting was rigged.  Don King, a Central Committee member and an Alioto spokesman, alleged that the Burton-dominated committee had rigged the meeting to endorse Jack Morrison. [155]   Jaicks, accused of owing his position on the Committee to the Burtons, denied that the brothers had such influence and denied that the endorsement was preordained. [156]   If the meeting was rigged, Jaicks declared, “then it was rigged by the registered Democrats of San Francisco.” [157]

                Although Morrison won the endorsement, Alioto may have benefited the most from the event. While Alioto’s spokespeople made charges and allegations against the Committee, Alioto himself spun the event to affirm his own claims to voters as a “new face” and as the only “true non-partisan” candidate:

It has become evident today that I am the only candidate in the Mayor’s race who is running as a true nonpartisan.   I couldn’t be happier… I think the people of San Francisco are tired of the partisan Republican-Democratic battles for nonpartisan offices waged by a tiny handful of ragtag professional hacks.  I am not a professional Republican, like Harold Dobbs.  I am not a professional Democrat, like Jack Morrison.  For these two professional politicians have had a combined total of nearly twenty years on the Board of Supervisors to solve San Francisco’s problems.  They have done nothing for San Francisco. [158]

 

Questions of legitimacy notwithstanding, the Central Committee’s endorsement of Morrison proved a small consolation for the candidate who had already been unable to win support from the city’s most influential labor organizations.  Following the controversial Central Committee meeting, the contest between Alioto and Morrison began to cool off.  In subsequent campaign appearances, Morrison repeated some of the charges against Alioto that he had made earlier in the campaign, but his presentations lacked the forthright character that he exhibited in September.  On November 3, Morrison renewed charges of a Shelley-Alioto deal and challenged Alioto to address the charges directly.  “I think the public has a right to hear Joe Alioto’s answer to ‘What about the deal’,” Morrison declared.  To a degree Alioto obliged, stating that “Jack Shelley isn’t the kind of man who would make a deal with the man who was chairman of Gene McAteer’s campaign to defeat him.” [159]

                Despite frequent claims from the three candidates that they were willing to debate each other, the three major candidates rarely confronted each other face to face during the campaign.  On September 22, the Chronicle reported that all three candidates sought a public debate.  “I’ll meet any candidate for Mayor who wants to talk about the issues,” Dobbs stated.  Alioto expressed the same sentiment to a group of supporters: “If Dobbs wants to debate, that’s agreeable with me, and he can bring his own crowd.” [160]   The Chronicle reported in October that, according to Alioto, Dobbs had backed out of forums at Hasting School of Law and the University of San Francisco when he learned that they were direct debate situations.  On October 17, Alioto pressed the matter by challenging to debate Dobbs – any hour, any day, any place – and offered to have his campaign foot the bill.  He backed up his offer with a $5,000 check to pay for a hall and TV time.  Dobbs replied that Alioto would have to wait his turn, while Morrison referred to Alioto’s offer as “just another example of how he’s (Alioto) trying to buy the election.” [161]  

The candidates did have the opportunity to face each other on a few occasions during October. On October 6 Alioto, Dobbs, and Morrison discussed their platforms and answered questions before the San Francisco Press Club.  In the wake of the recent struggles over the endorsements from labor leaders and the County Democratic Central Committee, Alioto and Morrison directed sharp criticisms toward each other.  Morrison reiterated: “City Hall is not for sale this year,” and declared that he hoped to create a “Just Society.” Alioto continued to describe himself as the only one of the three who was an independent, and he portrayed Dobbs and Morrison as the “architects of San Francisco’s biggest problems” – crime and taxes.  When questioned on their positions on Proposition P, Alioto offered a sharp criticism of Morrison.  Repeating his opposition to escalation and his support for a negotiated end to the war in Vietnam, Alioto accused Morrison of being not a dove “but a sick chicken or a sick Thanksgiving turkey.” [162]  

