
One of the most unusual and inventive CIA operations
A good pick-me-up
Robert Fulton's Skyhook and Operation Coldfeet
The infiltration of agents behind enemy lines during World War II
could be accomplished without undue technical difficulty, thanks
to the use of parachutes. Thousands of individuals descended upon
occupied Europe through "Joe holes" in Royal Air Force
Halifaxes and Army Air Force B-24s, or out the side doors of
C-47s. Extraction of personnel, however, proved a far more
challenging task. Usually, individuals had to exfiltrate enemy
territory by hazardous land routes. Sometimes they could be flown
out by light aircraft, like the British Lysander, that landed at
night on makeshift airstrips.
All American System
An innovative extraction method, reportedly used by the British
toward the end of the war, involved the use of a modified version
of a mail pickup system that had been invented by Lytle S. Brown
during the 1920s and perfected before Pearl Harbor by All
American Aviation. The All American system used two steel poles,
set 54 feet apart, with a transfer line strung between them. An
aircraft approached the ground station in a gentle glide of 90
mph, while a flight mechanic paid out a 50-foot steel cable. As
the aircraft pulled up, a four-finger grapple at the end of the
cable engaged the transfer rope, shock absorbers cushioned the
impact, and then the flight mechanic winched the mail pouch on
board.(1)
In July 1943, the need to rescue airmen from difficult terrain
led to tests of this system by the Army Air Forces. Initial
results, using instrumented containers, were not promising. The
instruments recorded accelerations in excess of 17 g's following
the pickup, a force far in excess of what the human body could
tolerate. Changes in the transfer line and modifications in the
parachute harness, however, brought this down to a more
acceptable 7 g's. The first live test, with a sheep, failed when
the harness twisted and strangled the animal. On subsequent tests
other sheep fared better.
Lt. Alex Doster, a paratrooper, volunteered for the first human
pickup, made on 5 September 1943. After a Stinson engaged the
transfer rope at 125 mph, Doster was first yanked vertically off
the ground, then soared off behind the aircraft. It took less
than three minutes to retrieve him.
The Air Force continued to improve the system, even developing a
package containing telescoping poles, transfer line, and harness
that could be dropped by air. The first operational use of the
system came in February 1944, when a C-47 snagged a glider in a
remote location in Burma and returned it to India. Although the
Air Force never used it to pick up individuals, the British
apparently did use it to retrieve agents.
CIA Involvement
During the Korean war, CIA became interested in the All American
system. In the spring and summer of 1952, CIA tried to establish
a resistance network in Manchuria. Civil Air Transport (CAT), its
air proprietary, dropped agents and supplies into Kirin Province
as part of a project known to the pilots as Operation Tropic. The
All American system seemed to answer the problem of how to bring
people out of Manchuria.
In the fall of 1952, CAT pilots in Japan made a number of static
pickups, then successfully retrieved mechanic Ronald E. Lewis. On
the evening of 29 November 1952, a CAT C-47 with CIA officers
John T. Downey and Richard G. Fecteau departed Seoul for Kirin
Province, intending to pick up members of a team that had been
inserted the previous July.
Photo: Robert E. Fulton, inventor of Skyhook. (Credit: Robert E.
Fulton) (226k)
But a double agent had betrayed the team, and the Chinese shot
down the C-47 as it came in for the pickup, killing the pilots
and capturing the CIA officers. Fecteau was not released until
December 1971; Downey was freed in March 1973.(2)
A Remarkable Inventor
Robert Edison Fulton, Jr., a talented inventor, had observed a
demonstration of the All American system in London after World
War II. He believed that he could do better, although at the time
he was busy formulating plans for a flying automobile.
Fulton may have been a collateral descendant of the steamboat
inventor, but he never bothered to check the genealogical
connection. Moreover, Edison had been a family name long before
it became associated with the famous inventor. Nonetheless, with
Fulton and Edison as part of his name, he seemed destined for a
career as an inventor.
