San Francisco State University

International Relations 742
Seminar: US Foreign Policy: National Security Decision Making

Spring Semester 2001

Wednesdays 4:10-6:45

Instructor: Ambassador David Fischer
Telephone: 405-0325

Email: examb@sfsu.edu
Office: HSS 133

Office Hours by appt (Send me an email request)

The Bay of Pigs, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Gulf War. The opening to China, detente with the Soviet Union, and more recently, the interventions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo.

The making of US foreign policy is both the stuff of headlines, as well as intra-governmental negotiations and decision making. Decisions have consequences which impact the lives not only of Americans, but people throughout the world. Who decides and what are the factors that enter into the process? Because those decisions are often taken in response to complex, fast-breaking events, both the process and substance of those decisions are often misconstrued by the media, the public and the scholarly community. Increasingly, many are attracted to arcane conspiracy theories to explain what are rational decisions made on the need to protect US interests as defined by the Administration in power.

This course assesses the formulation and execution of United States foreign policy. What are the roles of the President, the Congress, the press and special interests? When and how are political suasion, economic sanctions, covert action or military force best employed? How important are human rights, democratization, commercial advantage and market economics in the policy process? In what circumstances should the US look to allies or the United Nations? How have US national interests and foreign policy changed in the post Cold War world?

The process by which decisions are made and implemented in U.S. foreign policy is complex, often opaque, and variable. As a career diplomat Ambassador Fischer has served in both Republican and Democrat administrations and brings to this course a sophisticated understanding of the way in which foreign policy is made -- why a particular set of recommendations or a specific course of action is selected while others are discarded. The purpose of this course is to provide students with the tools to understand both the how and the why of U.S. foreign policy decision making.

Organization. The class, is divided into two parts: an introduction to acquaint students with the essential features of the decision making process in U.S. foreign policy and sessions organized around specific case studies.

The course will utilize the case method. Students prepare in advance, assessing national interests at stake as perceived by then policy makers and alternative policy responses available. Students present and lead discussions. The instructor provides context and facilitates discussion.

Students are required to complete all assigned readings in advance of each class session and are expected to come to class prepared to take an active part in a substantive discussion of the issues. Typically, the instructor will act as discussion leader by framing the issues that he considers important to an understanding of the problems under review before turning to students for elaboration and critical commentary.

Readings. Since this course is case-based, there are few required readings beyond the weekly case which will be presented. This is not as easy as it may seem, since I expect that students will have mastered the material to the degree that they can discuss it with reference to the original material. This is not something you can accomplish by reading the case the day before class.

All the Cases and required reading will be available in a Reader that is for sale for $40.00

In addition there are several excellent general texts available in the library, I would suggest:

(1) Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1993).

(2) James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, Foreign Policy Making and the American Political System (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).

(3) David A. Deese, ed., The New Politics of American Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).

(4) Paula Stern, Water's Edge: Domestic Politics and The Making of American Foreign Policy (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1979).

Writing Requirements. There are two writing requirements in the course.

i. Security Policy Memoranda

Students will prepare a single-spaced, two or three page policy memoranda in preparation for the cases studied in the course. This should be a thumbnail policy memorandum that identifies the problem, provides the minimal background necessary for understanding, specifies the national interests at stake, assesses courses of action available and recommends a response. See Sample Case Memorandum Format on final page of syllabus. Memoranda will be graded on the bases of clarity, conciseness and understanding of the issue as perceived by then policy makers.

Each student will be expected to write individual memoranda, although only one member of the group will present the material in each class.

ii. Final paper, of no more than 3,000 words or twelve double spaced pages, exploring one of four issues -- "The United States and Cuba, 1998-2000"; "The United States, Russia and Central Europe"; The United States and Iran, 1998-2000"; and "U.S.- China 1997-2000: Conflict or Cooperation?" Final papers should present the problem with just enough background to make it understandable to a general audience. Alternative courses of action should be explored in terms of the US interests served, concluding with an argument for whatever US policy response you recommend. The objective is an analytical and judgmental presentation, which will be graded on the bases of clarity, concision, organization, and command of subject matter.