As Alioto continued to campaign against Morrison for the city’s liberal votes, he also contested with Harold Dobbs for the city’s moderate and conservative votes.  Thus when the candidates met again at a two-hour talk and question session at a luncheon forum sponsored by the San Francisco Planning and Urban Renewal Association on October 19, Alioto concentrated a good deal of his attention on Dobbs.  At the luncheon, the candidates each had the opportunity to present their platforms and address each other.  The three men did express agreement on two points.  First, they agreed that the present City Charter failed to provide the Mayor sufficient power to carry out his responsibilities.  Second, they each expressed support for Proposition “J”, a ballot measure authorizing the City Planning Director to appoint his key assistants instead of having them selected for him by the Civil Service Department. [163]   Alioto, however, attacked Dobbs’ plank on tax relief.  “What you’re saying, is that the $29 million windfall that business got through reassessment should stay saddled on the backs of home-owners,” Alioto told Dobbs.  “Business is fair.  It doesn’t want a windfall.  Your position is almost immoral." [164]   Dobbs fired back four nights later.  At a “Candidates Night” sponsored by the Citizens Planning Committee at Galileo High School which Morrison was unable to attend, Dobbs called Alioto’s proposal for tax relief as “pie-in-the sky” suggestions that “wouldn’t save the home-owner five cents.” [165]   On November 2 Alioto and Morrison attended a luncheon of the San Francisco Junior Chamber of Commerce.  Following a debate between the two candidates, a “preference vote” by those present gave Alioto forty-five votes, Morrison twenty votes, and Dobbs eighteen.  Alioto drew applause by referring to Dobbs as “Mr. No Show of the Year” and as an “invisible man.” [166]

            The most heated exchanges between Dobbs and Alioto concerned their positions on the two dominant issues of the campaign: crime and tax reform. Dobbs took issue with Alioto’s language when, warning against the dangers of Morrison splitting Democratic votes, Alioto suggested that there would be “trouble” in the African-American community if Dobbs was elected.  Dobbs insisted that by “trouble” Alioto really meant “riots”, and he accused Alioto of making “rash” and “irresponsible” statements. [167]   Alioto continued to assert that he would be “better able” than Dobbs to work with the business community, labor, and minorities in meeting the unemployment and housing problems that he said were the causes of “frustration and unrest within the minority groups.” [168]   Complaints from the Dobbs’ camp concerning the matter continued even after the election.  The Chronicle quoted a Dobbs supporter on election night as charging that Alioto supporters at a Hunters Point Arts Festival had handed out leaflets warning that if Dobbs were elected San Francisco would have “another hot summer next year.” [169]

Alioto’s criticism of Dobbs’ platform on crime proved to be effective in keeping him on the defensive for the remainder of the campaign.  Throughout the week leading up to the election Dobbs deflected criticism that he was running a “racist” or “white-backlash” campaign and that as mayor he would give the police a “free hand” with minorities and hippies.  While continually pointing to rising crime rates and the need to support the police department, Dobbs insisted that he would never “condone arbitrary or unfriendly acts towards any particular group.” [170]   At a November 5 press conference, Dobbs characterized his opponents’ rhetoric as irresponsible and even harmful: “you have a situation where ordinary words like ‘crime in the streets’ and ‘supporting the police’ have taken on a special and disagreeable meaning.  They have been perverted to take on a racist or ideological meaning.  They should not – they must not – have that meaning in San Francisco.” [171]   Alioto offered no apologies, and at a press conference of his own following Dobbs’ statement he insisted, “Harold Dobbs is the last man to understand that the root causes of crime must be attacked as well.” [172]

                Alioto and Dobbs also sparred over their respective planks on tax reform.  As he had with Morrison, in his speeches Alioto pointed to Dobbs’ previous tenure on the Board of Supervisors in an attempt to link him to the increase in property taxes.  Dobbs challenged this claim by pointing out that he had not been on the Board since 1963 and therefore, unlike Jack Morrison, he was not a member of the Board that sponsored the resolution calling upon the legislature to pass Assembly Bill 80 in 1966. [173]   Dobbs became more impassioned, however, in response to an advertisement that appeared in both the Chronicle and Examiner in late October.  The advertisement, paid for by the Alioto for Mayor Committee, attempted to portray Dobbs as opposing immediate tax reform.  At an October 30 press conference, Dobbs lashed out at Alioto, accusing him of taking the “dirty road” and knowingly purporting a “bold-faced lie.”  Dobbs charged that Alioto had “seen fit to distinguish himself by creating the biggest lie in San Francisco, at the same time he has attacked me with deliberate and malicious intent.”  Dobbs went on to challenge Alioto to waive his rights to “any protection or immunity he may have as a political candidate” and defend himself in a court of law. [174]  

