The 1998 SPD Campaign in Germany

David Neumann

Analysis

A new program

When the SPD fell back into opposition in 1982, they thought it would not be long until they would regain the majority in parliament. It took them 16 years to do so. During these years they supported four different candidates challenging Kohl, with different campaign styles and with different political approaches

After the no-confidence vote against Helmut Schmidt in 1982, the old SPD fell apart. New politicians of the young socialists (the youth organization of the SPD) stepped up and changed the face of the old labor party. The party took a big step to the left during the eighties, mostly because of the fresh blood that had been pumped into the old structures. But these changes were not successful in regaining the majority in parliament. After the defeat of Hans-Jochen Vogel in 1983 and Johannes Rau in 1987 by Helmut Kohl, the SPD thought it had the program necessary to win the 1990 election, when the reunification washed over them.

The results for the candidate in 1990, Oskar Lafontaine, were disastrous. The SPD fell to a national average of 33.5 percent. The German voters thanked Helmut Kohl and his work towards the quick reunification and granted him yet another term as chancellor.

The Social Democrats were discouraged once again. "The SPD seemed to have the right answers to the problems of a post-industrial society, but it was surprised by an unexpected renaissance of traditional values like national pride and by the East Germans’ consumer behavior."("New Democrats...," p.139)

The SPD responded to the message of the voters and began a political shift to the right. In some crucial issues the new candidate for the 1994 elections, Rudolf Scharping, adopted conservative positions. The party was restored to the old near-to-center position of the seventies. Rudolf Scharping seemed to be the favorite against Helmut Kohl for a period of almost 6 months, when he led in the polls (maximum lead: 25 percent points in March). During the summer, however, he contradicted himself in public speeches and Kohl caught up with him. This election, even more than others was lost because of strategic campaign mistakes. ("Der SPD-Kanzlerkandidat...")

Scharping lost the 1994 elections by a very small margin. Still, it was a sign that with a pure shift to the right the SPD could not mobilize enough voters to be elected into government again. That was when the new structure of a double leadership evolved. Oskar Lafontaine surprisingly took over as party leader in 1995. He represented the left, the "social conscience" of the party. Shortly thereafter, he was considered the SPD’s mastermind. But next to him, Gerhard Schröder, the Governor of Lower-Saxony and former chancellor candidate hopeful, rose in popularity and made claims for the candidacy. Schröder represented the employer-friendly, business-oriented modernizer, and appealed to the more conservative party members.

For a period during 1997 these two factions seemed to fight a silent inner-party fight against each other. Both politicians declared themselves as candidates for chancellorship in the 1998 elections. Although there was a rivalry, the leadership of two party lines showed that the SPD obviously was able to cope with contradictions, and even to harmonize them. Thus the need to choose one candidate did not seem urgent. In fact, the delay of the decision kept the SPD in the publics' awareness. Party candidacy had never been undecided for such a long time in Germany. It was usually clear who would run for each party a year before the elections. But it 1998, the SPD had realized -- seemingly by coincidence -- that there was a more efficient, eye-catching way to pick a candidate.

A new campaign

The indecisiveness of SPD leaders forced them to search for other ways to choose their candidate. They ordered all the party members not to talk to the press about the candidacy decision, to prevent further pressure. Public pressure built on the SPD because the media began to attack the party for their indecisiveness. Gerhard Schröder, the governor of Lower-Saxony, stepped up and declared that if he could approximate the last Lower-Saxony elections (which was 44.3%) less he would view himself as the legitimate candidate. He declared that if he should lose more than two percent points, he would withdraw from his candidacy.

At first the public only saw this measure to be an act of desperation by the SPD. Although the decision probably resulted because of media pressure, it eventually work out to be a huge advantage for the SPD.

The first German primary

The decision about a candidate had been a problem for the SPD since they lost government power to the conservatives. In short, the party had always struggled combining two contradicting principles of candidate selection: "On the one side there is the political demand of leadership on the basis of a broad plebiscite vote. On the other side we find the traditional and legitimized way of a candidate election on the basis of a right of endorsement by the party leader, and the following decision in the top committees and the public ratification by the delegates at a party convention." ("Die trutzigen Niedersachsen...")