Evaluation: Grades will be determined in the following manner:

Class participation 40 percent

Policy memorandum 30 percent

Research paper/take-home

final examination 30 percent

Course Schedule

INTRODUCTION

1. Introduction to the course.

The use of the case method and the unique requirements of running effective simulation exercises. The tension between theoretical and practical approaches to the study of foreign policy. Discussion of student expectations.

Reading: The Jacksonian Tradition, Walter Meade, National Interest Winter 1999

2. U. S. Foreign Policy Decision making in the Nuclear Age: Structure, Process and Product

Readings: The President and Management of Foreign Policy, Alexander George
The Institutional Setting, Alexander George

3. Case Study: The Coming of the Cold War

Readings: JFK School cases C14-76-144.0 & C14-79-144.4
The Presidency and Foreign Policy, Stephen Ambrose

4. Case Study: Cuban Missile Crisis: US Deliberations at the Edge of the Precipice President Kennedy and The Bay of Pigs (1961)

Readings: ISD Pew Case 334-92-R The Cuban Missile Crisis
Required Viewing: 13 Days

5. The Making of U.S. Foreign Policy. Congress vs. the President

Readings: Congress and Foreign Policy
JFK Case C16-88-883 The US and South Africa: The Sanctions Debate of 1985,

6. Case Studies: The Role of Intelligence

Readings: Carnegie Case Study 503: Covert Action in Chile
Pew Case Study 439: The Fall of Marcos

7.Simulation Exercise: The Crisis in Mambo: The Role of the Media

Readings: The Crisis in Mambo

8. How We Go to War

Readings: Prelude to War: US Policy Toward Iraq, JFK Case Study C16-94-1245
The Kuwait Crisis: Sanctions, Negotiations. Carnegie Case Study 514

9. The Ethics of Intervention I (Somalia)

Readings: A Seamless Transition: The United States in Somalia, JFK School case C09-96-1324.0
Key Decisions in the Somalia Intervention, Pew Case Studies 464

10. Ethics and Intervention II (Haiti)

Readings: Pew Case Study 375, President Clinton's Haiti Dilemma

11. Ethics and Intervention III (Rwanda)

Readings: Pew Case Study 374 Watershed in Rwanda

12. Ethics and Intervention IV (Yugoslavia)

Readings: Pew Case Study 453: Yugoslavia: Could Diplomacy Have Prevented a Tragedy
Pew case Study 467: Tony Lake and the War in Bosnia

13. Intervention: Idealists vs Realists

Readings: Pew Case Study 462: The Clinton Administration and Peace Operations
Three Memoranda to the President, Council on Foreign Relations
http://www.cfr.org/p/pubs/Human_Intervent_Book.pdf
Humanitarian Intervention, Kofi Annan

14. Options for the Bush Administration

 

Sample NSC Memorandum

SECRET

 

THE WHITE HOUSE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

 

To: The President

From: The National Security Advisor

Subject: Responding to the Serbian Reprisal in Kosovo

August 4, 1998
Issue for Decision

Last Thursday, Serbian police massacred eighty ethnic Albanians, including women and children, in the Serbian region of Kosovo. The attack was in retaliation to the assassination of three Serbian magistrates July 12. Vivid CNN reports have fueled American public and congressional pressure for a robust reaction against Serbia. We need to formulate our position prior to Ambassador Robert Gelbard's meeting with Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade next week.

Background

Historic tensions between ethnic Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo have intensified since Milosevic rescinded Kosovo's autonomy in 1989. The Albanians, who constitute 90% of the Kosovo's population, have become increasingly violent in their quest for independence. Albanian paramilitary attacks against Serbian officials have trebled during the last six months--leading to this most recent Serbian response to what they perceive as terrorist acts.