                Rather than back down, Alioto repeated the claims made in the advertisement, and insisted that he could prove the truth of his charges by citing Dobbs’ own words in which he stated that that San Francisco should “try to get along with what we have.” Alioto maintained that Dobbs’ plan to address the tax problem by reducing city government expenditures would do nothing to bring immediate relief to property owners, and he insisted that the only solution was to shift the burden back to downtown property owners. [175]   On November 2 the Alioto campaign ran another ad in the Chronicle charging that Dobbs refused to support any new tax on big business and that during his years on the Board of Supervisors he “never once proposed any alternate to runaway property taxes on homeowners.” [176]   Alioto kept up this attack up until the election, and on November 5 called on Dobbs to take an oath:

I will join Joe Alioto to supporting a new tax to take those millions off the backs of homeowners and put them back where they belong – on big business – for that is the only fair and decent thing to do. [177]

 

Dobbs continued to contest Alioto’s claims until the end.  On November 2, Dobbs responded to the advertisements by making Alioto’s lack of political experience an issue.  Explaining that the tax increase facing property owners came from the State rather than local government, Dobbs declared:  “Possibly Mr. Alioto is under the apprehension that he is running for a State office, otherwise the advertisement that appeared this morning makes no conceivable sense whatsoever.” [178]   On November 6 George Christopher, former mayor and Honorary Chairman of Dobbs’ campaign, entered the fray.  Christopher charged that Alioto had “falsely tried to put the blame for the current exorbitant tax increase on the shoulders of Mr. Dobbs,” by engaging in “personalities and distorted statements.”  Rather, Christopher placed blame for the City’s tax problems on the Shelley administration and “Mr. Alioto’s liberal, free-spending partisans.”  “Now Mr. Alioto asks us to continue this kind of administration under a different name, and I do not think the people of San Francisco will be so deluded.” [179]    

Dobbs launched his final attack on the tax issue two days prior to the election when he disclosed that Alioto, who was nearly his neighbor, had his tax bill decreased from the previous year.  According to Dobbs, his tax bill increased from $1,318 to $2,116, while Alioto’s bill decreased from $2,420 to $2,136.  Alioto offered a prompt response and explanation for his tax bill.  According to Alioto, the assessor’s office had indicated that his home had been over-assessed for years while Dobbs’ property had been under-assessed.  Following this logic, Alioto contended that it was in fact Dobbs who had enjoyed a huge tax break over the years. [180]

In the final week of the campaign Alioto and Dobbs clashed over two additional issues.  The first concerned a proposal by Dobbs to secure the ultimate transfer of the Port of San Francisco from the State to San Francisco ownership and operation, a plan that had been endorsed by the city’s Chamber of Commerce for decades and was strongly supported by the Chronicle.  “The Port of San Francisco should be producing revenue for the city,” Dobbs explained at a press conference on October 31.  “It should be run by San Franciscans, who would develop it in order to stimulate commerce and to improve both freight and passenger service.  It can make money for San Francisco and take some of the burden of taxes off the backs of our citizens and our businesses.” [181]   He then proposed a study on the plan to be conducted by a three-man board, two of whom, Cyril Magnin and Jack Shelley, were vocal supporters of Alioto’s campaign.  Alioto casually dismissed Dobbs’ proposal, declaring that is was “just another study, that’s all it is.”  Rather than engage in Dobbs’ proposed study, Alioto believed that the city should first determine the price of acquiring the port and then decide whether or not to purchase it. [182]  

The second issue to supplement the tax debate during the final week of the campaign occurred on November 2 when Dobbs attempted to make an issue of Alioto’s lack of political experience and to call into question his level of commitment.  Dobbs claimed that Alioto had told the Rice Growers Association of California in a September 14 meeting “being mayor of San Francisco is a part-time job.”  “I don’t know whether Mr. Alioto was deceiving himself or misleading his employers,” Dobbs stated.  “But there’s one thing for sure – he’s planning to short-change the people of San Francisco.” In contrast, Dobbs pledged that he would be a “round the clock” mayor, ready, if necessary, to work nights and weekends on the city’s problems. [183]   On November 6 the Dobbs campaign ran a three-quarter-page ad in the Chronicle with the words “For Full-Time Mayor” printed in large bold type above his name. 

