The other side of the debate
One opponent of most of the suggestions listed above and proponent of a different way of approaching the situation is Larry J. Sabato. He argues that the roots of the problem lie in the fact that politicians need money to get their views out and get elected and that if they are running against someone with twice their funding, they are at a substantial disadvantage. These are the realities of the system. Yes, PACs try to influence the system to be favorable to whatever issue they are working for. Yes, they make safe bets by funding incumbents who have a better chance of winning and in so doing, increase their chances even more disproportionately. Yes, PACs even "hedge their bets" by funding two competing candidates so they may have influence no matter what the outcome. No one says these practices are desirable, but they are the reality in our system.
He speaks of one of the greatest ills being "soft money", a topic increasingly on the lips of reformers of all stripes. The distinction between "hard" money - or tightly regulated money directly given to a campaign, and "soft" money unrestricted funds to be used for general party overhead and basic "get out the vote" drives has become increasingly blurred. More and more, parties are using this money on behalf of candidates and it goes unregistered. Below is a graph indicating the amount of soft money contributions given to parties over the last few years.

His suggestions for reform center on accepting the nature of our society and system and working with it. He rejects public financing as a scheme, reasoning that in a society so accustomed to free speech and expression, people will never assent to having their individual and group associations removed from the system. Similarly, he dismisses notions of spending limits arguing that politicians these days are calling for less regulation, not more. In addition, the old stand-by argument of the First Amendment invalidates it. Calls for bans on all group giving (mentioned by the congressman above) can also be repudiated on the same grounds.
The solution, Sabato says, must "take advantage of current realities and the remarkable self-regulating tendencies of a free-market democracy" (Woll, 260) He says that since the stock market is deregulated, but buyers have full disclosure of all information, they are therefore capable of making their own principled decisions. He calls it "Deregulation Plus" and argues that since a group like the FEC could never police the system adequately and all other efforts have failed or have been rebuked by the impossibility of plugging all the loopholes created by the First Amendment, we should just remove the barriers and limits altogether and ensure total disclosure. He further reasons that if an informed marketplace has complete information, they can decide for themselves if someone has taken too much money from a certain source and will mobilize to demand change. Total disclosure would include all groups involved in political persuasion. Not only PACs, but those involved in pseudo-detached issue ad campaigns would be subject to total disclosure.
Finally, he raises the subject of political parties and their having to resort to "soft money" giving in response to limitations put on their influence over recent years. He gets back to a point made earlier regarding the unfortunate decline in political party power. "Political parties deserve more fundraising freedom, which would give these critical institutions a more substantial role in elections." (Woll, 261, emphasis in original) Instead of lamenting about soft money, just legalize it and let parties have more power so they may reclaim their role as party leaders, fundraisers, and cohesive agenda setters.
Sabatos plan is agreeable in the sense that he points out other plans have failed and hence reform attempts of the same type would be futile. However, these is a problem with his comparison of the political system to the stock market. Those who participate in the stock market are of necessity wealthy enough to have surplus money to invest. Those in the upper economic class in society are generally more educated. In addition, these investors have a direct financial stake in the market and hence intense personal interest in the running of it. All they need is full disclosure of information because in their own direct self-interest, they will find out the necessary information from which to make their decisions. These factors which facilitate the smooth working of the stock market must be present in the political system for all who make decisions in order to make this comparison. In mass society, most voters do not have money past paying bills to play with, are not highly educated, and do not see the direct impact that their research on the system in order to make informed decisions. Since they do not see themselves as direct "consumers" in the system, they are not as likely to inform themselves and make principled decisions. And who is to say that the mass public would mobilize and demand change even if they did have access to the information that a certain senator was "selling" his votes to the highest PAC bidder? As it stands today, numerous watchdog groups such as Common Cause, Public Citizen Watch, and the Center for Responsive Politics investigate, research, and present highly readable information to the public. If this information is not being voraciously eaten up by mass society now, why would that suddenly change?
In a similar argument, Herbert Alexander acknowledges the implausibility of reform attempts getting by the First Amendment. He argues that there is a problem with the assumption that higher campaign costs are leading to excessive amounts of money being spent and therefore require limits.
Presidential campaigns demonstrate that limits are illusory in a pluralistic society with many openings for independent expenditures and forms of soft money The highest value of First Amendment rights is political speech, the kind spending limits would restrict. The bigger problem is how to provide money to enable candidates to campaign effectively, not to unduly restrain their campaigning. Ensuring that all serious contenders have a reasonable minimum through public funding is much more important than limiting spending Campaign reform can and should better the democratic process. But opportunities to do so can be lost in the futile attempt to starve candidates with spending limits that demonstrably inhibit competition - the first goal of a healthy political system. (USA Today, 4/2794)
We definitely have seen the illusory nature of limits as he states, at least when they are competing for legitimacy with our universally revered First Amendment rights. What type of "reasonable minimum" might he be referring to in terms of public funding? This may be better than limits but it has its own problems, as we have addressed above. No one would disagree that campaign reform should better the democratic process, but how? It can be argued that just as spending limits can starve candidates by inhibiting their ability to compete, putting no restraints on this system spinning fast out of control could be just as deleterious. Is not competition equally inhibited by a system which gives inordinate advantage to those with inherited wealth or connections to it? As we have seen, some candidates feel absolutely constrained by the driving need to court donations and remain accountable to them. These conflicting loyalties, to money to stay in office, and to voters to be reelected, are a serious problem. And for those who are not blessed with personal wealth, the pressure is even greater to eat, sleep, and work fundraising if they want even a slim chance of competing. If healthy competition is "the first goal of a healthy political system", ours needs a check-up.