The problem has regional ramifications. Kosovo borders on Albania—and on Macedonia and Montenegro both of whom have significant Albanian populations. A civil war in Kosovo could embroil all three and destabilize their already weak governments. Greece and Bulgaria, in these circumstances, would be tempted to pursue outstanding claims against Macedonia. --stimulating a military response from Turkey in defense of Muslim brethren under attack by Christian orthodoxy. At risk is another Balkan war.

For Serbs, Kosovo is the soul of their national spirit. While they were prepared to see Slovenia, Croatia and even Bosnia go their separate ways, this will not be the case with Kosovo. Serbs are prepared to wage holy war to hold on to the region--and to reject any leader who entertains secession. Our European allies and Russia seem to understand this and are exerting pressure on both sides to conduct negotiations on Kosovo autonomy within the broader Serbian state.

US Interests

Certainly it is in the interest of the United States to deter another Balkan war, as it is to discourage brutal Serbian treatment of ethnic Albanian citizens. These interests are not, however, vital to American security. We should accordingly rule out unilateral commitments of major American political and economic resources or American lives. Americans citizens should not be asked to bear such costs. The European states, specifically Russia, Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy, for reasons of history and proximity, have a greater stake than we in the peaceful resolution of the Kosovo problem. We should encourage their involvement. We have 654 US service personnel assigned to UN and OSCE currently stationed in Macedonia.

Options

Kosovo cannot be contained by bluster or military action, much less unilateral American strikes. What we need is Milosevic's agreement to restore autonomy and to protect the rights of Serbs and Albanians alike--and ethnic Albanian acceptance of a solution short of full independence. The appropriate tool is political influence exerted in conjunction with interested European powers. This should be augmented by economic sanctions and incentives. Non-partisan observers from the UN, the OSCE should be deployed to stabilize and add transparency to the situation in Kosovo while the political process moves forward.

Recommendation

That instructions consonant with the above be prepared for Ambassador Gelbard's use with Milosevic; that the principal points of the instructions be shared with European allies, including Russia, and with appropriate international organizations--soliciting their support and comment; that detailed briefings be arranged for Jesse Helms and other senior Congressional leaders; and that the public be informed of the broad outlines and rational behind this policy though press briefings and backgrounders and public presentations.

Approve ________

Disapprove______

CC: State:S/S

JCS/OP

CIA/DIR

SecDef/EXEC/C

Treasury:OS

 

__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Notes About the Case Method

Some of you may already have taken courses which utilize the “case method.” As someone whose experience lies outside academia, I am uncomfortable with courses restricted to lectures. It seems to me an inefficient way to impart knowledge and experience and is, furthermore, too autocratic in a seminar experience that should be as participatory as possible.

For those of you who have not experienced the method, let me borrow heavily from those who have had more experience than I in teaching cases.

Learning With Cases

A case is a narrative of an actual, or realistic, problem that typically portrays policy makers confronted with the need to make a decision. Teaching cases present information, but not analysis; your task is to supply the latter, as well as to advocate a solution. Moreover, unlike the assignments to which your are probably accustomed, and which tend to be relatively solitary exercises, we will use in-class discussion to develop a solution to the problem posed in the case.

You should find case learning an enjoyable and active experience. But unless you have used cases in other courses, you may find that you need to learn some new skills. Studying cases may seem frustrating. Like the situations face by real policy makers, information provided in the case may be ambiguous, complex, or incomplete. Generally a case has no single "correct" answer; there are only choices, some better, some worse, and all open for discussion and interpretation.

Class discussion of cases may appear intimidating to some of you, and working together in a group to solve a problem may be unfamiliar to many of you. Learning with cases also involves your active participation. Unlike traditional lectures, where the material is presented by the professor and may find its way to your notebook with little conscious intervention on you part, case discussion demands your ideas and participation. Rather than being a passive "desk potato," just observing the knowledge transmission process, cases require you to learn by doing analysis and recommending action.

(Adapted from Dr. Brian Mandell, Harvard University, International Mediation Syllabus, Spring 1994.)