Alioto, who earned $100,000 per year as the president and general manager of the Rice Growers Association of California, denied ever making the statement. He claimed to have told the Association just the opposite -- that that being mayor would be a full-time job.  The Association had named two executive vice-presidents to take over his administrative duties.  He added that he would eliminate his $50,000 managerial salary if elected, and stated that the remaining $50,000 of his $100,000 salary would pay for the legal services that were handled by three of the fourteen lawyers in his law office.  Alioto then countered that it was Dobbs who would not be able be a full-time mayor because of his restaurants and his law practice.  “The attack is an obvious camouflage for the fact that he cannot be a full-time mayor in view of his commitments to the restaurants and to his law office, which lacks the type of staging that I have.” [184]

Which of the three candidates was more effective in the campaign would not be fully known until Election Day.  Based on the endorsements received by Alioto, it appeared that he had been more successful in winning over a broad spectrum of the city’s voters.  Morrison was endorsed by many of the city’s most liberal leaders, but he failed to receive endorsements from the city’s major labor organizations.  It was still unclear, however, how the city’s rank and file liberals would vote.  Dobbs was considered a clear favorite in the race in September, but then his campaign faced strong competition when Alioto entered the race.  By a narrow margin Dobbs was endorsed by the Union Labor Party, a Progressive Era good government group loosely tied to labor, in October, and both the Chronicle and Examiner formally endorsed him in the days before the election. [185]   However, a number of other groups, some of which had endorsed Dobbs in his 1963 mayoral campaign, gave their support to Alioto.  On September 30, the Civic League of Improvement Clubs, an influential non-partisan endorsement group, voted forty-three to eight to endorse Alioto over Dobbs, with Morrison receiving one vote. [186]   On October 18, the Italian Federation voted to endorse Alioto by a margin of two to one. [187]   Both of these groups had endorsed Dobbs in 1963.  On October 13, the Chinese-American Committee of Professional and Businessmen also endorsed Alioto. [188]   Perhaps the most symbolic and telling endorsement of Alioto came on November 2, when a fringe candidate for mayor, Charles Walker, withdrew from the race and gave his support to Alioto.  Walker – a shutter manufacturer and a conservative who claimed to speak for poor property owners – had made the news in September when he accosted Alioto as they were both officially filing for candidacy, and challenged him to explain what he would do to get tax relief for property owners. [189]   On November 5, the Chronicle printed an open letter from Walker in support of Alioto.  In the letter, which he addressed to “My Supporters and All San Francisco Home-Owner Tax Payers,” Walker explained why he had decided to support Alioto:  “Although I am a Republican and he is a Democrat, my conscience compels me to endorse and support Joe Alioto for Mayor.  Joe Alioto has the only sensible, thoroughly workable program for rolling back new property taxes…. He will fight with me for the homeowner.” [190]  

By Election Day Alioto believed that he had managed to build a strong and diverse coalition of supporters.  On November 7, he held a noontime rally at Union Square – “complete with Chinese-dragon dancers, a Mexican band.”  To the thousands of supporters that were present, Alioto affirmed that: “There has been tremendous support from organized labor, responsible business and professional men, Republican and Democratic organizations, and all ethnic groups.  They will form a great coalition to get rid of the blight enveloping our cities.  We have time in San Francisco to solve the problems so that the great middle class will remain here and not continue the exodus to the suburbs.” [191]   The degree to which Alioto had accurately assessed his base of support would be revealed on November 7.