Born in 1909, Fulton grew up in affluent circumstances in the New
York area, where his father was president of the Mack Truck
Company. He attended Choate and Harvard, then studied
architecture in Vienna. In 1932, he embarked on a 17-month
motorcycle adventure, visiting 32 countries and traveling 40,000
miles. Interested in photography, he worked for Pan American
Airways in the mid-1930s, taking pictures of the development of
the trans-Pacific air route.(3)
Following the outbreak of World War II in Europe in 1939, Fulton
began work on an aerial gunnery trainer. He developed a static
device that used films to simulate aerial combat.
Fulton demonstrated his trainer in May 1942 to Cdr. Luis de
Florez, who was in the process of establishing a Special Devices
Division for the Navy. De Florez endorsed Fulton's trainer and
provided developmental funds. Eventually, the Navy ordered 500
trainers at a cost of $6 million. Together with a gunnery manual
written by Fulton, the trainer became the Navy's primary
simulator for teaching air-to-air marksmanship.(4)
The Airphibian
After the war, Fulton bought 15 acres of land adjoining the
airport at Danbury, Connecticut, where he built a house and
workshop. He devoted most of his time and remaining funds to the
development of a flying automobile.
Fulton built and tested eight versions of the
"airphibian" and was about 90-percent finished when he
ran out of money. He sold control of his company in order to
raise funds to complete the lengthy government certification
process, but the new owners decided not to continue the
project.(5)
A New Challenge
While flight-testing the airphibian, Fulton often had wondered
what might happen if he had been forced down in inaccessible
terrain. A helicopter had only limited range. The All American
system, he believed, was not the answer. Following the
disappointment of the airphibian venture, he decided to try to
create a more viable pickup system.(6)
Experiments began in 1950. Using a weather balloon, nylon line,
and 10- to 15-pound weights, Fulton made numerous pickup attempts
as he sought to develop a reliable procedure. Successful at last,
he had his son photograph the operation. Fulton then took the
film to Admiral de Florez, who had become the first director of
technical research at the CIA.(7)Believing that the program could
best be handled by the military, de Florez put Fulton in touch
with the Office of Naval Research (ONR). Thanks to de Florez's
interest, Fulton received a development contract from ONR's Air
Programs Division.
Over the next few years, Fulton refined the air and ground
equipment for the pickup system. Based at El Centro, California,
he conducted numerous flights over the desert, using a Navy P2V
for the pickups. He gradually increased the weight of the pickup
until the line began to break. A braided nylon line with a test
strength of 4,000 pounds solved the problem. More vexing were the
difficulties that were experienced with the locking device, or
sky anchor, that secured the line to the aircraft. Fulton
eventually resolved this problem, which he considered the most
demanding part of the entire developmental process.(8)
The Skyhook System
By 1958, the Fulton aerial retrieval system, or Skyhook, had
taken its final shape. A package that easily could be dropped
from an aircraft contained the necessary ground equipment for a
pickup. It featured a harness, for cargo or person, that was
attached to a 500-foot, high-strength, braided nylon line. A
portable helium bottle inflated a dirigible-shaped balloon,
raising the line to its full height.
The pickup aircraft sported two tubular steel "horns"
protruding from its nose, 30 feet long and spread at a 70-degree
angle. The aircraft would fly into the line, aiming at a bright
mylar marker placed at the 425-foot level. As the line was caught
between the forks on the nose of the aircraft, the balloon was
released at the same time the spring-loaded trigger mechanism
(sky anchor) secured the line to the aircraft. As the line
streamlined under the fuselage, it was snared by the pickup crew,
using a J-hook. It was then attached to a powered winch and
pulled on board.
Fulton first used instrumented dummies as he prepared for a live
pickup. He next used a pig, as pigs have nervous systems close to
humans. Lifted off the ground, the pig began to spin as it flew
through the air at 125 mph. It arrived on board undamaged but in
a disoriented state. Once it recovered, it attacked the crew.
Human Pickups
The first human pickup took place on 12 August 1958, when S. Sgt.