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Case Discussion

At the heart of learning from cases is their discussion in class. This is a collective exercise. You might think of the class as a team of professional colleagues, perhaps a group of government ministers of a departmental working group, that has been asked to work together on a problem.

1. Be prepared to present your ideas forcefully, and to support them with as much care and persuasion as you can. At the same time, be equally prepared to listen to the comments of your classmates, and to treat others with respect. This is not shock radio; name calling and other incivilities are not acceptable. Keep an open mind, and do not hesitate to incorporate the ideas of other students, or to change your mind.

2. Do not wait too long to get involved in discussion. The longer you wait to participate, the harder it is likely to seem to become involved. I may call on you at any time, or ask you to play the role of a particular actor in the case.

3. If you want to raise an issue that is completely different from the one the class is discussing, consider waiting until the class is ready to move to another issue. Alternatively, if you feel that you need to interject your point (particularly if you feel the class is moving off onto a tangent) try to do so by linking your comments to those of others.

4. Do not hesitate to admit confusion, ask for clarification, or simply be wrong. Most of us do not like to do any of these, but bear in mind that by doing so, you may help the group stay focused on the problem.

(Adapted from Dr. Maryann K. Cusimano, Catholic University, US Foreign Policy Making Syllabus, Fall 1994.)

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Case Discussion Preparation

The quality of a case discussion depends critically on the degree to which you read and think about the case before class and the extent to which you participate in the subsequent class discussion. In lecture courses many students don't read the assigned material until afterward and expect to sit passively through class taking notes. But for a good case discussion you must read through the case at least once and often twice, formulate positions, and the be willing to explain your position and listen to and respond to your classmates' views. Here are some tips:

1. Get a sense of the whole case. Look at the case before you read it: What do the title and headings tell you? Who are the central characters? What is the story about? Look at the study questions. Read the case quickly, look for the broad outlines.

2. State the issues. Ask yourself, what is the case really about? What problems are the people in it dealing with? Where do you see conflict between ideas, perspective, and values?

3. Organize the details, read more carefully. Which details will help you answer the study questions and your own questions? Mark the case so you can find details later. Take notes to help you see relationships. Ask yourself what additional information you need?

4. Return to the study questions. What do they ask you to figure out? What analytic steps do the text and appendices suggest? Ask yourself, what approach can I take to get more meaning out of this information.

5. Prepare to justify, present and explain your analysis.

6. Make something of your work. Ask yourself what you have learned from the case. Prepare to present and defend your conclusions.

(Adapted from Dr. Patrick J McGowan, Arizona State University, American Foreign Policy Supplement to Syllabus, 1996.)

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What I am Looking For in "Good" Class Discussion?

1. Preparation:

Evidence of careful preparation including knowledge of the factual details of the case and reading materials; knows the case story

2. Quality of argument:

Logical consistency, appropriateness of the discussion, use of relevant evidence in the arguments; originality and creativity; and makes connections with course material

3. Quality of expression:

Comments that are clear, concise, fluent, enthusiastic, and civil;

4. Contribution to Process:

Comments contribute to the process of the discussion, such as building on the ideas of others, providing constructive criticism, asking constructive questions, or indicating a careful listening to others, timeliness, and asking constructive questions.

In sum, be clear (speak simply), be concise (make sure every word you say carries its weight and every idea adds to your argument), be logical (make sure one sentence follows from another and one statement follows from another.)

I recognize that class discussion comes more easily for some people than for others. By temperament, culture or habit, some are "talkers" while others are "listeners." Learning to be both is an important goal of this class, and a needed skill in life beyond this classroom. Comments that are not relevant to the ongoing discussion, that are off the point, that are disruptive to discussion, that are insensitive to others, or that attempt to dominate the discussion will not be rewarded! I prefer that you volunteer to participate, but will call on you if necessary to bring you into the conversation. If you are uncomfortable with speaking in class, please come by and talk with me. I can offer you some tips which may help.

(Adapted from Dr. Deborah Gerner, University of Kansas, US Foreign Policy Syllabus, August 1994.)