The state elections of Lower Saxony were the first example of a U.S. primary in Germany. "The mobilization of a broad partisanship of the SPD in an inner party decision corresponds to the spirit of the American primaries." ("Die trutzigen Niedersachsen...")

Compared to a primary, the election of Lower Saxony had several flaws.

a) The decision about the candidate was given solely to the voters of Lower-Saxony, thus excluding the partisans in the other 15 German states. It is questionable if Lower-Saxony, with its special problems, is truly representative of German partisans.

b) The second flaw of these quasi-primaries was that Oskar Lafontaine as the second candidate could do nothing for his own candidacy. Each of his actions would either have strengthened Schröder’s position or harmed his own party. "Thus, the semi-primaries were reduced to the question, if Schröder was able to clearly win a home game without an opponent." ("Die trutzigen Niedersachsen..")

Schröder was able to win. He and his party topped their last result by 3.6 percent points and were the clear winners in these elections with 47.9% of the votes. Oskar Lafontaine declared his withdrawal from candidacy on the same evening the elections were held. Thus formally, the decision about the candidate was not made by the people, but by this retreat. In reality, the voters of one state had decided who would be the candidate for Germany’s chancellorship for the first time. Until the Lower-Saxony elections, the campaign headquarters of the Social Democrats had been in the background, and the only action they took was preventing party members from quarreling about the party’s strategy. But after March 1, a new political campaign burst out over Germany, "a campaign like no SPD campaign before" ("Der Königsmacher...").

The SPD and the "Kampa"

After the Social Democrats had lost the last four elections, they had installed an independent campaign headquarters, called "Kampa," in Bonn in 1995. General Secretary Franz Müntefering headed campaign central, which consisted of many experts, some of them with a product marketing background, rather than a political background.

The "Kampa" prepared posters for the day after the Lower-Saxony elections, that were immediately posted across Germany. It showed a portrait of Gerhard Schröder, alone, and read "I am ready."  "As a waste of money, (the posters) were criticized even by Schröder’s aides. (...) Political advertising doesn’t always have to be understood by politicians, however.(...) Campaign-psychology of this kind feeds itself by the experience of the product commercials, and the SPD-Managers show contempt with their new, unpolitical advertising agency."("Licht fürs Fernseh-Volk"). The "Kampa" brought a young, modern, even funny campaign to the German voters, and picked about 25 young people to help them creating new ideas. One of the posters the people laughed most at, was a picture of the sinking Titanic and the text: "Directed by: Helmut Kohl."    The "Kampa" created a whole set of posters with altered movie titles, always making fun of Kohl or his party. (see multimedia-section for campaign spots and posters) Other tactics by the SPD included a more prominent presence on the Internet, as well as public countdowns to the elections outside the local party headquarters.

In March, the SPD made north rhine-westfalian governor Johannes Rau resign from his office. He had been in office for 21 years, and was the last active politician connected with the old SPD of the seventies. Wolfgang Clement, one of Gerhard Schröder's friends, replaced him. The substitution was framed as proof of SPD’s will to get rid of old-fashioned politicians and its effort to become a party for the future.

The conservatives’ campaign: dull and out-of-place

Against the power of the fresh and technically up-to-date campaign, the conservatives' campaign seemed dull and without any spirit. The "Allgemeine Zeitung" compared the campaign strategies of the Social Democrats to the Christian Democrats as "Hollywood versus German folklore movie."("Hollywood gegen Heimatfilm")

The conservatives launched two attack campaigns, both of which ignored that the SPD was reaching out to a the centrist constituency. They accused the SPD of cooperation with the PDS, the socialist party, and cautioned the voters of a "red scare."   This attack seemed completely out of place, and it was easy for the SPD to deny a possible coalition with the PDS. Many eastern German conservatives even warned the campaign managers against attacking the SPD this way, as they would probably lose eastern German voters. The campaign managers retained their strategy.

Other campaign efforts, like the "keep Kohl" poster (which was associated with "keep cool," designed to appeal to younger voters), seemed dull compared to the SPD’s campaign, which was better suited for getting the attention of younger voters.