Levi W. Woods, USMC, was winched on board the P2V. Because of the
geometry involved, the person being picked up experienced less of
a shock than during a parachute opening. After the initial
contact, which was described by one individual as similar to
"a kick in the pants," the person rose vertically at a
slow rate to about 100 feet, then began to streamline behind the
aircraft. Extension of arms and legs prevented the oscillation
that plagued the pig, as the individual was winched on board. The
process took about six minutes.(9)
In August 1960, Capt. Edward A. Rodgers, commander of the Naval
Air Development Unit, flew a Skyhook-equipped P2V to Point
Barrow, Alaska, to conduct pickup tests under the direction of
Dr. Max Brewer, head of the Navy's Arctic Research Laboratory.
With Fulton on board to monitor the equipment, the P2V picked up
mail from Floating Ice Island T-3, retrieved artifacts, including
mastodon tusks, from an archeological party on the tundra, and
secured geological samples from Peters Lake Camp. The high point
of the trials came when the P2V dropped a rescue package near the
icebreaker USS Burton Island. Retrieved by a ship's boat, the
package was brought on deck, the balloon inflated, and the pickup
accomplished.(10)
Operation Coldfeet
The stage was now set for the first operational use of Skyhook.
What became known as Operation Coldfeet began in May 1961, when a
naval aircraft flying an aeromagnetic survey over the Arctic
Ocean reported sighting an abandoned Soviet drift station. A few
days later, the Soviets announced that had been forced to leave
Station NP 9 when the ice runway used to supply it had cracked.
The prospect of examining an abandoned Soviet ice station
attracted ONR's interest. The previous year, ONR had set an
acoustical surveillance network on a US drift station used to
monitor Soviet submarines. ONR assumed that the Soviets would
have a similar system to keep track of American submarines as
they transited the polar ice pack, but there was no direct
evidence to support this. Also, ONR wanted to compare Soviet
efforts on drift stations with US operations.
The problem was how to get to NP 9. It was far too deep into the
ice pack to be reached by an icebreaker, and it was out of
helicopter range. Fulton's Skyhook seemed to provide the answer.
To Capt. John Cadwalader, who would command Operation Coldfeet,
it looked like "a wonderful opportunity" to make use of
the pickup system.(11)
Following a recommendation by Dr. Max Britton, head of the Arctic
program in the Geography Branch of ONR, RAdm. L. D. Coates, Chief
of Naval Research, authorized preliminary planning for the
mission while he sought final approval from the Chief of Naval
Operations. The mission was scheduled for September, a time of
good weather and ample daylight. NP 9 would be within 600 miles
of the US Air Force base at Thule, Greenland, the planned
launching point for the operation.
ONR selected two highly qualified investigators for the ground
assignment. Maj. James Smith, USAF, was an experienced
paratrooper and Russian linguist who had served on US Drift
Stations Alpha and Charlie. Lt. Leonard A. LeSchack, USNR, a
former Antarctic geophysicist, had set up the surveillance system
on T-3 in 1960. Although not jump qualified, he quickly went
through the course at Lakehurst Naval Air Station. During the
summer, the two men trained on the Fulton retrieval system,
working in Maryland with an experienced P2V crew at the Naval Air
Test Center, Patuxent River.
Some Problems
Meanwhile, ONR's scheme was running into difficulty at the Navy's
highest level, as skeptics argued that the plan would never work
and likely would cost the lives of the investigators. Thanks
largely to Dr. Britton's efforts, approval eventually came
through, but not until late September.(12) This meant that the
operation could not be launched until the return of
well-below-freezing temperatures. When equipment was sent to
Eglin Air Force Base for testing in the cold chamber, problems
with the gear developed that took several weeks to correct. Also,
promises for a support aircraft fell through. All the while, NP 9
kept moving farther away from Thule. "The winter dragged
without solution," Captain Cadwalader lamented.
New Target
In March 1962, the mission planners received the unexpected news
that the Soviets had abandoned ice station NP 8 in haste after a
pressure ridge destroyed its ice runway. A more up-to-date
facility than NP 9, it also was in a more accessible position at
83¡N 135¡W. "With the operation finally about ready to
take off," Cadwalader reported, "the target was shifted
to this new and tempting target." After the Canadian
Government readily agreed to the use of the Royal Canadian Air
Force base at Resolute Bay, 600 miles from NP 8, Project Coldfeet
got under way.
In mid-April, the P2V and a C-130 support aircraft from Squadron
VX-6 departed Patuxent River for Resolute Bay via Fort Churchill.