 THE 1967 SAN FRANCISCO MAYORAL ELECTION

                Joseph L. Alioto was elected Mayor of San Francisco on November 7 with the support of Democrats and Republicans, collecting 110,405 (43.4%) votes to 94,504 (37.2%) votes for Dobbs and 40,436 (16.0%) votes for Morrison. [192]   The totals indicate at least one contributing factor to Alioto’s victory: Republican support.  San Francisco had 106,158 registered Republicans compared with 200,428 registered Democrats. [193]   Dobbs had staked his hopes for victory on those Republican voters combining with moderate Democrats.  While he enjoyed the overwhelming support of the city’s most conservative voters, his vote total was over ten thousand votes below the city’s total registered Republicans.  On its face, this suggests that Alioto was able to win the support of some of the city’s moderate Republican voters.  Indeed, a closer examination of the election results by Assembly Districts demonstrates Alioto’s success in winning the support of a broad coalition of voters, including Democrats and Republicans, business and labor, and whites and minorities. 

                Table 1 summarizes the proportion of the votes received by each candidate per assembly district and Table 2 summarizes the proportion of precincts won.  Alioto scored victories in three of the city’s four assembly districts. District 19 was the only assembly district he did not win. Dobbs won 43.6 percent of the vote and 51.0 percent of the precincts to Alioto’s 42.6 percent of the vote and 46.6 percent of the precincts. For Morrison, district 19 revealed his weakness among the city’s middle-income voters.  Morrison had his worst showing in that district, winning only 11.3 percent of the vote and only a single precinct.  Although each of San Francisco’s four assembly districts had a majority of registered Democrats, district 19 had the smallest proportion of Democratic voters. [194]   District 19, in which Milton Marks had won his largest margin of victory against John Burton in the August runoff for the State Senate, [195] included the mostly white, middle income, white-collar Sunset, Richmond, and Parkside neighborhoods.  In those neighborhoods the voting was close between Dobbs and Alioto, but Alioto won more precincts. The district also included the white, upper income, Seacliff area, which strongly supported Dobbs.  As the results indicate, in the only assembly district that Alioto did not win the vote was extremely close.  The significance of Alioto’s vote in this district is more significant when the sizeable lead that Dobbs held in the summer is considered.  In July 1967, the Chronicle and Examiner reported on a voter poll in which Dobbs had led Shelley by nearly 11 percent of Democratic voters in district 19. [196] Based on the results from that poll, Alioto was able to gain the support of many of the district’s moderate voters who otherwise would have voted for Dobbs. 

Table 1

Vote by Assembly District

Assembly District	Total Votes	Alioto	Dobbs	Morrison	Other
18	53,046	41.0%	31.2%	23.7%	.04%
19	78,937	42.6	43.6	11.3	.02
20	47,863	46.4	31.4	17	.05
23	74,304	44.2	38.3	14.6	.03

Source: San Francisco election records, Registrar of Voters, City and County of San Francisco.

   Table 2

Precincts Won by Assembly District

       *Won one Precinct

       Source: San Francisco election records, Registrar of Voters, City and County of San Francisco.

             Alioto’s strength in winning support from San Francisco’s middle income and moderate voters can be seen in the 23^rd assembly district, where Alioto scored his smallest margin of victory over Dobbs.  The district gave Alioto 44.2 percent of the votes to 38.3 percent for Dobbs.  Prior to redistricting in 1965, the 23^rd District had the highest proportion of registered Democrats of all the city’s assembly districts.  The redistricting, however, eliminated the 22^nd Assembly District, which had been the city’s most conservative district and the only district with a Republican representative, and consolidated it with the 23^rd district.  Thus in 1967, in addition to middle- and lower-income areas the 23^rd Assembly District included some of the wealthiest and most conservative neighborhoods in the city.  These neighborhoods, which included the Marina, Forest Hill, Mt. Davidson, St. Francis Wood and Midtown Terrace – described by the Chronicle as the “city’s silk-stocking districts” – are where Dobbs demonstrated his greatest strength (although Alioto did win some precincts in the Marina, which housed many Italian Americans, including Joe DiMaggio).  Dobbs’s strength in these neighborhoods makes the results for the district 23 somewhat deceiving.  Although Alioto only led Dobbs by eight percent of the total vote, he won 64.8 percent of that district’s precincts to Dobbs’ 32.6 percent.  In addition, 43.2 percent of the total vote received by Dobbs for the district came from precincts where Dobbs was victorious, which were primarily concentrated in the affluent neighborhoods referred to above.  Outside of those neighborhoods were the middle- and lower-income areas of Noe Valley, Glen Park, Excelsior, Portola and Visitacion Valley, that had characterized the 23^rd District prior to its revamping in 1965.  As expected, Alioto showed strength over Dobbs in these areas.  More significant was Alioto’s showing in the district’s middle-income areas such as Diamond Heights, where he won precincts that the Chronicle expected to go to Dobbs.  Alioto also soundly defeated Morrison, who was only able to win a total of 5 precincts and 14.6 percent of the vote for the entire district.