The official election of the candidate

The personality focused SPD campaign was reinforced by the convention of Leipzig in April, where Gerhard Schröder was officially elected as SPD's candidate for chancellor.

There, the SPD showed, who was the "boss in the ring," "...and did that professionally, as if Leipzig was Hollywood. The convention of the SPD was no convention but a show, an artificial product for a media hero... The SPD celebrated, with almost obscene satisfaction, the essence of their campaign: First be successful, with whatever means, then act politically. And the incarnation of this essence is named: Gerhard Schröder."("Welche Fäden spinnt denn..")

While the show may have seemed embarrassingly silly for all participants and the live audience -- about 600 party members and 2000 journalists -- none of the silliness was transported through the television. What was left of it for the viewers at home, when they watched the convention as the top news at prime time were scenes of a great and important event. The silliness faded as soon as the event was caught by camera. The coverage providedthe SPD another boost in public awareness.

The "Kampa" managers

The Kampa had a large staff, but only two campaign managers were seen often in the media and did not hide behind the obscurity of the new institution. Because of their media presence they were considered the most important men for the SPD’s campaign.

Franz Müntefering.

Franz Müntefering, the party’s secretary, was the official head of the Kampa. He was the campaign manager and responsible for running and protecting it. He gave many interviews about the new campaign of the Social Democrats, which were helpful in explaining the party’s new campaign strategy. "Today, people can develop trust in somebody they see on TV," he said about the strategy of presenting Schröder often on television rather than he speaking at German marketplaces. ("Licht für’s Fernseh-Volk"). "His (Schröder’s) special abilities must not be limited by party bureaucracy. He must be able to keep his openness." Müntefering confirmed that the campaign placed the candidate a bit to the right of his party, for example, by showing him together with entrepreneurs. Within the party, Lafontaine backed up Schröder. This way the Kampa attempted to appeal to the largest possible spectrum of voters.

Bodo Hombach

Bodo Hombach, Schröder’s advisor, joined the Kampa after Schröder’s victory in Lower-Saxony, in order coordinate communication between the candidate and the campaign headquarters. He was especially responsible for the positioning Schröder in the campaign. "The dilemma of the opposition is that you have to win voters that you don’t have yet." For Hombach, the mobilization of the normal social democratic clientele was just part of the job. He pointed out that using negative messages against the political opponent, as well as the mobilization of new voter groups were both important. "Our campaign aims at the ‘new center,'" said Hombach. He wanted to get the voters on the right end of the party’s reachable spectrum, those who could identify with the party just a little more than halfway. "I will not fight with the Green party for one percent of the votes (on the left), I rather fight with the conservatives for five percent," said Hombach. ("Der Staubsauger für die neue Mitte")

The obstacles in running a personalized campaign in Germany.

Over the last few years, campaigns in Germany have been increasingly personalized and "Americanized". However, an American standard has not yet been reached, because the political system provides obstacles against it. Traditionally, German elections focused more on the parties, than on the candidates. This is logical, because the election system lets people vote for a party with their more important second vote, not for a candidate. The overall standing of a party towards issues had been seen as the decisive factor in earlier elections. The Christian Democrats were the first to start personalized campaigns:

A famous 1994 poster showed Helmut Kohl, standing in a crowd of cheering citizens. No party logo, no slogan or any other text was written on the poster; it was just the person of Helmut Kohl who was presented. ("Der Wahlkampf-Christo")

The multi-party system had been another obstacle to the development of personalized campaigns. The victorious party in Germany usually had to coalesce with another party, in order to form the government. This means, that even when the party is running a very personalized campaign for their candidate, the voters still have to consider other parties in their voting decision, over which the candidate has less, if not no influence at all. Since the smaller parties do not nominate a candidate for the chancellorship, they cannot run a personalized campaign at all. Thus the parties always stay an important factor, and a coalition does not consist of two candidates working together but rather two entire parties working together.

As the second part of this analysis will show, by projecting a more conservative stance on the issues Gerhard Schröder and his team effectively raised the importance of the candidate's personality.

The new center

To explain Schröder’s victory solely by his personalized and modern campaign would be shortsighted. His vision of a New Center was more than just a nice slogan created for the campaign. In the last few years, political sociologists have pointed out that there is a new group of voters emerging in Germany, a group with weaker party loyalty.