Captain Cadwalader, the project's commander, had hoped that the
Hydrographic Office's monthly ice reconnaissance flight that flew
between Thule and Point Barrow would provide an up-to-date
position on NP 8; bad weather and a navigational error, however,
prevented a sighting. Still, with the last known position only a
month old and given the general dependability of the Hydrographic
Office's drift predictions, he expected no difficulty in finding
the target. The C-130 carrying the drop party would locate NP 8,
while the P2V would be standing by in case an immediate
extraction was necessary.
The hunt for NP 8 began in perfect weather. The C-130 flew to the
station's last known position, then began a box search at 10-mile
intervals. Hours went by, but nothing could be seen except ice.
The next day, the C-130 started searching at five-mile intervals.
It spotted the abandoned US Ice Station Charlie but not NP 8.
Four more searches failed to reveal the elusive Soviet drift
station. With the flight time available for the C-130 running out
and the weather deteriorating, Cadwalader called off the
operation.
Back in Business
The expedition had no sooner returned to the US when the monthly
ice reconnaissance flight on 4 May spotted NP 8 well to the east
of its predicted position. ONR remained convinced that Coldfeet
could work, but its funding for the project had run out. Perhaps
the Intelligence Community, which had displayed interest in the
scheme, might be persuaded to support the operation.
As it happened, Fulton had been working with CIA on the
development of Skyhook since the fall of 1961. Intermountain
Aviation, an Agency proprietary at Marana, Arizona, that
specialized in aerial delivery techniques, had equipped a B-17
with the Fulton gear in October. Over the next six months,
Intermountain's veteran CIA-contract pilots Connie W. Seigrist
and Douglas Price flew numerous practice missions to perfect the
equipment needed to infiltrate and extract agents. (They later
conducted demonstrations for the Forest Service and Air Force
while training for a covert operation to extract fellow
CIA-contract pilot Allen L. Pope from an Indonesian prison.)(13)
Fulton then approached Intermountain about participating in
Coldfeet. Garfield M. Thorsrud, head of the proprietary, liked
the idea. After $30,000 was made available by the Defense
Intelligence Agency, Coldfeet was ready to resume, with
Intermountain furnishing the Skyhook-equipped B-17 and a C-46
support aircraft for the project.(14)
Photo: Intermountain Aviation's B-17 at Point Barrow, May 1962.
(Credit: Robert E. Fulton) (249k)
The Search for NP 8
On 26 May, the B-17 and C-46 reached Point Barrow, which was
selected to replace Resolute Bay in order to avoid the delay in
obtaining the necessary diplomatic clearance from the Canadian
Government. Carrying William Jordan, an experienced Pan American
Airways polar navigator who had been hired by Intermountain, the
B-17 began the search for NP 8 the next day.
Seigrist and Price flew a northerly heading at 8,000 feet for
almost four hours until they reached the ice station's predicted
position. They then descended to 1,500 feet and initiated a
square search pattern. The visibility was poor--"a
forbidding dusky grey," Siegrist recalled. "It was the
most desolate, inhospitable looking and uninviting place I had
ever seen." NP 8 never appeared, and the B-17 returned to
Point Barrow after more than 13 hours in the air.(15)
On 28 May, assisted by a P2V from Patrol Squadron One at Kodiak,
the B-17 located NP 8. Seigrist circled the station while Major
Smith and pickup coordinator John D. Wall selected a drop point.
Drift streamers determined the wind, then Smith left the aircraft
through a "Joe hole," followed by LeSchack. After
dropping supplies to the men and receiving a favorable report
from Smith over his UHF hand-held radio, the B-17 departed.
Map: Operation Coldfeet, May--June 1962. (Credit: Robert E.
Fulton) (172k)
The plan called for Smith and LeSchack to have 72 hours to
explore the Soviet base. While they conducted their explorations,
Intermountain mechanics Leo Turk and Carson Gerken installed the
pickup booms on the nose of the B-17. Seigrist and Price tested
the equipment on 30 May by making a practice pickup in front of
the Arctic Research Laboratory at Point Barrow.