                Alioto’s widest margin of victory came in the heavily Democratic 18^th and 20^th assembly districts.  Liberals Willie Brown and John Burton, both of whom were vocal supporters of Jack Morrison’s campaign, represented these two districts in the State Assembly.  Burton had defeated moderate Republican Milton Marks in both districts in the special run-off for the State Senate in August, [197] and Morrison had counted on the type of support in these districts that Burton had received in August.  He believed that his liberal record and appeal to minorities and rank and file workers would be enough to vanquish Alioto.   The strong showing by Alioto in these two traditionally liberal districts was a significant indicator of the willingness of some of San Francisco most liberal voters to embrace a more moderate candidate for the office of mayor.

                Morrison fared best in district 18, where he won 23.7 percent of the vote and 10.0 percent of the precincts.  Alioto won the district with 41.0 percent of the vote and 63.8 percent of the precincts, while Dobbs collected 31.2 percent of the votes and won 25.6 of the precincts. District 18 included the Haight-Ashbury and Eureka Valley neighborhoods, which, bordering both middle- and low-income areas, were predominantly liberal neighborhoods.  The district also included the low-income Western Addition and Fillmore neighborhoods, which also housed a high percentage of black families.  The district also included a few predominantly white, upper income, neighborhoods.  In those areas, namely Pacific Heights, Cow Hollow, and Anza Vista, Dobbs won a majority of the precincts.  Morrison won precincts in Haight-Ashbury, the Western Addition, and the Fillmore, but Alioto was also able to win many precincts in those neighborhoods. 

                Alioto’s strength in the 20^th assembly district was more surprising for Morrison and more telling of the extent of Alioto’s base of support.  In this district Alioto scored his widest margin of victory, winning 46.4 percent of the vote and 71.4 percent of the precincts.  Dobbs won 31.4 percent of the vote and 27.5 percent of the precincts.  Alioto’s success in the district, however, came largely at the expense of Morrison.  District 20 was John Burton territory, the area where he had made his strongest showing in his unsuccessful August bid for the State Senate.  The district included many low-income, working class, and minority districts, including Chinatown, Hunters Point, Bayview, Bayshore, the Mission, and Potrero Hill.  In August Burton had won decisive victories in the predominantly Black Hunters Point district, winning some precincts against Marks by totals of 167-1, 132-1, 124-1, 187-2 and 191-3. [198]   In the November election, however, Alioto defeated Morrison in each of those neighborhoods.  For the district as a whole, Morrison totaled just 17.0 percent of the votes and won only three precincts. 

                The balance of the district 20 was comprised primarily of downtown neighborhoods.  Alioto won in the predominantly Italian North Beach neighborhood, where both the Chronicle and Examiner cited his Italian name as being a key to his strong showing.  In the other downtown neighborhoods, namely Telegraph Hill, Russian Hill, and Nob Hill, Alioto and Dobbs both showed strength and won precincts. 
Table 3

Jack Morrison and Liberal Propositions

                                               Source: San Francisco election records, Registrar of Voters, City and County of San Francisco.

                     *Total “yes” votes

             Alioto’s strength among the city’s most liberal voters can also be seen in relation to two ballot measures that Morrison strongly supported and which Alioto opposed.  Voters rejected both Proposition N, the gross receipts measure that Morrison wrote, and Proposition P, the controversial Vietnam War measure that he repeatedly supported throughout the campaign, but affirmative votes for each measure either doubled or nearly doubled Morrison’s vote total (see Table 3).  Furthermore, the defeat of those two liberal ballot measures is another indicator of the mood of the electorate.  The total “yes” votes for both measures were significantly less than half of the number of all registered Democrats in San Francisco.  In addition, the votes in favor of the measures suggest that although many voters may have supported much of Morrison’s platform, they were often not willing to support the candidate himself for mayor. 