The newly emerged class of the new center is a very vaguely defined group of people, and concrete information about class characteristics are difficult to find. Schröder himself defines this group as:" (...) people of the scientific-technical intelligence, the cultural elite, but also small and medium large entrepreneurs. By the way: even the typical employee feels as part of the center. And for me, this New Center is crucial for the stability of a society." (Interview in "Die Woche")

Prof. Jürgen W. Falter of the Department for Political Science at the University of Mainz, Germany said about the new center: (The new center are) engineers, journalists, technicians and executives, who make up 20% of the electorate and can decide the elections."("Ab durch die neue mitte").

The reason for targeting these voters, was described by Schröder as: "One can only do something for the people who are not so well off, for example ethnic or social minorities, if one has contact to the productive powers in the country. We have to care about the people who bring in the real economic powers with their scientific-technological intelligence." ("Die SPD kann die...") Since the Social Democrats’ claimed to be the party of the new center, they were able to win this sociological group both in Lower-Saxony and in the federal elections, said Falter. Since this group doesn’t have strong ties to political parties it is crucial for the parties to fight especially for their votes. The most important aspect of this sociological group is that the people in it are opinion leaders of the established center of society, and are more likely to have an influence over other sociological groups and their voting behavior ("Wind des Wechsels").

  Election analysis

  The SPD captured the new center

One proof for the existence of a new center lies in the movement of voters from the CDU directly to the SPD. The SPD gained voters from exactly the constituency that they aimed at. According to "infratest dimap," an election research institute, German voters behaved more like a two-party-system as ever before. The CDU lost about 1.4 million voters to the SPD, many of them in the eastern German states. There was very little movement to or from other parties ("Wahl ‘98 - Analysen und Reaktionen"). In a further analysis, most of the shift comes from white-collar workers, a sub-group within the new center. While the CDU held 38% of the white-collar voters in 1994, they fell to 31% in 1998, and the SPD jumped to 41%. These numbers seem to confirm that the SPD was able to capture the voters they aimed for; and by capturing voters of the new center won support from opinion leaders throughout German society.

Important factors in the elections

In the 1998 elections, domestic issues played a much more important role than foreign policy matters. Of the domestic issues, unemployment was definitely the most prominent issue in the 1998 campaign. About 4.1 million people are unemployed in Germany with a national unemployment rate above 10%. Schröder was viewed as more able, with his good relations to employers and employees, to remedy the unemployment problem. In an exit poll sample 42% said they trusted Schröder and his party to provide more jobs while only 24% thought so about the CDU. In a more general question, 36% thought that the SPD would be able to fix existing problems in Germany, while only 32% thought this way about the conservatives. The unemployed themselves also trusted Schröder more than Kohl to provide them with jobs. 44% of them voted for the SPD, while only 23% for the CDU. With the unemployment question being the most important in this campaign, the conservatives, who generally used to be seen as more competent on economic questions, suffered a decisive defeat.

However, there was no direct correlation between the unemployment rate and the result for the SPD. As the map shows, the voters in the state with the highest unemployment rate, Saxony-Anhalt, gave the SPD fewer votes than the SPD’s national average.

The eastern Germans

While party loyalty in the western part of Germany is usually very strong, the eastern Germans don’t have a tradition. The 1998 election was only the third time they had voted for the German parliamentary elections . The eastern voters therefore switching parties more often, and are more influenced by short-term developments and the personalities of the politicians. Radical changes are more likely to happen in these states. For this reason, Schröder was the ideal candidate in the eastern part of Germany. The Christian Democrats received their worst losses in these states, ranging from a loss of 7.3% points in Brandenburg to a 15.3% point loss in Saxony. In the western states the losses for the conservatives ranged from 3.5% points (Bavaria) to 7.2% points (Lower-Saxony).