The next day the mission to retrieve Smith and LeSchack got under
way. In addition to pilots Seigrist and Price, the B-17 carried
navigator Jordan, coordinator Wall, jumpmaster Miles L. Johnson,
winch operator Jerrold B. Daniels, nose-trigger operator Randolph
Scott, and tail-position operator Robert H. Nicol. Cadwalader,
Fulton, and Thorsrud also climbed aboard to observe the
operation.
The weather, Seigrist and Price soon learned, had deteriorated
since their last trip over the frozen sea. Warmer temperatures
had heated the ice mass, causing dense fog to form. The target
eluded the B-17, and it returned to Point Barrow.
After a second fruitless search on 1 June, Thorsrud asked
Cadwalader to call out the P2V. The next morning, the P2V took
off from Point Barrow two hours and 30 minutes before the B-17.
Using its more sophisticated navigational equipment, it quickly
located NP 8, then guided the trailing aircraft by UHF/DF steers
to the location.
Up, Up, and Away
Conditions for the pickup were marginal at best. The ice had a
grey hue, and it was difficult to make out an horizon. The
surface wind was blowing at 30 knots, nearing the limits of
Skyhook's capability. After inflating the balloon attached to 150
pounds of exposed film, documents, and equipment samples, Smith
and LeSchack had to keep a tight hold on the canvas bag
containing the cargo lest it be blown away.
As Seigrist lined up for the pickup, the horizon disappeared.
"I was instantly in a situation," he recalled,
"what could be imagined as flying in a void." The
pickup line and its bright orange mylar marker, however, provided
sufficient visual clues to enable Seigrist to keep his wings
level. He flew into the line, made a good contact, then
immediately went over to instrument flying to avoid vertigo.
Winch-operator Daniels brought the cargo on board without
difficulty.
As prearranged, Price, a former Navy pilot, now took over the
left seat to make the pickup of LeSchack. The wind was blowing
stronger, and Smith had to struggle to hold LeSchack from being
blown away. As the rising balloon caught the wind, LeSchack tore
away from Smith's grasp, pitched forward on his stomach, and
began to drag across the ice. After 300 feet, his progress was
stopped by an ice block. As he lay on the ice and tried to catch
his breath, Price hooked into the line.
Smith watched as LeSchack rose slowly into the air, then
disappeared throughout the overcast. Although LeSchack rode
through the air facing forward, he managed to turn around and
assume the correct position before being hauled on board the
B-17.
Price and Seigrist again changed seats so that Seigrist could
make the final pickup. Smith held tightly to a tractor as he
inflated his balloon. Still, he started to drag across the ice
until he managed to catch a crack with his heels. He lay on his
back as Seigrist approached the line. "The line made contact
on the outer portion of the left horn," Seigrist remembers.
"It just hung there for what to me was an eternity."
Slowly, the line slid down the horn and into the catching
mechanism. As the line streamed along the bottom of fuselage,
assistant jumpmaster Johnson reached down through the "Joe
hole" and placed a clamp on it. He then signaled
nose-trigger operator Scott to release the line. Next,
tail-position operator Nicol secured the line, Johnson released
his clamp, and winch-operator Daniels quickly brought Smith on
board. He received a warm welcome from Fulton, Cadwalader, and
Thorsrud--and a drink of "medicinal" Scotch.
Photo: Major Smith samples "medicinal" Scotch after
being winched on board Intermountain's B-17, 2 June 1962.
Lieutenant LeShack is in the lower right corner. (Credit: Robert
E. Fulton) (309k)
Valuable Intelligence
Operation Coldfeet, Cadwalader reported, produced intelligence
"of very great value." ONR learned that the Soviet
station was configured to permit extended periods of silent
operation, confirming the importance that the Soviets attached to
acoustical work. In addition, equipment and documents obtained
from NP 8 showed that Soviet research in polar meteorology and
oceanography was superior to US efforts. "In general,"
Cadwalader summarized, "the remarkable Soviet
accomplishments in their drift stations reflect their long
experience in this field and the great importance that their
government attaches to it."(16)
Operational Success
Beyond the intelligence obtained, Cadwalader wrote, perhaps the
greatest accomplishment of Coldfeet "was to prove the
practicality of paradrop and aerotriever recovery to conduct
investigations in otherwise inaccessible areas." Certainly,
Coldfeet had been an outstanding operational success. The
recovery of Smith and LeSchack had been especially challenging.