The day before the election Morrison had indicated that he expected to benefit from voters who went to the polls to vote “yes on P.” [199]   After the results of the election were clear Morrison expressed both surprise and disappointment at the results from the districts 18 and 20.  “Yes, it was a real surprise to me.  I even lost Chinatown for the first time in my political career.”  Morrison did, however, offer an explanation for Alioto’s strength in San Francisco’s liberal neighborhoods, suggesting that the Alioto campaign had hoodwinked these voters.  “Mayor Shelley said it first, and we just couldn’t overcome it,” Morrison stated.  “I’m certain that many of these areas would have voted for me if they thought I could win.  But they were sold the idea that a vote for me would give the election to Harold Dobbs.” [200]   Money, Morrison added a day later, also played a part in Alioto’s success.  “I said no one was going to buy this election, but it looks now as if Mr. Alioto has.  He spent hundreds of thousands of dollars.” [201]   Alioto responded to both of Morrison’s appraisals.  “Other than Mr. Morrison,” Alioto stated, “I don’t believe anyone believed Mr. Morrison could win the race.”  Alioto also responded incredulously to Morrison’s claim that he had bought the election with heavy expenditures for billboard, television, radio, and newspaper ads.  “When you say an election has been bought, you say the electorate is buyable,” Alioto asserted.  “I don’t believe it.”  Despite Morrison’s charges against him, Alioto declared that he welcomed the support of “Mr. Burton, Mr. Morrison and Dr. Goodlett” to his administration. [202]

                After the election, a column in the Chronicle offered the following appraisal of the campaign:

It was the liveliest election in years – after giving signs of being the dullest….  With the entry of Alioto and Morrison, it was a new contest.  Dobbs’ carefully built base of support gradually eroded, and the Alioto campaign caught on with an air of excitement that Dobbs could never match. [203]
 

            The Chronicle then stressed the impact of Alioto’s “new faces” campaign and his personal style as a significant factor in his victory.  To be sure, that was one component of Alioto’s victory, particularly in gaining the support of some of the city’s moderate voters who might have otherwise supported Dobbs.  Alioto, however, clearly offered a campaign that had something for liberals and moderates alike.  As Alioto declared on election night, “This victory is not mine personally.   It is that of a great coalition of San Franciscans representing a broad cross-section of the entire community.” [204]   Some of the more effective elements of his platform were reiterated as Alioto addressed his supporters on election night.  He repeated his pledge to seek immediate tax relief for property owners by shifting the burden back to big business.  He indicated that he opposed the plan for redevelopment in the Mission district that residents of the area had rejected, stating that before proceeding with any plan in that area he would like to “talk to the people out there.”  He repeated his plank on crime and law and order, which appeared to satisfy many moderate, middle-income voters while assuring minority groups that police brutality would not be condoned or allowed to persist.  Alioto stressed his friendship with labor, and it appeared that labor leaders who had endorsed Alioto were able to deliver the votes of their rank and file.  In what may have been a show of good faith and appreciation to organized labor, Alioto made an additional promise on election night that had not been part of his campaign.  “I will seek an amendment so that no non-union goods will be supplied to the San Francisco governments purchasing department under the competitive bid system.” [205]  

Alioto offered a final commentary on the race following the election in response to the fact that he had been elected by a plurality and not a majority of the votes.  When asked, Alioto indicated that in the future he would favor runoff elections when no candidate obtained a majority.  “I have not expressed myself up to now because I was personally involved,” Alioto stated.    “There is so much possibility of abuse if a mayor can be elected by a plurality.  If a majority is required you will see fewer ‘spoilers’ being entered.” [206]

                The Chronicle and Examiner both surmised that the election of Alioto marked a significant setback for the “Burton Machine.” Both newspapers also suggested that the election was a missed opportunity for Harold Dobbs.  In September when Shelley dropped out of the race, both papers declared Dobbs as the clear frontrunner.  Alioto’s campaign offered a platform that was liberal enough to win the support of the majority of the city’s Democrats, but that at the same time stopped short of several liberal planks that were less attractive to the city’s more moderate voters.  Whether or not minority and working class voters who voted for Alioto did so only because they believed that Morrison could not win, their willingness to support Alioto demonstrates a degree of acceptance of his platform.  In addition, for those who associated the current administration of Democrat Jack Shelley with the city’s problems –many of which were common to central cities throughout the country – Alioto, the New Deal Democrat running as a self-proclaimed independent, was able to offer voters a non-Republican alternative.  Alioto’s election, then, indicated the emergence and potential viability of a successful type of urban liberal Democratic leadership.   