The east Germans, who had saved Kohl’s chancellorship in the 1990 and 1994 elections turned their back on him this time and let the CDU’s percentages drop below 30% in all the eastern states except for Saxony. The Social Democrats also managed this time to win their traditional voting constituency of the western states as well as blue-collar workers in the East. Back in 1994, the CDU managed to win more votes from this constituency than the SPD. This time 40% of the blue-collar workers voted for the SPD in the eastern states, while only 25% of them voted for the CDU. (see chart). (insert blue_col.gif)

The 1998 election also confirmed the impression that party alignments in East Germany are not developing as quickly as some had thought. Just as it seemed safe to declare Saxony the most conservative state in the east, the CDU lost 15.3%, more than in any other state. "In the east of Germany, party alignments are less, and thus, present influences and personalities play a more important role. Inevitably, changes are stronger and happen in a shorter time." ("Schäuble wäre besser...")

Other indicators

The CDU, however, was able to hold on to their traditional voter constituency, the catholic voters with a strong connection to the church as well as voters over 60. But the SPD reduced the conservative margin of support. The Social Democrats were able to win a large and important section of the constituency, the age group between 25-59. In all of these age groups, the SPD significantly beat the conservatives. The turnover was extremely strong in the age group between 45 and 59, especially among women. Surprisingly, the SPD was only able to capture the youngest voters (age 18-24) by a small margin, 36% versus 32%. But since this age group does not make up the New Center, one could argue that the voters younger than 25 were not targeted by the SPD’s campaign. It is probable that the near-center position of Schröder was not appealing to the young voters, who then moved to the right and left.

The gender of the voters did not have significant influence for the result. Male voters were more attracted to parties on the right, but only by a very small margin.

"Wechselwähler" and non-voters

Analysts at the German election research institute "Forschungsgruppe Wahlen" explained Schröder's clear victory by his sympathetic appeal to the "Wechselwähler," the voters who switch parties in almost each election. "With his profile as a candidate of the center, (Schröder) has eased the decision to vote for the SPD and against Helmut Kohl, especially for a big part of the ‘Wechselwähler’ of the middle class" ("Schäuble wäre besser..."). "Helmut Kohl was not the right candidate for this election. He wasn’t trusted to solve the tasks of the future; the more agile and most of all more sympathetic candidate was Gerhard Schröder".("Schäuble wäre besser gewesen...")

Another important reason for the SPD victory was their mobilization of non-voters. They gained 1,350,500 votes from people who did not go to the polls in 1994. This absolute number equals 2.2% of all eligible voters ("Wahl ‘98 - Analysen und Reaktionen"). The SPD managed to get almost as much - 1,150,000 voters (1.9%) - directly from people who voted for the CDU in 1994. Of this overall number, 450,000 were gained by the SPD from voters in the Eastern part of Germany, although these voters only represent a fifth of all voters.

Additionally, the Social Democrats won 265,000 (0.44%) former Green Party voters.

The CDU, however, in spite of the higher voter turnout, lost an absolute number of 224,000 (0.37%) to the non-voters.

Conclusion

The 1998 German elections can be viewed as a milestone in terms of Americanization of the German campaign style. Personalization of the campaign, initiated by the Christian Democrats, was topped by the almost non-political style of the SPD. Never before have campaigns been conducted in such a similar fashion as product advertising, devoid of traditional political content. The campaign style had a major influence in helping the SPD to hold the lead in the race until the end. On the other hand, their victory was helped by the poor campaign of the Christian Democrats, who started off in a traditional, but wrong way (running a typical left vs. right policy campaign) and were not able to readjust later. Schröder’s focus on personality provided little opportunity for the CDU to attack, especially since the CDU built a campaign strictly along party-lines.

Apart from their new campaign, SPD introduced a "primary" for the candidate decision, an instrument, which was formally not implemented in the decision process. If they want to hold on to that decision type, the SPD will have to work out other ways, because state elections does not serve as a substitute for a national primary. The pressure to build a campaign may excuse the party, but it they should not repeat this practice, as it deteriorates the democratic meaning of state elections.

The "Kampa" will continue its work throughout the legislative term and will try to position the candidate and the party slightly relative to each other, so that the SPD can continue to reach a larger spectrum of voters. ("Vollzeit-Kampagne")

The 1998 election represented a depoliticalization of the electoral process. It will be very interesting to see if this development will continue in the 2002 elections; especially to watch how the Christian democrats react to their campaign failure of 1998. By then, the people of Germany will know the real meaning of the New Center.