As Admiral Coates wrote to Thorsrud, the pickup had been
conducted "under stronger winds and lower visibility than
had previously been attempted; nonetheless, through the
exceptional skill of pilots and the coordination and efficiency
of the crew, all pickups were made without a hitch, and in the
best time (6 1/2 minutes) yet achieved."(17)
While the Skyhook system provided an important asset for all
manner of intelligence operations, its utility as a long-range
pickup system was somewhat undermined during the 1960s by the
development of an aerial refueling capability for helicopters.
Still, it appears likely that Fulton's Skyhook did find
employment in a number of specialized clandestine operations
following Coldfeet, although its subsequent use by CIA and the
military services remains shrouded in secrecy.
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NOTES
(1) The All American system is best described in W. David Lewis
and William F. Trimble, The Airway to Everywhere: A History of
All American Aviation, 1937-1953 (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1988).
(2) On Operation Tropic, see William M. Leary, Perilous Missions:
Civil Air Transport and CIA Covert Operations in Asia
(University, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1984), pp. 138-42.
(3) Fulton's background is detailed in Wesley Price, "The
Automobile Gets Wings," Saturday Evening Post 219 (17 May
1947): pp. 51-52, 54, 56. He describes his motorcycle trip in
One-Man Caravan (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1937).
(4) Interview with Fulton, 9 November 1988; Robert Lewis Taylor,
"Captain Among the Synthetics," New Yorker 11 (11
November, 1944): pp. 34-43, and (18 November 1944): pp. 32-43.
(5) Price, "The Automobile Gets Wings"; James R.
Chiles, "Flying Cars Were a Dream That Never Got Off the
Ground." Smithsonian 19 (February 1989): pp. 144-46, 148,
150, 152, 154, 156, 158-60, 162; interview with Fulton, 9
November 1988.
(6) Interview with Fulton, 28 September 1988.
(7) Harvey M. Sapolsky, Science and the Navy: The History of the
Office of Naval Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1990), p. 51.
(8) Interview with Fulton, 9 November 1988.
(9) "Skyhook-Aerotriever System: Operations Conducted by
NADU," Naval Research Reviews(October 1960): pp. 18-21;
Leonard A. LeSchack, "Skyhook Retrieval," United States
Naval Institute Proceedings 92 (March 1966): pp. 138-42.
(10) `'Skyhook," Naval Research Reviews (October 1960); pp.
18-21.
(11) John Cadwalader, "Operation Coldfeet: An Investigation
of the Abandoned Soviet Arctic Drift Station NP 8," ONI
Review 17 (August 1962): pp. 344-55. I am indebted to Dr. Edward
J. Marolda, head, Contemporary History Branch, Naval Historical
Center, for a copy of this declassified report.
(12) Cadwalader to the author, 30 October, 1989.
(13) Connie W. Seigrist, "Coldfeet,"n.d. The author is
grateful to Captain Seigrist for a copy of this narrative account
of his participation in the operation. Pope had been shot down on
18 May 1958, while flying a B-26 for the CIA-supported rebel
group that was trying to topple the Sukarno government. The
planned rescue attempt proved unnecessary after Attorney General
Robert Kennedy obtained Pope's release in July 1962.
(14) The operation finally cost nearly twice the project figure
of $30,000 because bad weather led to increased flying time.
(15) Seigrist, "Coldfeet." My account of events in May
and June 1962 is also based on a telephone interview with
Garfield M. Thorsrud, 7 February 1994; Cadwalader, "Project
Coldfeet," and the Robert Fulton Company, "Pictorial
Report of Operation `Cold-feet,' " 23 June 1962. I am
indebted to Mr. Fulton for a copy of this report. The accounts
vary somewhat in detail, and I have had to reconstruct events on
the basis of what seemed to me most logical.
(16) Cadwalader, "Project Coldfeet."
(17) Coates to Thorsrud, n.d.; copy courtesy of Mr. Thorsrud.
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