Two days following the election of Joseph Alioto as mayor of San Francisco, the Chronicle, which had endorsed Dobbs, provided the following assessment of the election:

By this election, San Francisco is presented with a new man and a new style of leadership in City Hall, coming at a time when the city is in the midst of a number of disruptive controversies and uncertainties that must be resolved. [207]

 

In many respects, this appraisal aptly summarizes Alioto’s mayoral campaign.  As a late entry into a field that totaled eighteen candidates for mayor and as someone who had never held an elected office, Alioto promoted himself as a “new face” that would be able to bring a new and energetic approach to solving the city’s problems.   San Francisco in 1967, like most central cities, was pressed with concerns for law and order, civil rights, tax relief, redevelopment and urban renewal.  When addressing these issues in the 1967 campaign, any claim of detachment from the current city administration proved to be an advantage.  Alioto – attorney, businessman, and moderate Democrat – successfully campaigned as an independent, nonpartisan candidate for a nonpartisan office, building an electoral base consisting of Democrats and Republicans, which included the support of leaders from the labor and business communities. 

CONCLUSION

            As mayor for two terms, serving from January 1968 through December 1974, Alioto supported downtown high-rise construction and redevelopment plans despite growing opposition to what opponents dubbed “the Manhattanization of San Francisco.” He made the Transamerica pyramid in the financial district a pet project, and he championed the completion of the Embarcadero Center complex of offices and apartments that replaced the aging wholesale produce market adjacent to the waterfront. Alioto also initiated urban planning guidelines and endorsed strong measures to preserve the city's aesthetic beauty and environmental quality.  He opposed freeway construction, and in 1970 he convinced the federal and state governments to move a section of Interstate Highway 280 away from a proposed lakefront site along city-owned property in San Mateo County. Alioto also worked for tax reforms designed to shift the local property tax burden from homeowners to commercial property owners, and he worked to redistribute federal and state revenues to municipal government uses.  The mayor supported the right of public employees to strike, and he aggressively used his powers of persuasion to bring timely settlements between labor and management.  He reached beyond moderate AFL-CIO union leaders when making appointments to city commissions when he included members of the independent, left-wing dock workers and warehouse workers union, several of whom had been members of the Communist Party during the 1934 waterfront strike. He also made city government more inclusive by appointing Black, Hispanic, and Asian officials to city government.  His administration worked with both city agencies and private employers to establish recruitment programs for minority workers. During a student and faculty strike at San Francisco State College from November 1968 to March 1969, Alioto affirmed the right of dissenting students to express their grievances, but he also refused to allow violence on the campus.  He authorized mass arrests by police tactical squad members as a strategy to maintain order, and he personally facilitated settlement of the strike and the restoration of campus operations.

After the 1968 convention, labor union leaders and Democratic Party strategists encouraged Alioto to consider running for the governor, and the press talked up the San Franciscan as a likely future national party leader. However, a 23 July 1969 Look magazine article that accused the mayor of having connections with Mafia organized crime figures shattered his state and national prospects. Alioto won his libel suit against the magazine, which included damages of $350,000, but the negative publicity took its toll.  In 1970 he withdrew his name from consideration in the Democratic Party primary, and in 1974, he lost the primary election to Jerry Brown.  Alioto returned to his law practice and conducted successful, high profile antitrust cases through the 1980s. Among his many noteworthy victories, he successfully represented the Oakland Raiders against the National Football League’s attempt to prevent the team from moving to Los Angeles. In 1992 the State Bar of California named Alioto “Antitrust Lawyer of the Year.” [208]

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